



Humanitarian Aid  
and Civil Protection

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# End term Evaluation for Drought Cash Transfer Program

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## Final Evaluation Report

BY



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## Acronyms

ASALs	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
BRC	British Red Cross
CBA	Community Based Targeting Approach
CSI	Coping Strategies Index
CTP	Cash Transfer Project
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
HAP	Humanitarian Action Plan
HDD	Household Dietary diversity
KAP	Knowledge Attitude and Practice
KII	Key Informant Interview
KRCS	Kenya Red Cross Society
MSC	Most Significant Change
NDMA	National Drought Management Agency
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
SRA	Short Rains Assessment
TOR	Terms of Reference

## Executive Summary

### Background

This report presents findings of the final evaluation of the ECHO funded project, enabling resilience to the drought situation for the most vulnerable households in Kenya, through Unconditional Cash Transfers. The project was implemented in the backdrop of the Government of Kenya declaring the drought a national disaster in February 2017. The 23 Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) were the most affected with 5.61 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Kenya, including 3.4 million people who were food insecure. The project worked in seven of the 23 ASALs areas namely: Garissa, Isiolo, Marsabit, Samburu, Turkana, Wajir and West Pokot. These seven counties were the most affected with Global Acute Malnutrition rate above 30%. Together the seven counties of the project accounted for 57.6% (1.9million out of 3.3 million) of people in need of humanitarian assistance in the 13 priority counties of the Revised Flash Appeal of August 2017.

Through the project, unconditional cash transfers were delivered to 25,066 most vulnerable households affected by the drought. Each household received a monthly cash transfer of Ksh. 3,000 (approximately USD28 on the official market<sup>1</sup>). The project was implemented for 6 months in Marsabit, 5 months in Wajir, Garissa, Isiolo, and Samburu, and 4 months in West Pokot and Turkana. For Marsabit, the project had additional complementary community based nutrition and hygiene promotion elements. Cash was delivered through two means: cash-in-envelope system using cash vendors in Marsabit, and the mobile money system called MPESA operated by the mobile network provider, Safaricom.

The evaluation had a broad objective, which aimed to assess project's achievements, lessons learned, and recommendations for future actions. The evaluation determined the extent to which the project was relevant, efficient, effective and sustainable.

### Methodology

The evaluation used qualitative and quantitative methods in data collection and analysis. Quantitative methods included a household survey covering 2696 households across all seven counties, secondary data analysis of the Post Distribution Monitoring datasets, and an online survey questionnaire for members of cash coordination committees at national and county levels. Qualitative methods were: 1) Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with project staff, stakeholders, members of cash coordination committees, traders, chiefs and MPESA agents; 2) Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and volunteers; and 3) Most Significant Change stories with beneficiaries. The key limitation of the evaluation was the absence of a baseline specific for beneficiaries of the cash transfer resulting in probable underestimation of projects impact.

### Findings

The evaluation found many positives with the project. The evaluation found the CTP relevant to the needs of beneficiaries and aligned to the county government humanitarian response plans and targets. Cash than in-kind transfers was the most preferred mode of addressing drought induced food deficits among all stakeholders. The processes for beneficiary selection were efficient resulting in insignificant inclusion and exclusion errors. Its success enabled the CTP to protect the integrity of community relations and community based social safety nets. For example, beneficiaries of the CTP were not excluded from other support such as general food aid but were of course excluded from other targeted food assistance. Furthermore, the project was well coordinated within the humanitarian sector, with

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/>,

KRCS sharing the 4W's of the project in County Steering Groups and cash sector groups. KRCS' ability to negotiate a contract with Safaricom that Zero Rated Bulk Payment transfers to beneficiaries as well as offered a direct portal to transfer money to beneficiaries on the Safaricom's MPESA platform was commendable as it improved efficiency of the project. Furthermore, KRCS's organisational structure, with offices in every county, CTP officers and volunteers in communities, provided significant staffing at low start-up cost to the project. While numbers at county level were sufficient, cash transfer and programming skills thinned out as one moved from national staff to county staff and to volunteers. Significant capacity building was required for staff at county and community level for them to acquire adequate skills to implement and support coordination of cash transfer projects. The evaluation also noted that head office staff were stretched with staff allocated for the CTP also managing other projects.

We noted effects of the CTP on increasing food consumption and reducing negative coping strategies by beneficiary households. Majority of the cash transfer, 76% was spent on food. Women noted how the cash transfer had empowered them to make decisions in the household and improved their confidence. Interestingly, the cash transfer reduced inter-tribal conflicts between the Turkanas and Pokots because the cash increased transfer increased food availability at household level therefore negating the need to for raiding each other. Traders and MPESA agents recorded increased sales and income during the cash transfer period, although traders felt they could have benefited more had they been given enough information about the project to help them plan their stocking. Another interesting finding was how the cash transfer had improved the credit worthiness of beneficiaries. Whereas they were not receiving credit prior to the project because they had small herds of livestock, their access to a predictable income through the cash transfer, guaranteed repayment of debts. Thus, a significant portion of beneficiaries was able to borrow food on credit to smoothen consumption or in some cases free up savings to purchase small livestock (goats and chickens). Sadly, some beneficiaries were left in debt because neither they nor the traders knew when the project was ending. Other beneficiaries invested the part of the transfer combined with savings from their other income sources to purchase small livestock or start small businesses. We spoke to a widow in Isiolo who sacrificed her first transfer buy on-layers so she could use proceeds from the eggs to purchase food as well as protect herself from the consumption shock once the cash transfer stopped. Another man in Turkana used part of the money to start a vegetable garden from which he was selling vegetables to surrounding communities. A group of women in Turkana had started table-banking group (initially saving KSH500/month<sup>2</sup>), which has since been registered with the social services.

Despite the many benefits we observed, the CTP had insignificant effect on dietary diversity and was unable to meet its outcome targets in the log frame. The extent of impact of the CTP was undermined by several factors. The value of the transfer of KSH3,000 was below the MEB, which meant households could not purchase the required amount and variety of food to achieve the project objectives. Although the reduction of the transfer value from the planned KSH5,000 to KSH3,000 was to align with the government rate, the reduction compromised achievement of project targets. The value of transfer was also affected by steep seasonal increases in prices of main food commodities in November 2017 and January 2018, which diminished the amount and quality food that beneficiaries could purchase. In some communities, beneficiaries had to spend between 13-33% of the transfer on transport to reach MPESA agents and the market. While market assessments would have informed of the feasibility of a CTP or approaches to stimulate market access by beneficiaries in such cases, their absence may have disadvantaged beneficiaries in these areas. Cash allows households to make individual decisions depending on the particular circumstances and perceptions of risk. Without strong messaging around

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<sup>2</sup> This is equivalent to US\$5

food consumption and dietary diversity, the ability of the project to influence dietary diversity was minimal. In spite of the inadequacies of the transfer value there was strong preference for cash instead of food. It seems the ability to get food on credit, which beneficiaries highlighted as one of the biggest benefits of the transfer, spur these sentiments.

In conclusion, the project was successful in mitigating the effects of the drought but was less successful in meeting its targets. More could have been achieved by addressing the challenges mentioned above.

## **Recommendations**

### **Recommendation 1: Improving Capacity of staff**

The following recommendations will enhance the capacity of staff in designing, monitoring and delivering cash transfer projects

**Recommendations 1.1:** There is need for a CTP technical advisor and CTP manager at national level to oversee cash transfers in KRCS. This is line with KRCS' thrust to scale up cash transfers. These will spearhead organisational capacity development and improve KRCS' "cash readiness".

**Recommendation 1.2:** All volunteers working on cash transfers need to receive significant training on monitoring and implementation of cash transfers instead of the short orientation process for a specific cash transfer project. If recommendation 1.1 above is implemented this training can be implemented in house.

### **Recommendation 2: Enhancing Value for Money**

The following recommendations are aimed at improving the cost efficiency of KRCS' cash transfer projects.

**Recommendation 2.1:** KRCS needs to develop unit costs for cash transfer support activities. This will support appropriate costing of support activities at budgeting stage. Support activities include targeting and verification, encashment, PDMs and complaints reporting and feedback processes.

**Recommendation 2.2:** KRCS needs to ensure volunteers for a similar project are based within localities of the project.

### **Recommendation 3: Improvements to PDMs**

PDMs had several deficiencies that need to be re-looked:

**Recommendation 3.1:** PDMs need to collect the following additional information

- a) Sales of traders to measure the multiplier effect of the cash transfer
- b) Price monitoring should include all main food commodities purchased by beneficiaries or that constitute the food basket for the typical household in ASAL.
- c) It is important for PDMs to also measure the impact of the cash transfer on livestock ownership
- d) Distances travelled by beneficiaries to cash out, receive cash, or get to the market and back home.
- e) Indebtedness of beneficiaries.

### **Recommendation 4: Measurement of results**

**Recommendation 4.1:** KRCS needs to ensure a baseline undertaken of beneficiaries receiving the cash. This can be undertaken as part of the verification exercise.

**Recommendation 4.2:** It is recommended that KRCS consider longer periods of training to ensure volunteers grasp the concepts in data collection.

### **Recommendation 5: Improving market assessments and feasibility studies**

**Recommendations 5.1:** It is recommended that KRCS should make it mandatory for market assessments to be undertaken prior to any cash distribution-taking place. This forms good and mandatory practice in cash transfer programming.

**Recommendation 5.2:** Within markets assessment, KRC should explore options of supporting mobile vendors who have capacity to supply goods to participate in Food and Non-Food items fares. This includes exploring propositions to community leaders to work closely with KRCS and the vendors to introduce an open markets days system that will benefit not only KRCS beneficiaries but the wider community as well. In budgets, advertisement costs, including vendor support costs (transport and fares logistics) will have to be included.

**Recommendation 5.3:** In future, we recommend that KRCS' design including the assessments that lead to it should consider such aspects, which might negate an otherwise crucial response.

**Recommendation 5.4:** There is need to formalise the arrangements of alternates there is need to formalise these arrangements through a written agreement that is signed by both parties.

### **Recommendation 6: Improving verification processes**

**Recommendation 6.1:** It is recommended that KRCS plan for between one month to one month and a half for the targeting and verification process, which will enable volunteers to do a thorough exercise of verifying beneficiary details.

### **Recommendation 7: Improving targeting processes**

**Recommendation 7.1:** KRCS should develop scenario planning to provide boundaries for modifications and a system of approval for modifications to the Community Based Targeting Approach (CBA).

**Recommendations 7.2:** To dilute the influence of chiefs in selection of beneficiaries KRCS volunteers should be part of the village committee that undertakes the initial selection of beneficiaries as opposed to excluding the chiefs.

### **Recommendation 8: Improving complaints reporting, recording and response**

**Recommendation 8.1:** KRCS should consider multi-lingual access at the call centre to enable more beneficiaries access the toll free line.

**Recommendation 8.2:** KRCS should develop complaints registration form to be used by community leaders to record all complaints made to them.

### **Recommendation 9: Supporting achievement of outcome results**

**Recommendation 9.1:** The KRCS is recommended to continue discussions on cash transfer value with the government and in the Cash Coordination meetings.

**Recommendation 9.2:** It is recommended that KRCS develop communication messages and strategy for their delivery. This should be complimented with adequate training of volunteers.

**Recommendation 9.3:** The evaluation team suggests that KRCS should develop an exit strategy and communicate with all stakeholders about project timelines including when the assistance will terminate.

## 1 Introduction

This report presents the final deliverable for the End of Project Evaluation of the ECHO funded project, enabling resilience to the drought situation for the most vulnerable households in Kenya, through Unconditional Cash Transfers. The project was financed by ECHO through the British Red Cross and implemented by the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) in seven counties of Kenya namely: Marsabit, Wajir, Garissa, Isiolo, Samburu, West Pokot and Turkana.

## 2 Background<sup>3</sup>

### 2.1 Evaluation Context

In Kenya, major droughts occur in about every 10 years, with moderate droughts occurring every 3 to 4 years, mostly in the 23 Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs)<sup>4</sup>. The ASALs have the lowest development indicators and the highest incidence of poverty in the Country. The pastoralist and agro-pastoralists communities in the ASAL regions of Kenya are exposed to food insecurity caused by high livestock mortality resulting from acute shortage of rains and consequent lack of pasture for livestock<sup>5</sup>.

The Government of Kenya declared drought a national disaster on the 10 February 2017 and a humanitarian Flash Appeal was launched in March 2017. By May 2017, there were 5.61 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Kenya, including 3.4 million people who were food insecure. During that period, about 2.6 million people faced severe food insecurity, of whom 500,000 were already in Emergency (IPC Phase 4<sup>6</sup>), and 800,000 people faced Stressed (IPC Phase 2) food security. Household purchasing power had been compromised, limiting access to food by the affected communities<sup>7</sup>. Most staple food commodities within the local markets were out of reach of many people. For instance, maize prices in August 2017 were 60 per cent above the five-year average in most of the counties that are within the ASALs. Furthermore, during the same period livestock prices within the ASALs had declined by up to 40 per cent. The combination of low household incomes and high staple food prices had significantly reduced the livestock-to-cereals terms of trade<sup>8</sup>. Within this background, there was an urgent need to address the dire humanitarian situation that was continuously deteriorating affecting the food security of the population and the nutrition status of children.

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<sup>3</sup> A majority of this section is drawn from the End of Project Report

<sup>4</sup> Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Country / Region: 2016 Kenya Preliminary Drought Appeal, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 2016;

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Kenya%20Drought%20EA%20consolidated%20-18112016..pdf>,

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Kenya%20Drought%20EA%20consolidated%20-18112016..pdf>,

<sup>5</sup> Kenya Natural Disaster Profile United Nations Development Program Enhanced Security Unit 2015, Paul Andre de la Porte Resident Representative United Nations Development Programme;

<http://meteorology.uonbi.ac.ke/sites/default/files/cbps/sps/meteorology/Project%20on%20Disasters.pdf> ,

<sup>6</sup> The **Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)** is a set of standardized tools that aims at providing a "common currency" for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity. This evidence-based approach uses **international standards**, which allow comparability of situations across countries and over time. It is based on consensus-building processes to provide decision makers with a rigorous analysis of food insecurity along with objectives for response in both emergency and development contexts;

<http://www.ipcinfo.org/> ,

<sup>7</sup> Kenya Flash Appeal revised for September - December 2017;

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Kenya%20Flash%20Appeal%20Revision%20Sep2017.pdf> ,

<sup>8</sup> Ibid;

Humanitarian organizations including Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) set in with humanitarian assistance to the affected communities to alleviate human suffering caused by the drought. This project (under evaluation) is one of the initiatives of KRCS funded by the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) through British Red Cross (BRC) to the tune of 4 million Euros targeting 25,066 most vulnerable households affected by the drought in seven Counties namely; Marsabit, Wajir, Garissa, Isiolo, Samburu, West Pokot and Turkana in the Northern and North Eastern Kenya through unconditional monthly cash transfers of Ksh. 3,000 (approximately USD28 on the official market <sup>9</sup>) for every household. The project has been implemented for 6 months in Marsabit, 5 months in Wajir, Garissa, Isiolo, and Samburu, and 4 months in West Pokot and Turkana. For Marsabit, the project had additional complementary community based nutrition and hygiene promotion elements.

## 2.2 Project Description

### 2.2.1 Project Aim / Main Objective

The KRC's ECHO funded Drought Cash Transfer Program aimed at reducing the negative impact of drought on the affected communities in Kenya between April 2017 and January 2018. This would be achieved **by increasing their resilience through cash transfers to reduce negative coping mechanisms, improve their household dietary diversity and increase the number of households that could meet their basic needs.** The project also aimed at strengthening cash coordination and the appropriateness of cash response, providing learning for the wider cash response across Kenya, within the implementation period of the Drought Cash Transfer Program (Aug 2017- Jan 2018) and for future interventions.

### 2.2.2 Specific Objective

To increase resilience among the drought affected communities in Marsabit, Wajir, Garissa, Isiolo, Samburu, West Pokot and Turkana Counties during the drought period from April 2017 to January 2018.

## 2.3 Purpose and objectives of the study

The evaluation had a broad objective, which aimed to assess project's achievements, lessons learned, and recommendations for future actions. This was achieved through determining the extent to which the project was relevant, efficient, effective and sustainable.

The **specific objectives** of the evaluation were:

1. To evaluate the project against the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria of evaluation<sup>10</sup>.
2. To document lessons learnt throughout the lifespan of the Action to inform future programme design in similar crises and contexts.

The Terms of Reference (TOR) provided detailed questions for the evaluation criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability (see Annex 1, Terms of Reference).

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<sup>9</sup> <https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/>,

<sup>10</sup> DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance- Development Assistance Committee; <https://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/2755284.pdf>;

#### **2.4 Geographic coverage for the evaluation**

The evaluation covered all counties that benefited under the KRC's Drought Cash Transfer program namely: Marsabit, Wajir, Garissa, Isiolo, Samburu, West Pokot and Turkana.

#### **2.5 Programme performance against log frame indicators**

The table below presents performance of the programme against log frame indicators.

Indicator	Category/Measurement	Definition	Baseline	Target	PMD 2	PDM 3	Endline	Comments
<b>80% of targeted households who report reduction in negative coping mechanism by February 2018</b>		Coping strategies to be used will include 1. Skipping of meals, 2. Reducing portion size of meals, 3. Reliance on less preferred and/or less expensive foods, 4. Borrowing food or relying on help from neighbours, friends and relatives and 5. Restricting consumption by adults so as children can feed. More will be defined through an "Other" option.	-	80.0%	88.7%	76.0%	91.7%	During the project, households had reduced negative coping strategies. When the cash transfer stopped households food security situation regresses
<b>Average Coping Strategies Index (CSI) score for the target population<sup>11</sup></b>	Wajir	CSI score is to be calculated according to WFP methodology (frequency x weight). The coping strategies to be used will include 1. Skipping of meals, 2. Reducing portion size of meals, 3. Reliance on less preferred and/or less expensive foods, 4. Borrowing food or relying on help from neighbours, friends and relatives and 5. Restricting consumption by adults so as children can feed. 6. Rely on less preferred, less expensive foods. 7. Purchase food and or other items on credit. 8. Send household members to eat	12.32	11	3.81	1.41	28.7	The log frame targets were not met in all counties. Two reasons contribute this. The transfer value was inadequate to significantly reduce negative coping strategies. Second, the baseline figures are county average. However, the project targeted the most vulnerable who are likely to have much higher coping strategy
	Turkana		25.95	24	24.58	52.33	53.2	
	Garissa		26.29	25	41.37	27.5	35.7	
	Marsabit		29.00	28	-	-	48.8	
	Samburu		20.57	19	23.47	20.77	44.97	
	West Pokot		13.6	12	4.08	3.02	44.8	
	Isiolo		16.85	15	1.55	0.25	28.81	

<sup>11</sup> This is given by Total County CSI/Number of households surveyed

Indicator	Category/Measurement	Definition	Baseline	Target	PMD 2	PDM 3	Endline	Comments
		elsewhere. 9. Send household members to beg. 10. Reduce the number of meals eaten in a day.						index. Thus, the measurements could be underestimating the project's effect.
<b>% of the target population with acceptable Food Consumption Score (FCS)</b>	End-line household survey	FCS measures dietary diversity, energy and macro and micro value of the food consumed at household level. FCS score calculated according to WFP methodology and definition of thresholds. "Acceptable" is generally designated as a score of greater than 35. Should be the outcome indicator for all general Humanitarian Food Assistance projects. The target value should be greater than 80%, but may be context specific.	-		-	-	44%	44% of households had acceptable FCS- were consuming minimal acceptable amount of food.
<b>Improved Household Dietary Diversity as measured by the Household Dietary Diversity Score<sup>12</sup></b>	HDDS*	The target is based on the minimum dietary diversity required to contribute to a reduction in malnutrition, a minimum of the following 6 food groups: cereals; root and tubers; vegetables; meat, poultry & offal; milk and milk products; and oil/fats.	TBC		1.88	1.61	2.9	

<sup>12</sup> Measured by the household dietary diversity score (HDDS)

Indicator	Category/Measurement	Definition	Baseline	Target	PMD 2	PDM 3	Endline	Comments
	Average HDDS <sup>13</sup>			6	0.33	0.28	0.50	Dietary diversity remained low. The cash transfer did not improve dietary diversity. Improvements after the evaluation are due to the on-season rains, which have improve rangeland resource, which in turn improved livestock bod condition and prices.
<b>90% of targeted households are able to spend at least 65 per cent of the transfer value on food<sup>14</sup></b>	Secondary data analysis of PDM datasets	This measures the proportion of the cash transfer going directly to the purchase of food. This is the context that the cash supports 65% of the household's food needs based on required daily food basket for the household. <b>This indicator does not measure consumption.</b>	-	90.0%	96.6%	100.0%	-	The target was met. 96% of households spent at least 76.6% of their transfer on food.
<b>75% of targeted households report their</b>	Secondary data analysis of PDM datasets	This is a simple indicator collected on the basis of respondent's satisfaction on the cash transfer meeting his/her household's basic	0%	75.0%	69.7%	54.6%	59.4%	The target was not met. The main reason being the frequently mentioned inadequacy

<sup>13</sup> This is given by HDDS/Total household size

<sup>14</sup> This was not measured during the final evaluation because of the long period for expenditures

Indicator	Category/Measurement	Definition	Baseline	Target	PMD 2	PDM 3	Endline	Comments
<b>basic needs being met</b>		needs. In addition to food these basic needs may include: as purchase of veterinary drugs for animals, paying school fees, saving cash to purchase productive assets among others						cash transfer value.
<b>80% of the targeted households report satisfaction with cash transfer process and methods of implementation</b>	Secondary data analysis of PDM datasets	Satisfaction of the households will be measured against a set of criteria that will include beneficiary involvement in the selection and targeting process, beneficiary communication (response team communicated to the beneficiaries about the response) and beneficiary reported satisfaction level (with the appropriateness of cash distribution).	0%	80.0%	98.9%	98.7%	95.8%	The target was met. 95.5% in the endline survey compared to the target of 80% reported satisfaction with the cash transfer process.
<b>100% of complaints received are documented and processed</b>	Secondary data review of complaints logs	All the complaints received will be logged in. The indicator reviews complaints included and how they were addressed or not addressed. Those fully addressed are confirmed addressed.	0%	100.0%	31.2%	95.4%	93.3%	The project fell short by 6.7% to reach the target when the endline survey results are compared with the target.
<b>Terms of reference agreed for National cash working group and guidance working</b>	Secondary data review of minutes of cash working group	Agreement will be documented in minutes of the National cash working group	0	1	-	-	1	Terms reference for the National Cash Coordination task team were developed.

Indicator	Category/Measurement	Definition	Baseline	Target	PMD 2	PDM 3	Endline	Comments
<b>documents will be agreed at the county level</b>								
<b>Meetings have been held and actively engaged with members at National and County level for cash coordination</b>	Secondary data review of minutes of cash working group	Scheduled meetings held, with minutes that demonstrate specific action plans at national and county levels	0	30	0	0	30	According to interviews with members of the cash coordination groups, meetings were consistently held across all the counties.
<b>Government officials at the county level involved in cash coordination have knowledge and understanding of cash programming</b>	End-line Partner survey	The log frame is not clear on the definition of this indicator. For the purposes of the evaluation it is compounded knowledge question that measures knowledge of three areas of cash transfer programming: 1) market assessment and impact, 2) cash delivery modality, 3) cash transfer effects.	0	7	0	0	7 <sup>15</sup>	All government staff were trained on CaLP level 2 training.
<b>Kenya Red Cross Staff at county level</b>	End line Qualitative Survey	Judging from the end of project report, the measure for this indicator relates to strategic	0	7	0	0	7	KRCS staff at the county level had received orientation on

<sup>15</sup> All key county government staff were trained on level 2 CaLP training.

Indicator	Category/Measurement	Definition	Baseline	Target	PMD 2	PDM 3	Endline	Comments
have knowledge and understanding of their roles and responsibilities in Cash coordination of how to influence government officials and government decision making processes	..	positioning of KRCS staff in cash programmes coordination at national and county levels.						cash transfers and participated in the CaLP level 2 training. Discussions with staff showed good understanding of their role in cash coordination but less were less confident in their ability to influence government decision-making processes at the county level.

### 3 Methodology

A mixed method design, that utilised qualitative and quantitative methods, was used for the evaluation. This section details the methodology used for the evaluation and their limitations.

#### 3.1 Tools and Techniques

Development of tools for both the quantitative and qualitative data was guided by the evaluation questions and evaluation matrix developed at inception. The evaluation matrix is presented in Annex 1.

##### 3.1.1 Quantitative tools and techniques

The quantitative tools included a household structured questionnaire administered to beneficiaries of the cash transfer. Termed the “Endline Survey”, structured interview sought information on the cash transfer process, outputs and outcomes. Mobile based data collection software<sup>16</sup>, Kobo Collect, was used to collect household data. The rationale for use of mobile-based data collection software was the need to undertake real time data quality checks, integrate skip rules, and ensure the availability of data immediately after data collection, as there was a short reporting period for the evaluation. The Endline Survey was complemented by secondary analysis of Post Distribution Monitoring (PDMs) reports generated by the KRC for November 2017 (PDM 2) and January 2018 (PDM 3) for the project<sup>17</sup>.

The second quantitative tool was an online questionnaire completed by members of the cash coordination committees (other agencies such as; Oxfam, Save the Children, World Food Programme, ECHO, DFID and others) at national and county levels.

The tools are presented in Annex 4.

##### 3.1.2 Qualitative tools and techniques

Topic guides were used for Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with project staff, government staff, chiefs, and traders. Topic guides were also developed for Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and volunteers. The Topic Guides gathered information on the performance of the project on the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. In addition to the KIIs and FGDs, the evaluation collected human-interest stories using the [Most Significant Change \(MSC\) methodology](#).

The tools used for KIIs, FGDs and MSC stories are presented in Annex 4.

#### 3.2 Sampling Strategy and Sample Size

Endline Survey: A combination of total population sampling and simple random sampling were used to determine respondents for the household questionnaire. In sites with small numbers of beneficiaries 120 and below, a total population sample was used (all beneficiaries for the site were interviewed). For sites with larger numbers of beneficiaries, mobilisation of all beneficiaries was undertaken. From the gathered crowd simple random sampling was undertaken to determine the respondents for the

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<sup>16</sup> Mobile Data Collection (MDC) refers to the utilization of existing information technology products such as phones, smartphones, and tablets (hardware), and software for data gathering. Instead of collecting data on paper using a pen, which is then manually entered into a database for analysis, data is input into a device which is then capable of exporting directly into a centralized database (which can be done using the Internet or a local computer); <http://www.devimpactinstitute.com/index.php/devblog/item/9>,

<sup>17</sup> The programme undertook three PDMs. The first PDM completed in September covered only Marsabit. The second and third PDMs included all the seven counties. Because of their coverage of the entire project area, PDM 2 and 3 were thus used to inform evaluation findings.

interview. This approach raise bias through expectation of selection to receive cash. To address this potential bias, potential respondents were made aware of the purpose of the visit and that it did not determine who was selected for subsequent rounds of cash distribution.

A cluster based sampling approach was used with the county as the cluster. Random selection with consideration of accessibility of the project site was undertaken to determine the evaluation sites.

The actual sample sizes achieved per county, for the household interviews, are presented in Table1.

**Table 1: Actual Sample sizes for the endline survey**

County	Min. Sample size (95% CI)	Expected sample size (+10%)	Actual Sample size
Wajir	340	374	356
Garissa	348	383	372
Isiolo	348	383	395
Samburu	346	381	435
Turkana	358	394	385
West Pokot	310	341	366
Marsabit	354	389	387
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,404</b>	<b>2,645</b>	<b>2,696</b>

Online structured questionnaire: The Online structured questionnaire was self-completed. It was sent to all members of the cash coordination groups at national and county level. The response rate was low as only two responses were received. As a result, this data was not used in the evaluation report. Annex 5 provides a list of organisations who received the online questionnaire.

Key Informant Interviews, Focus Group Discussions and MSC stories: Key informants were purposively selected based on their participation in or knowledge of the project. A combination of face-to-face, telephone and self-completion were utilised to collect data from key informants depending on their availability for the interview. Annex 3 presents the list of key informants interviewed for the evaluation. Focus Group Discussants were selected from beneficiaries that did not participate in the endline survey. FGDs were held separately for men and women beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. A minimum of eight participants were interviewed for each of the FGDs held by the evaluation team. For volunteers, a select number were interviewed based on their participation in the project. However, this number did not always meet the minimum of eight participants. Participants in MSC stories were identified from FGD participants. Key criteria used for selection was the ability of the story to demonstrate the effect of the cash transfer on food security, future vulnerability to food insecurity, addressing life threatening situations.

Table 2 provides the number of people reached through KIIs, FGDs and MSCs.

**Table 2: Sample size for the qualitative survey**

Level	Type of interview	Respondent	Planned number of interviews	Actual number of interviews	Number of participants	
<b>National</b>	KII	KRCS staff	2	2	2	
		BRC staff	1	2	2	
		ECHO	1	0	0	
<b>County level</b>	KII	County government	7	4	4	
		NDMA	7	7	7	
		KRCS staff	7	7	7	
	FGDs	CSO	7	3	3	
		Women beneficiaries	7	7	85	
		Men Beneficiaries	7	7	62	
		Non-beneficiaries	7	7	55	
		KRCS Volunteers	7	6	43	
		MSC	Beneficiaries	7	4	4

### 3.3 Data Collection

Endline survey: KRCS volunteers collected Data for the endline survey. All data collectors were trained on the tool for one day. It included a run through and explanation of the questions and role-plays. The evaluation team supervised data collection for the endline survey.

KII, FGDs and MSC stories: The evaluation team undertook all KIIs, FGDs and MSC stories. Translation was provided by a combination of chiefs, volunteers or other community members depending on ability to translate the local language to English. There were no challenges observed by the evaluation team in this regard.

### 3.4 Data Processing and Analysis

Data from the endline survey was cleaned and analysed in SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). The analysis focused on descriptive statistics (frequencies and cross tabulations) and calculation of specific indicators of the log frame.

Qualitative data was organised into common themes using discourse analysis in Microsoft Excel®. From these themes, trends in the data were noted by identifying common conclusions and divergent views on specific questions using filter functions in Microsoft Excel®.

### 3.5 Validation

A validation meeting was held with KRCS and BRC staff in Nairobi immediately after the field visits. The purpose of the meeting was to present the evaluation team's preliminary findings and seek KRCS and BRC's response and provision of further information to substantiate the findings.

### 3.6 Limitations of the evaluation

The following were limitations of the evaluation:

- a) the use of KRCS volunteers for data collection had the potential for introducing bias. This risk was mitigated by ensuring a mix of volunteers who had non- and prior involvement in the project for data collection. Secondly the evaluation team oversaw data collection in the field ensuring questions were asked and recorded appropriately,
- b) the endline survey collected data on outcomes: Food Consumption Score (FCS), Household Dietary Diversity (HDD), Coping Strategy index (CSI) etc. As the data was collected two months after the last distribution, findings on these outcomes do not reflect the true performance of the cash transfer. The findings however provide information on the food security status of the beneficiary households at the time of the evaluation.
- c) The project did not undertake a baseline study of the target beneficiaries to determine the project's starting point for log frame indicators. Outcome indicators used the county average as the baseline figure. However, the average can be significantly higher than the food security situation of beneficiaries as they were the most vulnerable in the target communities. Thus, comparing the PDM data sets and the baseline county average figures underestimates the project's effect. Furthermore, it may have led KRCS to overestimate the project's targets.

## 4 Findings

This section presents the main findings of the evaluation. It is organised according to the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. Under each criterion, findings are provided for each of the evaluation questions as presented in the Terms of Reference.

### 4.1 Relevance

#### 4.1.1 *To what extent are the programme activities aligned to the real needs of the intended beneficiaries?*

The project was a direct response to a declaration as a National Disaster of the 2016/17 drought induced food deficits in 23 Counties lying in the ASAL areas of Kenya. An analysis of the project documents, specifically the project proposal by the evaluation team showed that the selected seven counties that benefited under the KRC's Drought Cash Transfer project were considered as the most food insecure with vulnerable people, the majority of which were in need of humanitarian support to see them through the devastating effects of the catastrophe.

Speaking with the KRC's programme manager, the evaluation team noted that County selection was determined using data from national key food security and vulnerability studies undertaken by the National Drought Management Agency (NDMA). These included the short and long rain assessments, the County level Early Warning Bulletins, Vegetation Condition Index etc<sup>18,19</sup>. The KRC also considered recommendations that were in the 2017 Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) for Horn and East Africa, which also delineated the food security needs of the people within the drought, affected zones in Kenya<sup>20</sup>. Likewise, according to the KRC's Drought response management, the IPC<sup>21</sup> that provides detailed geographical information on which counties and districts within those counties were affected most was also crucial to the KRC in terms of geographical targeting. Overall, the evaluation team noted that there was a coordinated approach and a visit by the KRC to various food security and drought response documents including executing their own needs assessment in order to design a contextually relevant drought response for the ASALs that aligned with the needs on the ground.

According to the Kenya Flash Appeal of August 2017, the seven selected counties were among the 11 priority counties for humanitarian assistance (or worst affected by the drought). Together the seven counties of the project accounted for 57.6% (1.9million out of 3.3 million) of people in need of humanitarian assistance in the priority counties. By July 2017, Turkana, West Pokot, Isiolo, Samburu, parts of Marsabit where in IPC "crisis" phase three while Garissa and Wajir where in IPC phase two, "stressed".<sup>22</sup> In terms of Global Acute Malnutrition phase classification, Figure 1 shows that Marsabit

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<sup>18</sup> National Drought Early Warning Bulletin (The Presidency Ministry Of Devolution And Planning) March 2017; <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1700-national-drought-early-warning-bulletin-march-2017.pdf>

<sup>19</sup> Revised Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) 2017 Kenya Drought Appeal, International Federation of Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies; [file:///C:/Users/T440/Downloads/MDRKE039repoa%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/T440/Downloads/MDRKE039repoa%20(1).pdf),

<sup>20</sup> Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Horn of Africa (ECHO/WWD/BUD/2017/01000) - Last update: 20/03/2017 Version 2; <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hip.pdf>,


<sup>21</sup> The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)- 2017; <http://fews.net/east-africa/kenya/food-security-outlook/february-2017>

<sup>22</sup> The Revised Flash Appeal for Kenya, August 2017.

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Kenya%20Flash%20Appeal%20Revision%20Sep2017.pdf>

and Turkana had figures at 30% or above representing an “extremely critical” situation, higher than all the other counties in the ASAL region. Garissa, Wajir, and Samburu were in the critical phase.

**Figure 1: Nutrition Phase Classification, Aug - Oct 2017 (Projection)**



Source: *The Revised Flash Appeal for Kenya, August 2017.*

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Kenya%20Flash%20Appeal%20Revision%20Sep2017.pdf>

The analysis by the evaluation from qualitative interviews suggested the project came at an appropriate time. In relation to timing, data analysed from all counties reflected that before the intervention 51% of the households that benefited later in KRC’s response were eating reduced meals, and consuming less preferred foods (wild fruits and vegetables), engaged in selling of firewood and charcoal to obtain income to purchase food, brewing and selling illicit beer and migration to relatives in town or with a better food security situation.

The conclusion that was arrived at by the evaluation team was that the KRCS’ Drought Cash Transfer program was well timed to assist the targeted people at a time when they wanted the aid most. In

relation to this, we came across one-woman beneficiary in West Pokot who had this to say: *“Thank you KRCS for the timeous intervention, otherwise my children would have died of hunger”*.

#### 4.1.2 *To what extent is the programme relevant to the targets of the county government?*

The evaluation gathered information about how the KRCS ensured complementarity of its responses with the county government’s targets related to the 2017 drought response. The evaluation team consulted key informants at two levels to generate information related to this topic. The evaluation noted that by aligning the project’s indicators to the NDMA and county government food and nutrition security indicators, the project contributed directly to the county government’s objective of arresting the dire effects of the drought on vulnerable families. In terms of targets, information collected from both the NDMA and KRCS management reflected that each county had a database of total geographical areas (simplified to village level) including the estimated numbers of individuals that were in need of food assistance. The KRCS considered implementing its response within the geographical zones where the needs were most concentrated- this was done to align the response with county targets. To achieve this, locations within counties were chosen based on further guidance by the various County Steering Groups that consists of representatives of the key County Government, National Government sectors and Non-state actors that work in the Counties. The allocation of the locations in the Counties were guided by the coordination between partners so that KRCS was allocated to areas that were worst affected do not have any humanitarian support to avoid duplication of efforts (double dipping by communities). This was supported by NDMA officials spoken to during the evaluation as reflected by the NDMA official in Garissa and Wajir below:

*“All the locations that KRCS worked in with their cash transfer project were determined through discussions in the county steering group. This ensured their work did not duplicate what others were doing and to ensure they worked in the most affected communities.”* **NDMA official Garissa.**

*“Yes the cash transfer project from KRCS targeted the most affected locations of this county. KRCS did not come with the locations themselves but we made a decision as the County Steering Groups based on which areas were most affected using information from the vegetation condition index. And food security assessments we conduct for the Early Warning Bulletins.”* **NDMA official, Wajir.**

## 4.2 Effectiveness

### 4.2.1 *Was cash delivered safely and spent safely? Were any security issues reported as a result of the distribution itself or increased cash on the Market?*

The CTP was implemented in areas with varied potential security and safety risks for both staff and beneficiaries. A risk and security assessment that was conducted by the KRCS during the initial phase of implementation showed the following as some of the security risks that could directly affect the project:

- a) livestock raiders- who normally move around with guns and are motivated to acts of raiding by their desire to accumulate wealth- cash program recipients could be a potential target,
- b) general banditry activities, and ethnic clashes (mainly along community borders for grazing land) - again this posed danger to cash receipts who could be targeted to and from cash distribution points.

The evaluation team was then interested in finding out how KRCS mitigated the risks and ensured that cash was delivered safely. The evaluation noted that KRCS was keen in using the most contextually viable, efficient and safe payment modality that suits each of its target areas. A payments mechanism assessment informed the type of payments system that could be used for each location. Discussions with KRCS project staff noted that in addition to security, each payment system was cautiously selected in consideration of: 1) availability of infrastructure that supported technologically friendly systems; 2) accessibility by women, girls, boys and men; and 3) efficiency. For instance, in the initial months of the project in Marsabit biometrics through Compulynx technology was used but was abandoned in favour of the cash-in-envelope system because of the delays it caused. Cash in envelopes was considered as the most secure, efficient and viable option for Marsabit due to the unavailability of mobile network. Discussions with KRCS staff and collaborated in interviews with community members showed that KRCS put in place measures to ensure that risks associated with direct cash payments were mitigated. Information about dates of cash transfers for specific locations was kept a secret to a few staff-communicated only to the communities a few days before they were conducted to reduce cash-in-transit heists. Similarly routes to and from the distribution points had to be varied. This arrangement ensured that the safety of staff who were involved in conducting the distributions was not compromised. When the evaluation team spoke with the beneficiaries, the field officers and the volunteers, common messages about safety considerations were received. Cash in envelope distributions was done during the day and with a deliberate attempt to finish them whilst it was still safe and convenient for the beneficiaries to travel back to their homesteads. According to the Chief in Kupibagasa, Marsabit, the cash distribution points were in central locations that ensured no beneficiary walked more than a kilometre to and from the cash distribution centre. Because of these measures, 98.4% of the beneficiaries in Marsabit felt completely secure during the cash in envelopes distributions (see Table 3). Furthermore, interviews with the beneficiaries and community leaders in Marsabit noted that exposure to robbery or other insecurity was low because the context had limited robberies, and that the community understood the money was for the most vulnerable, stealing from them would bring a “curse”. From these discussions, the evaluation reflects that this method of transfer was secure. Some of the testimonies from the Marsabit participants are below:

*“There were no insecurity or safety issues. This area is one and very rare cases of theft. Because the money is for the vulnerable, they fear God and therefore are afraid to mug them. This is unlike other big towns.”* **Chief, Kupibagasa, Marsabit**

*“We were always safe. Security was not a problem.”* **FGD Women beneficiaries, Kupibagasa Marsabit.**

Apart from Cash in Envelopes, Mobile Money was also used during the response in Samburu, Isiolo, Wajir, Garissa, Turkana and West Pokot counties. MPESA running on the Safaricom network was – the mobile money system used by the project. The evaluation sought to understand how Mobile Money beneficiaries felt in relation to security. An overwhelming majority (97.8%) of beneficiaries felt safe at the MPESA Agent while withdrawing their cash (See Table 3). This was because of several reasons. Firstly, the MPESA system provided for a safe means of transacting for beneficiaries. The requirement for a unique pin number and ID number upon cashing out secured transactions for beneficiaries. In a Focus Group Discussion with cash beneficiaries in West Pokot, one elderly man remarked:

*“MPESA is convenient, efficient, secure and confidential. We received the cash directly on our phones without any other person knowing, and allowed us to access the money at a convenient time and place.”*

Furthermore, the MPESA system was decentralised and agents were located in main shopping centres across the county locations and sub-locations and in most cases, within walking distance to most of the KRCS beneficiary communities. Therefore, in a majority of the locations, beneficiaries did not have to travel long distances to cash out at MPESA agents, as they were available in their localities. In areas with high prevalence of cattle rustling, (Samburu, Turkana and West Pokot), beneficiaries either travelled in groups to MPESA agents and the market or avoided risky routes. Despite these initiatives to safeguard themselves, cash beneficiaries were always sceptical of their security. In an FGD with KRCS volunteers in West Pokot, one of them pointed out that:

*“There were no security related issues for project beneficiaries (in terms of during travelling to and from cash-out points or to and from markets). However, due to the prevailing cattle rustling (raids), beneficiaries avoided certain routes and always travelled in groups (the fear was always there)”.*

**Table 3: Did you or the person who went to the distribution felt safe at the Mpesa Agent/ any cash vendor while withdrawing the cash and spending at the local market?**

	County							Total
	Garissa County	Isiolo County	Marsabit County	Samburu County	Turkana County	Wajir County	West Pokot County	
Not at all	.5%	0.0%	1.6%	.2%	0.0%	1.1%	.3%	.5%
Somewhat	.3%	.3%	0.0%	1.4%	5.5%	2.8%	.8%	1.6%
Yes – completely	99.2%	99.7%	98.4%	98.4%	94.5%	96.1%	98.9%	97.9%
Total (Number)	372	395	387	435	385	356	366	2696

Source: PDM (November 2017), PDM (January 2018), and Endline survey (April 2018)

In addition to security during cash distributions, the evaluation sought to understand how the beneficiaries felt when accessing markets. In a majority of sites, the evaluation team heard from the beneficiaries and KIs that markets were available within beneficiary localities limiting exposure to security risks. In an interview with one trader at Kositei in West Pokot, he had this to say:

*“The market is accessible to all community members irrespective of sex and age, and KRCS cash beneficiaries could safely access the market without any security fears”*

#### 4.2.2 Were any recipients disadvantaged by the transfer system chosen?

Use of MPESA mobile money system, in six of the seven counties, was the most appropriate cash delivery mechanism in the targeted communities because of the availability of mobile network and that it is decentralised and well established with majority of communities. There are quite a number of pre-conditions that one has to satisfy before being enrolled into the Mobile Money system and the evaluation team sought to understand if those conditions affected KRCS’ cash program participants. To receive money through the system clients are required to own an active sim card and have access to a phone. To have the sim card a client needs to possess an ID or passport to facilitate its registration in their name. There are additional requirements for a client to use the MPESA mobile money system such as:

- basic literacy to operate the system;
- access to an MPESA agent; and
- Safaricom network coverage.

Information collated from all FGDs in the areas that used Mobile Money plus data collected at household level reflected that the majority of beneficiaries without IDs, with poor literacy levels or in areas without network coverage<sup>23</sup> were still able to access their money through a variety of measures put in place by the project that included:

- use of alternates or proxies, where the beneficiary did not have an ID to register a sim card,
- use of a relative/neighbour/MPESA agent's phone for checking account balance and cashing out in cases the beneficiary did not own one,
- assistance from MPESA agents and KRCS volunteers to cash out in instances where beneficiaries were unable to read the text messages from MPESA, and
- those without network would travel to areas with network and MPESA agents on agreed dates of transfer, although this arrangement afforded participants access to money it was not without its own limitations as shall be discussed later.

In relation to how payments mechanisms could have disadvantaged the recipients, there is what the evaluation team might term a program design bias. Whilst Mobile Money should be promoted because it is generally regarded as one of the most efficient and secure system of distributing cash transfers, it normally works well for beneficiaries who have uncompromised access to reliable mobile network. As discussed in preceding passages, this also includes unhindered access by participants to the key gadgets (e.g. mobile cell phones) and infrastructure that is required for this system to work to their advantage. For this KRCS cash transfer project, the mobile money cash delivery system was also utilised in target areas with no mobile network coverage or MPESA agents, yet, these crucial elements ideally inform the decision of selecting this modality for humanitarian response. In areas with no mobile network, beneficiaries had to walk long distances and or incur high transportation costs to access their entitlements. This was a great disadvantage to the concerned beneficiaries and was an issue that was raised as a concern by beneficiaries interviewed in Malkagufu, Dela in Wajir, and Naimaral village in Samburu. Other locations mentioned by volunteers and KRCS staff included Lagdera and Mbalambala in Garissa. These areas constitute at least 3% of the project's beneficiaries.

There was another concern by beneficiaries who said, MPESA agents were not readily available within their local markets forcing beneficiaries to again walk long distances or face high transportation costs. For instance, FGDs in Samburu county, Naimaral village, beneficiaries were concerned so much about the distances that they had to walk- an average of 30km return journey to the nearest MPESA agent. In Malkagafu of Wajir County, Chepkachim village in West Pokot and Lagdera and Mbalambala sub counties of Garissa beneficiaries incurred transport costs of KSH600-1000, KSH900 and KSH400-600 respectively per return trip to access an MPESA agent for cash- out. This translates to between 13-33% of the transfer value on transport costs. As a coping mechanism and in order to reduce these high costs beneficiaries in West Pokot (Chepokachim, and Kour) resorted to sharing the transport costs by giving one person their sim cards, pin codes and IDs to cash-out on behalf of other beneficiaries. Although, this practice did not seem to be widespread, it presented risks to some beneficiaries related to fraud at their own local level since the arrangement worked based on trust. Though this was not reported by most of the beneficiaries, there was a risk that some participants could have failed to receive part or all of their entitlements resultantly causing conflict within the communities. This is an issue of major concern to the evaluation team since it looked like the KRCS designers had not foreseen this aspect during their design phase. In addition, though the payments modality selection was informed by a

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<sup>23</sup> Although this was the case, there were issues with this arrangement that negatively affected beneficiaries which we will discuss in the following sections.

Payments Mechanism assessment, there is no evidence on the ground that aspects such as the one under discussion were given serious consideration in these areas. In future, we recommend that KRCS' design including the assessments that lead to it should consider such aspects which might negate an otherwise crucial response.

Still looking at issues that might have disadvantaged beneficiaries, there were some isolated cases, in West Pokot, of beneficiaries being overcharged (KSH200 instead of KSH49) on cashing out by traders in cases where M-PESA agents ran out of cash. In addition the project experienced a challenge of beneficiaries with inactive sim cards (about 125 or 0.5% of beneficiaries) and therefore unable to receive money. However, measures that included strategic partnerships with M-PESA agents to facilitate reactivation and registration on M-PESA during the course of the project limited the impact of this challenge.

As discussed earlier, participants who did not have identification documents used alternates to stand in for them. There were some isolated cases of selected alternates abusing the money received in their phones on behalf of beneficiaries (five cases reported in West Pokot, two cases in Oldonyiro in Isiolo County, and one case in Kupibagasa, in Marsabit County). Though this number of complaints can be regarded as redundant, in future the project's field team can facilitate for this arrangement to be formal. Discussions with volunteers reflected that under this project the arrangement was done purely between the beneficiaries and their trusted alternates. The evaluation team would suggest that in the future, there is need to formalise these arrangements through a written agreement that is signed by both parties. This can act as a deterrent as well as useful in the event of disputes arising at a later stage within the implementation. The cash recipient identification system, which is crucial for mobile money system to work somehow, affected about 13.4% of the beneficiaries who used an alternate according to the endline survey results.

Non-matching national Identification (IDs) information and phone numbers resulted in beneficiaries not accessing their entitlements. This was because beneficiaries would register the number of a close relation without formally providing an alternate. While a majority of these cases were resolved in the first and second months of the project, one area visited for the evaluation (Malkagufu in Wajir North) had about 7.7% of beneficiaries who either received their entitlement for only one month out of the five or none at all. Although the total KRCS beneficiaries who raised this concern can be regarded as low, there is need for future program designs to look into issues like these in order to avoid similar cases recurring for they pose a risk of causing conflict within communities whose effects can be long lasting even after the project phase. Still on the same issue, challenges related to mismatching IDs and sim card registration details or inactive sim cards are issues that can be resolved during verification processes. However, volunteers noted the time allocated for these initiatives to be inadequate to ensure thorough verification of all beneficiaries' details. This was in light of the geographical spread of the project sites. Volunteers were of the opinion that at least a month to a month and a half was required to complete the targeting and verification process. Some volunteers' concerns are captured below:

*“Some of the challenges we experienced of inactive sim cards or IDs not matching sim registration details could have been addressed if we had more time for verification. Because we had two weeks to finalise the process sometimes we did not do thorough job. We would however, aim to rectify in subsequent encashment visits.”* **Volunteers, Wajir**

*“The time we were given for targeting and verification was not enough. Some errors we would rectify later but some remained because we could not identify them.”* **Volunteers, Marsabit**

*“We conducted verification exercises in three weeks. Garissa is too big and some areas were impassable. We surely could have benefited from more time to complete the exercise.”*  
**Volunteers, Garissa.**

Cash in envelopes that was used in Marsabit, had its own issues as well. Some beneficiaries faced delays in receiving their transfers due to seasonal migration in search of pasture and water for livestock while for some localities; flash floods rendered them inaccessible. The evaluation could not ascertain the percentage of those who were affected this way because we received much of this information from third parties (e.g. FGDS and KIs).

Cash disbursement to clients started in August 2017 in Marsabit and in the other counties it started late, in October 2017. This delay disadvantaged the cash recipients. In summary, the number of beneficiaries who were reached by the cash transfer program surpassed the target by 7% (cumulative target against cumulative number of beneficiaries reached). In October 2017, the program surpassed the target by 92% and in January 2018, 82% of the targeted beneficiaries were reached (See table 4).

**Table 4: Cash transfer progress**

	Target	Number of beneficiaries paid							Total	Cumm Target	Diff
		Jul	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan			
<b>Marsabit</b>	4,700		3,445	4,075	6,838	5,810	6,191	2,885	29,244	28,200	1,044
<b>Isiolo</b>	3657				7,162	3,652	3,652	3,656	18,122	18,285	(163)
<b>Wajir</b>	2923				6,721	2,920	2,922	2,925	15,488	11,692	3,796
<b>Turkana East</b>	3511				7,665	3,846	3,653	4,149	19,313	15,644	3,669
<b>Turkana South</b>	1600				2,395	1,199	1,198		4,792	4,800	(8)
<b>West Pokot</b>	1600				3,173	1,598	1,596		6,367	6,400	(33)
<b>Garissa</b>	3628				7,251	3,628	3,626	3,625	18,130	18,140	(10)
<b>Samburu</b>	3447				6,842	3,438	3,404	3,420	17,104	17,235	(131)
<b>Total</b>	25,066	-	3,445	4,075	48,047	26,091	26,242	20,660	128,560	120,396	8,164
<b>% (Client reached)</b>					191.7%	104.1%	104.7%	82.4%	106.8%		

Source: Monthly progress reports (Sept 2017, Oct. 2017, Nov. 2017, Dec. 2017 and Jan 2018)

#### 4.2.3 Was targeting effective?

According to the KRCS documents that were made available to the evaluation team, plus discussions that with the KRCS Program Manager, targeting of the seven counties in the ASAL areas was based on the analysis of food security and livelihoods assessments that determined the seven most affected counties. In each county, sub-counties were selected in County Steering Groups (CSG<sup>24</sup>) based on a combination of food security and livelihoods assessment and state of vegetation as it provides information rangeland resource regeneration important for pastoral communities. Discussions with government staff and county government staff confirmed the appropriateness of the targeting approach for sub-counties. In Isiolo the following words by a NDMA representative suggests that the project's geographical targeting approach was spot- on as it identified the locations that were in critical need of humanitarian support;

*“CSG discuss the geography based on vulnerabilities, early warning bulletins, assessments (short or long rain assessments) look at the areas that are more vulnerable...the wards are ranked. Last year KRCS in Isiolo county targeted three wards which were the worst affected (Sericho, Cherab, Chari, Oldonyiro).”* **NDMA, Isiolo**

At the second level of targeting, selection of household beneficiaries, KRCS used the community based targeting (CBT) approach. The evaluation found the approach was effective in identifying the most vulnerable community members. In all communities visited, there was strong affirmation from both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike of the efficacy of the targeting. Non-beneficiaries interviewed in Wajir concurred that:

*“Selection process was fair and [transparent] but the number of beneficiaries were few compared to the number of households that needed assistance”* **Non beneficiaries, Dela Village, Wajir North**

In a FGD with non-beneficiaries of the cash transfer project in Turkana County, one middle aged woman commented:

*“KRCS involved all community members during beneficiary selection to the satisfaction of all of us. However, we feel the KRCS caseload was low and didn't accommodate all vulnerable food insecure HH in our community”*

A discussion with the local Chief, in Turkana County, also indicated that targeting was effective as the most vulnerable and labour constrained communities members were targeted. He had this to say:

*“The Kenyan Red Cross came at a time when as a community, we were struggling to make ends meet. We were now afraid that some community members especially the elderly, orphans, PLWHA and the disabled would die of hunger. The Cash Transfer Project by the KRCS brought life to the community, especially these vulnerable groups and we are ever thankful for the timeous intervention”* **Chief, Kakong, Turkana County**

Concerning inclusion and exclusion errors, Table 5 shows the opinions of beneficiaries in the endline survey. 92.4% of beneficiaries interviewed in the endline survey were of the opinion that those selected

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<sup>24</sup> The CSG is a grouping of all humanitarian actors in a county chaired by the county executive. Its aim is to coordinate humanitarian assistance in counties.

to receive cash were the most vulnerable. This further demonstrates the efficacy of the targeting process.

**Table 5: Do you think the people who were selected to receive cash were the most vulnerable or needy people in the community?**

	County							Total
	Garissa	Isiolo	Marsabit	Samburu	Turkana	Wajir	West Pokot	
<b>No response</b>	.3%	.3%	.3%	.5%	.3%	0.0%	0.0%	.2%
<b>No</b>	6.7%	7.8%	10.6%	4.4%	2.9%	10.1%	10.1%	7.4%
<b>Yes</b>	93.0%	91.9%	89.1%	95.2%	96.9%	89.9%	89.9%	92.4%
<b>Total (Number)</b>	372	395	387	435	385	356	366	2696

Source: Endline survey

In addition to the CBT approach, there was a deliberate attempt by field-based staff to be sensitive to context specific issues that arose during the targeting process. County level KRCS staff adjusted the design to respond to different circumstances in targeted counties. In Garissa and Wajir, to counter the influence of clan-based selection, ensured the village committee, which makes the initial selection, includes an Imam<sup>25</sup> who is considered as fair by the community. The community was involved in verification of the selected list of beneficiaries. In Isiolo County, to counter the influence of chiefs in the selection of beneficiaries, KRCS staff excluded them from the initial selection process. Community would undertake the initial selection with the chiefs asked to verify the list. Flexibility of the project management in allowing these adjustments enhanced efficacy of the targeting approach. This notwithstanding, such adjustments can carry with them risks. For example in Isiolo, the chiefs excluded from the process of selecting beneficiaries felt excluded by the project. This harms ownership of project activities by the community leaders. Alternative processes that ensure chiefs are involved in the initial selection of beneficiaries is important. This could include including KRCS volunteers in village committees that undertake the initial selection curtail the chief's influence in the process.

#### 4.2.4 Was there any abuse of cash by agency staff, local elites or authorities involved in targeting or distribution?

The evaluation asked questions related to abuse of aid at various levels of program implementation including by KRCS staff handling cash, its volunteers, third part service providers such as Mobile Money transfer agencies including Safaricom staff, and local leaders within the communities. The question was tackled from two angles. Firstly, the evaluation we sought to understand if there were key projects implementation personnel who demanded favours (in cash or kind) during the targeting process as well as during the cash distribution process. Data was gathered and triangulated from various sources including: 1) Cash Transfer beneficiaries, 2) Chiefs, 3) volunteers, 4) KRCS staff, 5) non-beneficiaries and 6) Mobile Money Transfer Agencies. The KRCS M&E team, which operated the feedback mechanism, was also interviewed in relation to the matter. The evaluation noted that there were no incidences of abuse that were detected, reported or noted.

<sup>25</sup> The person who leads prayers in a mosque for the Islam religion.

4.2.5 *Were there sufficient skills to manage the cash programme effectively? To what extent were implementation arrangements adequate in terms of management, coordination and human resources?*

The capacity to undertake cash transfers has been growing with every grant cycle in terms of systems and capacity of staff. At the time of the evaluation, KRCS had implemented six major grant cycles of cash transfers since 2011. Testament to this growth in capacity is KRCS' positioning as co-chair of the Kenya National Cash Coordination task team, which comprises National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), National Disaster Operations Centre (NDOC), World Food Program (WFP), British Red Cross (BRC), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), DFID, OXFAM and Cash Learning Partnership. Through this platform, KRCS has been able to influence development of Terms of Reference for the coordination task teams at national and county levels. In Isiolo specifically, through the platform KRCS was able to influence harmonisation of transfer values to the government value of KSH3,000.

Furthermore, developments in the organisational systems to support cash transfers were evident. KRCS, through a close working relationship with Safaricom, has a portal to transact directly on the Safaricom M-PESA platform, which increases efficiency of transfers. At the time of the evaluation, KRCS was in the process of linking this portal with its financial system to improve efficiency of transfers through automation. Current discussions at the highest levels of KRCS and Safaricom on the establishment of mobile network masts in areas with no mobile network but KRCS is implementing cash transfer also demonstrate the growing capacity of KRCS to implement cash transfers at large scale. While these systems demonstrate improving organisational systems for the implementation of cash transfers, a skills audit to assess readiness to implement cash transfers at scale maybe required. This includes the sufficiency of skills to operate the new systems, negotiating contracts with the mobile network provider etc.

KRCS has decentralised offices in all counties. In each county, a CTP officer was recruited for the project. Supporting the CTP officers were the county management structured that include the county coordinator, administration and logistics staff. Counties are organised into regions overseen by a Regional Manager. At the community level, KRCS has an extensive network of volunteers to support implementation and monitoring of activities. Such an orientation provided the project with adequate numbers to implement the project. In each county, the Regional Manager, County Coordinator and other support staff at this level, support the CTP focal staff. However, in some counties e.g. Garissa, Marsabit, majority of the volunteers stayed in the county centre. This diminished KRCS's capacity at the community level as it had the effect of increasing costs for monitoring and other activities supporting the cash transfer due to costs of mobilisation for these activities (transport and allowances).

At national level, the project required a fulltime and dedicated national coordinator for the project. It was clear from interactions with headquarters staff that they were overwhelmed with the scale of the project in the context of other humanitarian actions managed by the same staff.

BRC Staff also closely monitored the project, concerning project quality and accountability with staff in all departments: finance, administration, monitoring, evaluation, and management all undertaking field visits to support KRCS in various aspects of implementing the cash transfer project.

In terms of cash transfer programming skills, i.e. designing, implementing and monitoring cash transfer projects, these are still concentrated at national level. While orientation of county CTP officers was undertaken, in-depth training is required covering the design and implementation of cash transfers. Capacity at volunteer level is thinner. This is mainly because volunteers were not involved in the orientation by the headquarter staff. At this level introductory training on cash transfers and key

elements of cash transfer implementation were required. Given the scale of the project, there was need for a dedicated CTP Manager at national level to oversee the project.

#### 4.2.6 *What were the recipients' views on use of the cash*

Across all sites visited for the evaluation, beneficiaries appreciated the cash transfer for its ability to provide relief at a time of dire need. The flexibility of cash transfer enabled them to address their immediate food and non-food needs (especially medical bills and school fees). Beneficiaries in Marsabit appreciated the flexibility in making choices when spending the assistance from KRCS that was brought about by cash. The participants had the following in appreciation of the method of aid transfer:

*"The day we receive the money there was a big change. We would use the money to buy food [maize, beans, sugar, cooking oil and vegetables]....When a child is sent away from school because of school fees or stationery, we would use part of the transfer to pay part of the school fees or purchase the required stationery."* **Beneficiaries, Kupibagasa, Marsabit County.**

The same line of thought was reflected in the following words of participants from Wajir, Samburu and Turkana counties:

*"The money helped us a lot. We bought food and paid schools fees for our children...others paid for medication... We purchased sugar and enjoy the sweetness of the tea."* **Beneficiaries, Malkagufu, Wajir County.**

*"Cash provided me the flexibility to meet my food needs and other emerging household emergencies like hospital fees. When given food, it is impossible to exchange the food items with such emergencies like hospital fees."* **Beneficiaries, Samburu County**

*"I used about 75% of the cash I received to purchase food (mainly cereals), and the remaining 25% on other household needs like paying school fees, buying stationery for my kids in school, medical fees and any other emerging needs"* **Beneficiaries, Turkana County**

*"Most people value education of their children, hence you realise that when schools open cash beneficiaries prioritised paying school fees of their children compared to other household expenditures, because they believe that if they educate their children, they will break the cycle of poverty in future"* **Chief, Kainuk, Turkana County**

According to the PDMs, a median of KSH2300 or 76.6% was used on food out of the money the household received<sup>26</sup>. The difference was used on education, medication, paying debts and others such as shelter, restocking and shelter. In terms of the frequency of transfer, over 95% of beneficiaries in the endline survey were satisfied with the frequency of cash transfers as they highlighted the monthly distributions suited their household.

Some beneficiaries wished cash tranches were pegged at a higher value than what they received. This set of beneficiaries lamented the inadequacy of the transfer amount to meet a significant proportion of their monthly food needs. KSH3,000 (approximately \$28 (USD) disregarded family size; households with larger family sizes were disadvantaged. Similarly, beneficiaries in areas without network or MPESA agents had to meet transport costs to and from the local markets - subtracting- subtracting this cost from the entitlements that were meant to address their monthly food and no-food items needs.

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<sup>26</sup> KRCS (2017) November 2017 Post Distribution Monitoring Report: Humanitarian Cash Transfers Post Distribution Monitoring Report Garissa, Wajir, Isiolo, Samburu, Turkana And West Pokot Counties

Concerning the value of the monthly cash transfers, according to beneficiaries in all sites visited, the transfer would purchase food that would last between less than a week to one and a half weeks depending on the variables of family size and distance from established markets as noted by beneficiaries in Wajir and Samburu counties:

*“It was not enough...the money would last me one and half to two weeks.”* **Beneficiaries, Malkagufu, Wajir County**

*“It is difficult for us to say the money was not enough, because as a community we appreciate what the KRCS was giving us. However, the general feeling among community members is that the KES3000 per month was not sufficient to cover all our food needs because of the following reasons; 1. We were using the cash not to cover our food needs only, but to meet other household emerging priorities. 2. Prices of food items are generally high in this area. 3. Some beneficiaries were sharing their food items with their vulnerable relatives who could not benefit from the program. Culturally the community also survives on sharing with neighbours, friends and relatives.”* **Beneficiaries, Marti, Samburu County**

Given few options available to raise income to purchase food apart from selling livestock (mainly selling of firewood, charcoal and domestic work), the cash transfer was the main source of income for food purchases as majority of beneficiaries had low livestock herds. To increase the period the food would last, households would use various income earning sources that included either buying more of less expensive food, purchasing more of what they consider essential (maize and sugar) or more meals but with smaller portions. Others would seek to purchase food on credit using the predictable and guaranteed cash transfer as surety for payment (see more discussion on this in section 4.4.7). Beneficiaries in Marsabit and Isiolo had this to say about managing the inadequate transfer value:

*“Despite the little [money] we received helping us, the money was not enough for all the food we needed. The food would last at least a week or less. Therefore, when food ran out we would negotiate to purchase food on credit from shopkeepers, which we paid back after receiving the cash transfer. The maximum they would give was KSH1,500. They would only give those in the programme [KRCS CTP].”* **Beneficiaries, Kupibagasa, Marsabit County**

*“You budget the food to reach the next transfer...either buy less food and stretch it...buy less beans and mix it with more maize. As a mother you know how to budget...”* **Beneficiaries, Oldonyiro, Isiolo County**

In the endline survey, 40.6% of beneficiaries felt the money was not enough to meet their basic needs. The highest proportion was in Isiolo (68.4%) followed by West Pokot (54.4%), and Samburu (50.6%) (See Table 6). Beneficiaries required at least KSH12,269.84 in Garissa to KSH5,600.50 in West Pokot. The average amount beneficiaries viewed as adequate to meet their basis needs was KSH8,208.60. A calculation of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) by the Kenya Cash Coordination Working Group through the KRCS is shown in Figure 2. Depending on the IPC classification, the minimum transfer value, as calculated by KRCS, could have been KSH5,628 with the maximum at KSH10,555.00. The actual transfer value by KRCS was 53.3% of the minimum at IPC phase 2<sup>27</sup>. Given that the counties

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<sup>27</sup> IPC classification phases mean the following: Phase 2 (Stressed); Phase 3 (Crisis); Phase 4 (Emergency); and Phase 5 (Famine)

targeted by the project were in IPC Phase 3 and Phase 4, the transfer was variably lower – 48.9% and 34.9% of the required transfer value respectively. While it is clear the transfer value fell short of requirements, KRCS had to align with the government transfer value of KSH3,000.

**Table 6: Was the transfer sufficient to cover your household basic food needs for a month?**

	County							Total
	Garissa County	Isiolo County	Marsabit County	Samburu County	Turkana County	Wajir County	West Pokot County	
<b>No</b>	16.9%	68.4%	33.1%	50.6%	22.6%	35.7%	54.4%	40.6%
<b>Yes</b>	83.1%	31.6%	66.9%	49.4%	77.4%	64.3%	45.6%	59.4%
<b>Total (Number)</b>	372	395	387	435	385	356	366	2696
<b>Mean Amount in KSH would you need to cater for your BASIC needs?</b>	12,269.84	8,391.85	7,766.05	6,965.91	8,982.76	11,959.44	5,600.50	8,208.60
<b>Total (Number)</b>	63	270	128	220	87	127	199	1094

Source: Endline survey

**Figure 2: Minimum expenditure basket for households with six members**



Source: British Red Cross, MEB calculation Excel Sheet

#### 4.2.7 What were the views of non-recipients?

The views of non-recipients showed:

- Strong preference for cash,
- Targeting was fair, and transparent but caseload was low,
- The money was inadequate to meet the basic needs of beneficiaries especially with larger household sizes and those incurring high transport costs to markets,

*“Money is better than food you can use it for other things e.g. medicine and school fees... The KSH3,000 was not enough. It can last at most a week for beneficiaries...We were not selected because the number of those vulnerable was small and not enough for everybody... It is OK with those in the project but need an additional number.”* **Non-beneficiaries, Kupibagasa, Marsabit County.**

*“The selection process was very fair. The community-based approach is very effective and should be repeated. The lives of beneficiaries have changed as they use the money to buy the food items they require. They go to the shopkeepers and get commodities on credit to cater for what they need which supplements the cash transfer...The KES3,000 was little but it is better than nothing.”* **Non-beneficiaries, Dela Village, Wajir County.**

*“Cash provided the beneficiaries with the flexibility to purchase what they required, depending on their different priorities at any given time. Moreover, the markets were functional, and beneficiaries could access, whatever food items and other non-food items they required. There were no price distortions created by the cash transfers, and as non-beneficiaries we were not affected negatively by the cash injection into the local economy”.* **Non-beneficiaries, Kour, West Pokot.**

#### 4.2.8 *If both cash and in-kind assistance were available, which option did recipients prefer?*

There was a strong preference for cash among all stakeholders: beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, NDMA, county government and other CSOs. The strong preference for cash was because of its:

- ability to enable a quick response to fast onset emergencies;
- low cost of delivery and less demand on logistics and management arrangements when compared to in-kind support;
- Flexibility to purchase or use on felt household needs/priorities by beneficiaries;
- ability to increase credit worthiness of beneficiaries with traders to access food and non-food items on credit;
- Enabled investments to reduce future vulnerability (livestock investments, micro-businesses, table banking) which would not be possible with in-kind support; and

The following statements from different stakeholders demonstrate these notions on whether cash or in-kind support:

*“It is one of the best intervention because if people are given cash they decide on what to buy. Nowadays people can now own phones because money is transferred through MPESA, improved communication and brought some cohesion...improvement of security as one can call in case of unsafe conditions.”* **NDMA, Isiolo**

*“Prefer cash because empowers the beneficiaries...and therefore better for them...cash is efficient but the money may not be sufficient to buy the essentials and may use it for other purposes... In this local setting live a communal life...if given food they will be sharing reducing the amount of food consumed...cash difficult to share...”* **Volunteers, Marsabit**

“Cash is better because cash you can buy whatever you want to eat. If it food they can bring maize when some are agreed and they cannot eat maize.” **Assistant Chief, Kupibagasa, Marsabit County**

“We prefer cash than food. Cash helps us in so many ways. One can save some of the money to buy books for their children so they stay in school. But, with food you cannot sale. So cash is better than food.” **Beneficiaries, Oldonyiro Isiolo County**

“For cash you are empowered and given an alternative. To some of them getting a book for their children will be much more important than a kg of sugar. When you give cash, they have various options. Some may go into Table banking to save and invest to raise their own incomes. Some may get into tailoring. More options to survive than giving them food. This is why now we are lobbying to move from food transfers to cash transfers for the asset creation project between WFP, KRCS and Government. Cash is more preferred. From 2013, cash was more preferred. Access to food in the isolated areas was a challenge and beneficiaries had to travel long distances.” **NDMA, Garissa County**

One beneficiary in West Pokot County indicated that she preferred cash transfers than food aid because she was empowered to purchase her preferred food items rather than the traditional maize, beans and vegetable oil usually provided during food aid programs.

“In this community, most people prefer cash to food, as it provides us with the flexibility to make choices on how to spend the money, what to purchase, in what quantities, according to our individual HH priorities, unlike the maize, beans and vegetable, we used to get previously”.  
**Beneficiary, West Pokot**

As presented in Table 8, approximately 70.5% of beneficiaries preferred cash to in-kind support. This preference was matched with how beneficiaries perceived cash based responses during the implementation period. Information extracted from PDM 2 (November 2017) and PDM 3 (January 2018)<sup>28</sup> showed even higher figures of 96% and 99.5% of those that preferred cash to in-kind support. The main reason for preference of cash was the ability of households to use the cash for other necessities beyond food such as health and education which are important to address in humanitarian situations. Another reason provided by beneficiaries was that unlike food assistance, with cash you can buy the food you prefer which enhances the relevance of the humanitarian assistance to local context.

**Table 7: If the assistance could have been done over again, would you have preferred to receive food/goods rather than cash?**

	County							Total
	Garissa	Isiolo	Marsabit	Samburu	Turkana	Wajir	West Pokot	
<b>Would prefer cash</b>	47.3%	79.2%	76.7%	76.8%	69.6%	50.8%	90.4%	70.5%
<b>Would prefer food/goods</b>	52.7%	20.8%	23.3%	23.2%	30.4%	49.2%	9.6%	29.5%

<sup>28</sup> KRCS (2017) Humanitarian Cash Transfers Post Distribution Monitoring Report: Garissa, Wajir, Isiolo, Samburu, Turkana and West Pokot Counties. November 2017

KRCS (2018) Humanitarian Cash Transfers Post Distribution Monitoring Report: Garissa, Wajir, Isiolo, Samburu, Turkana and West Pokot Counties. January 2017

<b>Total (Number)</b>	372	395	387	435	385	356	366	2696
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Source: Endline Survey

#### 4.2.9 What complaints and feedback mechanisms were utilized during the project period? How effective were they?

KRCS established several mechanisms for reporting complaints and feedback on the CTP. The channels included:

- KRCS toll free number
- Village Committees
- Chiefs
- Volunteers
- KRCS County offices
- Transparency International, Uwajibikaji Pamoja (Accountability Together) toll free Short Message Service (SMS)
- Regular community feedback meetings

The use of multiple channels ensured beneficiaries had varied options for reporting their complaints. However, according to KRCS, the KRC toll-free line remained the main instruments for receiving complaints and feedback on the project from stakeholders.

During the endline survey, beneficiaries were asked whether they were aware of complaints and feedback channels for the CTP (Table 8). An inquiry was also made on the main channels they were aware of (Table 8). About 59.1% highlighted, they had been made aware of the complaints reporting mechanism. 63.2%, of those that were informed of complaints and feedback-reporting mechanisms were aware of the KRCS toll free line. Only 40.6% of those that knew a complaints and feedback reporting mechanism had reported a complaint. Of these 93.3% had received a response to their report.

**Table 8: KRCS complaints mechanism**

	County							Total
	Garissa	Isiolo	Marsabit	Samburu	Turkana	Wajir	West Pokot	
<b>Were you informed about how you can report problems or ask for help regarding the cash programme you were participating in?</b>								
<b>No</b>	38.2%	50.9%	86.0%	55.4%	23.1%	12.1%	15.0%	40.9%
<b>Yes</b>	61.8%	49.1%	14.0%	44.6%	76.9%	87.9%	85.0%	59.1%
<b>Total (Number)</b>	372	395	387	435	385	356	366	2696
<b>If yes, which mechanisms do you know? (Column Analysis)</b>								
<b>Complains Mechanisms</b>								
<b>KRCS toll free line</b>	60.9%	80.4%	70.4%	47.4%	48.1%	77.2%	64.0%	63.4%
<b>Local Leaders (Chiefs and Elders)</b>	13.5%	7.2%	16.7%	20.1%	7.8%	22.8%	0.0%	11.8%

KRCS Office	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.6%	2.4%	0.0%	44.1%	9.4%
KRCS Volunteers	0.0%	16.0%	0.0%	9.3%	20.3%	0.0%	2.9%	7.4%
Village Committees	6.1%	0.0%	3.7%	20.1%	15.3%	0.0%	5.1%	7.3%
Suggestion box	19.1%	0.0%	5.6%	1.0%	1.0%	0.0%	.3%	3.3%
KRCS WhatsApp forums	1.3%	.5%	3.7%	0.0%	4.4%	0.0%	.3%	1.3%
Other specify	0.0%	.5%	0.0%	1.0%	1.0%	.3%	1.6%	.8%
Total (Number)	230	194	54	194	296	313	311	1592
<b>If yes, have you used any of those mechanisms to register your feedback or complaints?</b>								
No	40.0%	93.5%	81.8%	54.4%	34.5%	63.0%	75.7%	59.4%
Yes	60.0%	6.5%	18.2%	45.6%	65.5%	37.0%	24.3%	40.6%
Total (Number)	45	46	11	103	139	73	169	586
<b>If you used any of the complaint/feedback mechanism you have mentioned, did you receive any response?</b>								
No	18.5%	33.3%	50.0%	0.0%	5.5%	11.1%	2.4%	6.7%
Yes	81.5%	66.7%	50.0%	100.0%	94.5%	88.9%	97.6%	93.3%
Total (Number)	27	3	2	47	91	27	41	238
<b>Are there any complaints you have so far regarding this project as at now?</b>								
No	86.0%	98.7%	100.0%	96.6%	86.2%	99.4%	92.6%	94.3%
Yes	14.0%	1.3%	0.0%	3.4%	13.8%	.6%	7.4%	5.7%
Total (Number)	372	395	387	435	385	356	366	2696

Source: Endline Survey

Despite a majority of beneficiaries highlighting the toll free line as the complaints and feedback reporting mechanism they were aware of, in qualitative interviews, beneficiaries showed strong preference for reporting to chiefs, volunteers, village committees, and visiting the KRCS offices to lodge their complaints compared to the toll free lines. The main reason for limited preference of the toll free line was the Swahili language used by operators that some beneficiaries could not speak or understand.

*“Project beneficiaries mostly used the Village Committees and the Red Cross Volunteers to lodge their complaints about the cash transfer project. Toll-free line method was least used due to language barriers and poor literacy levels of the project beneficiaries.”* **KRCS Volunteer, Turkana County**

Systematic complaints and feedback reporting is important to ensure full response and redress. The evaluation noted systematic recording of complaints and feedback by KRCS staff and through the toll free line. However, this was absent for village committees and chiefs, yet they were the most preferred channels for registering complaints and feedback on the CTP. While the KRCS staff do interact with the chiefs and village committees to capture some of the complaints and feedback the lack of a systematic

way of capturing these by chiefs and village committee members means information obtained through this interaction may not always be complete.

#### *4.2.10 Did this action meet the objectives and results set out in the project (as outlined in the logical framework)?*

Section 2.5 provided a summary of the project's performance on all log frame indicators. The project managed to achieve or surpass 54.5% (6 out of 11) targets in the log frame. The achieved indicators relate to processes and outputs. However, the project did not meet any of its outcome indicators, which relate to coping strategies, household dietary diversity, and food consumption scores. The outcome indicators were always going to be difficult to achieve for a number of reasons. First, the transfer value was inadequate to achieve the consumption changes anticipated in the short term. Qualitative interviews, showed beneficiaries would purchase what they viewed as priority, which was not necessarily linked to achieving a diverse diet or would consume more meals but with less portions to extend availability of the food until the next transfer. Borrowing food from traders was also a very common coping strategy among beneficiaries of cash transfers to supplement the cash they received from the project.

Second, the project did not have a strategy for achievement of the outcomes through messaging on food consumption. Many studies have shown that cash transfers may not increase dietary diversity because households' decision-making factors on food consumption during emergencies differ focused on either ensuring more quantity than quality of the food or addressing current food insecurity while planning for future vulnerability in the absence of the cash transfer. In the former, beneficiaries stock up on inexpensive food or what they consider as "must have" (maize or sugar in this case). In the latter beneficiaries spend less on food and continue with coping strategies (but to a lesser extent) while saving or investing the difference in assets or small businesses that would help them cope with food insecurity in the absence of the cash transfer (see section 4.2.6 for examples and evidence).

This notwithstanding, the cash transfer did help households reduce negative coping mechanisms as beneficiary households regressed after the transfer. For example, during the transfer, 73% (PDM 2) and 61.5% (PDM 3) of households were using low or no coping strategies compared to 34.2% after the transfer.

#### *4.2.11 How was the community engaged in the project?*

The project had a strong community engagement component through:

- a) Community based beneficiary selection processes; and
- b) Community based project feedback systems through community gatherings and engagement of chiefs and their village committees.

#### *Community based beneficiary selection*

The success of the community based selection process was credited with ensuring efficiency and effectiveness of targeting. The community based selection process involved the engagement of all stakeholders (general community members, chiefs and religious leaders) at community level through *Barazas*<sup>29</sup>, which are led by selected community members to either select or verify the list of beneficiaries. This engagement was highly appreciated by community members. It also cultured a sense of ownership of the project among community level stakeholders as one chief in Isiolo put it:

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<sup>29</sup> *Barazas* are community meetings

*“I am very thankful of KRCS because they have been helping our people especially when they have involved all the stakeholders. We have been working with the volunteers hand-to-hand. Red Cross is very transparent. Beneficiaries are elected in the public and it has to be an agreement between KRCS and the community.”* **Chief, Kipsin, Isiolo**

#### Community based project feedback systems

KRCS employed a community based feedback mechanisms on project performance which comprised: 1) community *Barazas*; 2) interactions with community leaders; and 3) post distribution monitoring focus group discussions. Beneficiaries recognised *Barazas* as important for providing their feedback. Community leaders appreciated the open lines of communication with community volunteers on matters regarding the project. They would interact with volunteers on issues such as complaints from beneficiaries and timelines for cash distribution. In addition to the quantitative household interviews during post distribution monitoring, KRCS also engaged beneficiaries and community leaders through focus group discussions.

The evaluation found the mix of instruments to facilitate community engagement in project processes adequate.

### **4.3 Efficiency**

#### *4.3.1 Were resources utilized and managed in an efficient manner?*

The structure of KRCS, with existing staff on the ground in all counties, reduces project establishment costs when compared to NGOs that have to set up in targeted counties. The network of volunteers in all localities enhanced KRCS' ability to closely monitor the programme at lower cost than through fulltime paid staff.

The use of MPESA and the negotiation for a Zero Rated Bulk Payment Account on the MPESA platform from Safaricom has reduced costs of transfer further.

Prudent financial and results monitoring was evident in the project through several processes. KRCS uses a set of Value for Money (VfM) matrices to determine efficiency in use of financial resources. Data from the VfM matrices guided decisions on project management. PDMs and monthly encashment monitoring and beneficiary feedback meetings enhanced results monitoring. However, limited financial resources to support monitoring of the project activities (See further discussion in section 4.3.4) undermined these activities. Contributions from BRC to supplement the monitoring budget as well as oversight visits to counties supported prudent financial management.

In all seven counties KRCS was part of the county steering group where the 4W matrix<sup>30</sup> for all partners delivering humanitarian assistance met. The cash coordination meetings were also held consistently in the targeted counties enhancing coordination of cash transfer programming in the counties (see further discussion in section 4.2.10). Through these platforms, KRCS was able to ensure its work was well coordinated with other actors, avoid duplication of support.

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<sup>30</sup> The 4W matrix is a program and partnership management document that maps out the partners in terms of who (organization) works where (Sub County/Ward/Village), When (period of action) and what (type of action) for effective coordination and utilization of resources between partners

4.3.2 *Were the project activities implemented within the planned time and financial targets? If there were any significant variances (whether early or late, over or under expenditure), what caused them?*

A slow start to the project, which delayed the first disbursement by two months, negatively affected timely implementation. The main reason for this delay was the extended negotiations with government on the transfer value from the planned KSH5,000 to KSH3,000 to align with the government's Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) rate.<sup>31</sup> Negotiations could have started at project design stage. However, at this stage, the cash coordination meetings were not functional and therefore a platform to harmonise the cash transfer value was absent. While the KRC's value was based on the calculation of an MEB and emergency oriented, the government's transfer value was a longer-term transfer structured as a social protection instrument. Once the Cash Coordination meetings were revived by this project under evaluation, an agreement was reached to harmonise all cash transfers to the government's transfer value, through the HSNP, so as not to distort transfers for the longer-term HSNP programme.

Nonetheless, the project made up for the delay by making a once off transfer for the two months delay.

Further delays in transfers were observed in Marsabit ranging from two days to two weeks. These were consequence of: 1) delayed completion of the targeting and verification exercise; 2) long turnaround time in processing reimbursements to vendors; 3) long process in the use of biometrics through Compulynx technology; and 4) long delivery periods for cash-in-envelope. Due to extended delays because of the use of the biometric technology, the system was abandoned in favour of cash-in-envelope cash delivery mechanism. This reduced delays in delivery of cash in Marsabit. The delays in Marsabit improved as the project progressed as processes for reimbursing vendors improved.

4.3.3 *What type of administrative, financial or managerial challenges did the programme face and to what extent has it affected planning and delivery?*

The evaluation did not note any significant challenges in financial management or managerial capacity of KRCS serve for the delays in vendor reimbursements and allowances for volunteers, which improved during the project. However, these did not significantly delay implementation of the project overall except for the initial three months of the project. Nonetheless, delays in disbursement have the effect of soiling KRCS' image to external stakeholders and will eventually affect their livelihoods causing them to refuse in collaborating with KRCS in future projects. These therefore need to be managed carefully in future.

One of the major managerial challenges for the project was the absence of a dedicated manager for the CTP. Staff overseeing the CTP were part of the Disaster Management Operations team, responsible for other interventions and emergencies. With the scale of the CTP, the staff faced challenges in providing the depth of attention for a project of this scale. This is despite initiatives such as reducing the frequency of PDMs from monthly to every two months to reduce the administrative burden on staff. The evaluation team thinks that KRCS should have budgeted for full-time cash implementation positions to ensure that cash activities would not lag-behind. Working with a team that has other duties as was this case for this project meant overwhelming them with tasks – with potential of the team using discretion on competing priorities with possibility of not fully getting committed to some tasks related to either of the two competing projects.

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<sup>31</sup> The initial project was planned for Marsabit only. In Marsabit the planned transfer was KSH5,000 which was reduced to KSH3,000 to align to the government's transfer value of KSH3,000 for the Hunger Safety Net Programme. The six additional counties were added in August when the transfer value was already agreed for Marsabit. As a result it had no effect on budgetary allocations for the six counties.

#### 4.3.4 *To what extent were the resources made available sufficient for the planned interventions for the programme?*

According to interviews with staff, the budget was adequate for interventions of the project with the exception of cash monitoring activities that included encashment and PDMs. According to ECHO guidelines for cash transfer, expenditures supporting the cash transfer should not be more than 10% of the budget for transfers. This includes overheads costs. This amount was inadequate to implement the PDMs and encashment in all the project sites during the period of the project. ASAL communities are mainly pastoralists who are sparsely distributed. This results in long travel distances within counties. Such orientation increases costs of support activities. It seems these issues were not including in the budget at programme design stage. In Garissa, encashment was not undertaken in about 52% (41 out of 79) of the project sites. These sites were also not included in the PDMs. Thus, in 52% of the sites, KRCS had no information on how the cash transfer performed. This demonstrates that there were significant deficiencies in the amount available for monitoring activities, which could have undermined programme quality.

As experienced by the evaluation team in Garissa, Wajir and Marsabit, some roads are inaccessible during the rainy season resulting in longer routes being utilised to reach beneficiaries. This adds to the cost of monitoring activities. From the discussions that the evaluation team had with KRCS staff, it seems the inadequacies emanated from budgeting costs of support activities. KRCS is yet to develop unit costs for support activities for cash transfers to aid in the determination of what is adequate for support activities. With the absence of these unit costs, it is difficult to budget costs for support activities. Future program designs should forecast on such issues and factor in the related costs within budgets at proposal development stage.

## 4.4 Impact

#### 4.4.1 *Where and how accessible were the markets where cash was spent? Did any recipients find it difficult to reach markets (distance, time)?*

In a majority of areas, markets were accessible to beneficiaries. Markets were more developed in Isiolo and Marsabit with weekly markets observed in Isiolo for remote areas. The weekly market days were conducted by traders from within Isiolo and some who travelled from well-established markets like, Nanyuki to participate during the weekly open market days. In Isiolo, these open markets were conducted on each day of the week on a rotational basis for targeted places. In Kipsin, for example, the market day was always on a Thursday while in Oldonyiro, the market day was a Tuesday. Discussions we had with the KRCS field staff revealed that a variety of commodities was sold in sufficient quantities within acceptable price ranges during such weekly markets days. Beneficiaries had choice to purchase what they desired just like in a well-established market system that has physical structures. In fact, for Oldonyiro beneficiaries highlighted that they would wait to do their main shopping during market days as prices were markedly cheaper than the few local traders due to increased competition on these days. In Samburu there were some challenges that were noted related to access to local markets. Information collated from FGDs in that area revealed that (Naimaral village), beneficiaries walked 30 km to markets. This was also revealed by interviews in Malkagufu, Wajir, who said beneficiaries travelled 40km to the nearest market and back, as well as parts of Garissa, Turkana and West Pokot.

To reduce travel distances trader mobilisation was required to facilitate market response to areas where cash was being distributed. This could have helped in triggering a market response in areas where markets were absent. Mobilisation would have entailed disseminating information on potential increased demand for commodities and cash being injected in the market to stimulate commodity stock planning (which would stabilise prices) and trader response through mobile markets. One trader in Oldonyiro had this to say:

*“If I had known about the project in advance and how much was being poured in this area I could have planned my stocking to ensure I had all the commodities bought by beneficiaries”*  
**Trader, Oldonyiro, Isiolo**

Another trader in Dela, with information gleaned from a community Barraza made efforts to plan her stock of sugar to take advantage of the cash injection from the project as she said:

*“I attended the Barraza and heard about the project. I timed my stock of sugar from Somalia to coincide with cash distribution.”* **Trader, Dela, Wajir**

In all areas, the project did not engage in trader mobilisation despite some areas showing clear challenges with access to markets. Normally for cash based responses, a Markets Assessment will investigate local markets functionality including projecting how markets would respond when there is increased demand. The challenges experienced with access to markets by some beneficiaries demonstrates the lack of such an assessment. This is because issues to do with influencing traders to respond to increased demand and or recommendations for humanitarian actors to implement an indirect response (e.g. supporting traders to move goods across locations) are normally embedded within the markets assessment. Discussions with KRCS project staff revealed the market assessment was only undertaken for Marsabit. However, market assessment should be form standard practice for cash based responses in future to inform a go or no go decision to implement cash in locations where markets are distant. One option that KRCS could consider is that, within markets assessment, they should ensure to explore options of supporting mobile vendors who have capacity to supply goods to participate in Food and Non-Food items fares. This includes exploring propositions to community leaders to work closely with KRCS and the vendors to introduce an open markets days system that will benefit not only KRCS beneficiaries but the wider community as well. In budgets, advertisement costs, including vendor support costs (transport and fares logistics) will have to be included.

Despite long distances for some beneficiaries, markets were functioning with supply chains of food commodities uninterrupted. The distance beneficiaries had to travel to access, markets were not any different, as they travelled the same distances with or without the cash transfer. However, the frequency of travel between the period of the transfer and outside the transfer period could not be ascertained.

While price increases were experienced these were a result of seasonal increases in transport costs and general national inflationary pressure (see section 4.4.2 for a discussion on effects of price increases on cash transfer value). Functionality of markets was reflected by the results of the endline survey where a majority of beneficiaries (89.8%) were able to find food items they needed in the local market (Table 9). Garissa (18.3%), Wajir (17.4%) and West Pokot counties (11.4%) had the largest proportion of beneficiaries that could not find food items they needed in their local markets. This provides a reflection of the functionality of these markets where trader mobilisation could have benefited beneficiaries.

**Table 9: Were the food items you needed to buy available in your local markets?**


	County							Total
	Garissa	Isiolo	Marsabit	Samburu	Turkana	Wajir	West Pokot	
<b>No</b>	18.3%	8.1%	8.3%	3.0%	11.4%	17.4%	6.3%	10.2%
<b>Yes</b>	81.7%	91.9%	91.7%	97.0%	88.6%	82.6%	93.7%	89.8%
<b>Total (Number)</b>	372	395	387	435	385	356	366	2696

Source: Endline survey

#### 4.4.2 How have prices changed? Were prices influenced by the cash transfer?

Figure 3 shows the trend in prices of main commodities purchased by households. Beans increased by 24.6%, while cooking oil by 10.0%, Maize by 33.3% and rice by 4.5%. These price increases had the effect of increasing the price of the food basket by 92.2% in November, and 36.2% in January. The increase in prices were not linked to the cash transfer but rising transportation costs due to inaccessibility of some areas during the rainy season and commodity shortage in general, especially maize. The diminishing value of the transfer especially in November, had the effect of reducing the amount, quality and diversity of food beneficiaries could purchase which in turn undermined project objectives on food consumption, and dietary diversity.

**Figure 3: Price trends of selected commodities between September 2017 and January 2018**



Source: Monthly progress reports (September 2017, November 2017, December 2017 and January 2018)

A significant proportion of beneficiaries interviewed in the endline survey noted no effects of the cash transfer on prices (see Table 10). When asked whether they noted price changes after the cash transfer majority (62.8%) responded in the negative. This was supported by discussions with traders and price monitoring data presented in Figure 3 above.

**Table 10: Has there been price change of items in the market after the cash transfer?**

	County							Total
	Garissa	Isiolo	Marsabit	Samburu	Turkana	Wajir	West Pokot	
<b>No</b>	64.2%	45.3%	70.5%	86.2%	66.0%	40.7%	62.6%	62.8%
<b>Yes-Up</b>	34.4%	54.4%	29.2%	12.6%	34.0%	58.1%	36.9%	36.5%
<b>Yes-Down</b>	1.3%	.3%	.3%	1.1%	0.0%	1.1%	.5%	.7%
<b>Total (Number)</b>	372	395	387	435	385	356	366	2696

Source: Endline survey

Price monitoring was only limited to four commodities of maize, beans, cooking oil and rice yet beneficiaries in areas such as Garissa and Wajir sugar was also a priority product beneficiaries purchased.

#### 4.4.3 What was the impact of cash transfers (positive or negative) on the local economy?

Discussions with all six traders interviewed for the evaluation showed the cash transfer had increased their sales<sup>32</sup> during the days the transfer was made.

*“My sales for maize, beans, sugar, and cooking oil were slightly higher during the days KRCS was providing money to beneficiaries.”* **Trader, Oldonyiro, Isiolo**

*“Due to the good business from KRCS beneficiaries, I have increased stocks n food items demanded by cash beneficiaries.”* **Trader, Dela, Wajir**

*“My business was very good during the period when KRCS was supporting the community through the cash transfer project. My sales were high and my business grew. Why did you stop the project?”* **Trader: Kositei, West Pokot**

The advent of cash transfers also pushed up food credit markets with traders offering beneficiaries credit for food.

*“Previously people did not have incomes so we never used to give credit to these beneficiaries. Because the cash transfer, I am now even giving credit to the beneficiaries of the cash transfer. I normally give credit for food up to a maximum of KSH7,000 depending on the person who is borrowing.”* **Trader, Dela, Wajir**

All MPESA agents interviewed reported increased cash-out but some (2 out of 5) had challenges in getting adequate float.

#### 4.4.4 Have women or marginalized groups been empowered as a result of the cash project?

While the project selected the most vulnerable households, it made deliberate attempts to have majority of women as the cash recipients for those selected households through making heads of families including males to allow their female counterparts to receive cash. The main reason for this was that women would focus on household needs when making decision on purchases with the cash transfer. This assumes that women will have significant influence on how the cash is used. Results of the evaluation show that the recipient of the cash (73.6%) mainly made the decision on how the cash transfer was used (see Table 11), who in this project were mainly women (74.8% of respondents to the endline survey were women). About 12.7% made the decision together with their spouse. Ability of women to make purchase decisions based on household needs were demonstrated by three cases the evaluation team came across in Marsabit and Isiolo where the chiefs had to replace the male recipient with their wife because they were abusing the money.

*“When he got the money he would spend it without the family. We decided to change his name and put that of his wife. The situation improved with the money used to buy food for the family.”* **Chief, Kupibagasa, Marsabit**

**Table 11: Who in your family decided on how to spend the money?**

County	Total
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<sup>32</sup> This could not be corroborated with PDM data as this information was collected by the project’s PDM data collection.

	Garissa	Isiolo	Marsabit	Samburu	Turkana	Wajir	West Pokot	
<b>Consultative between husband and wife</b>	2.4%	2.8%	22.0%	12.6%	25.5%	11.8%	11.5%	12.7%
<b>Partner-Wife/husband</b>	6.2%	18.5%	4.7%	8.7%	17.9%	20.5%	20.8%	13.7%
<b>Self-respondent</b>	91.4%	78.7%	73.4%	78.6%	56.6%	67.7%	67.8%	73.6%
<b>Total (Number)</b>	372	395	387	435	385	356	366	2696

Source: Endline survey

The ability to make decisions on household expenditures was an empowering experience for women, which increased their confidence not only in the household but in the community as well. As noted by women beneficiaries in Marsabit, Isiolo and Samburu counties (in three FGDs out of seven), and the dignity of receiving cash contributed to further entrenchment of this confidence.

*“At that time we were very happy and knew our children can eat...It has brought a lot of confidence to our lives.”* **Women beneficiaries, Kupigasa, Marsabit**

One group of women had engaged in table banking using part of the cash transfer to build savings and capital for micro-businesses in order to reduce their future vulnerability to food and nutrition insecurity (See 4.4.9 for details on this story).

#### 4.4.5 How has the cash project affected traditional systems of community self-help? Were those receiving/not receiving cash integrated/reintegrated/excluded from the community?

99.6% of the households surveyed in PDM 2 and PDM3 reported that the cash grant had not created tension or conflict in the community. Findings of the qualitative assessment shows several reasons for this. First, because the targeting approach was appropriate and resulted in very low inclusion and exclusion errors, non-beneficiaries understood clearly why they were left out of the programme. They understood the project was short term and only targeted the most needy in their communities. Second, the culture of sharing was maintained once food was purchased thereby preserving community self-help systems that are dependent on reciprocity. In Kupigasa, Marsabit, beneficiaries were not excluded from the government’s general food aid distribution because according to the chief, *“we knew the money they received little and they still needed help”*.

#### 4.4.6 Were there any issues with alternate beneficiaries?

According to the endline survey, about 13.4% of beneficiaries had alternates (Table 12). Garissa (26.9%), Samburu (20.2%) and Isiolo (18.5%) had the highest proportion of beneficiaries with alternates. Only 1% or less reported issues with alternates abusing the cash transfer or putting a charge for being used as an alternate (PDM 3, January 2018). The insignificance of challenges with alternates was also reflected in qualitative interviews. Cases reported in the areas visited were insignificant and isolated ranging from 1-5 cases of:

- alternates abusing the cash;
- Alternates charging a fee for the beneficiary to access the money on their phone;
- Alternates travelling for long period in search of livestock pasture (3 months in one case reported in Oldonyiro in Isiolo)

**Table 12: Did you have an alternate?**

	County							Total
	Garissa	Isiolo	Marsabit	Samburu	Turkana	Wajir	West	

							Pokot	
No	73.1%	81.5%	91.7%	79.8%	98.7%	89.3%	92.9%	86.6%
Yes	26.9%	18.5%	8.3%	20.2%	1.3%	10.7%	7.1%	13.4%
Total (Number)	372	395	387	435	385	356	366	2696

Source: Endline survey

#### 4.4.7 How has the cash project influenced local debt and credit markets?

According to discussions with beneficiaries and chiefs in the targeted counties, taking food on credit is a way of coping with shocks within households in the targeted counties. Credit worthiness is based on livestock heads owned which determine ability to pay. For the poorest targeted by the KRCS cash transfer such opportunities were not accessible prior to the cash transfer as they were viewed as default risk due to low livestock holding. The cash transfer provided a predictable income for beneficiaries from which traders could recoup their food loans. Thus, the cash transfer improved credit worthiness of the cash transfer beneficiaries enabling them to borrow food worth KSH600 to KSH7,000. The benefits of this credit were used in different ways. First, beneficiaries used the credit to augment food purchases from the KSH3,000 received from KRCS. Second, some beneficiaries took advantage of the food credit from traders to use their transfers to purchase small livestock such as goats and chickens.

Microfinance and other credit markets were not affected by the cash transfer because most beneficiaries were not eligible to benefit from these markets due to the absents of minimum livestock holding.

#### 4.4.8 What was your immediate need? Did Cash meet your immediate need?

For beneficiaries, the cash transfer came when they needed it most. With three to four consecutive seasons of below normal rainfall (mentioned in Laisamis and Kupibagasa in Marsabit; Malkagufu in Wajir, and Kipsin in Isiolo), beneficiaries were in dire stress and in need of food assistance. The cash transfer was able to meet this need as noted by the chiefs from Kupibagasa and Laisamis in Marsabit:


*“The money came at the right time. This is the only season we have rains in the past four years and all out livestock died and people had no food. We were relying on our livestock and small farms...nothing was there in the past four years. People have not recovered...even the rain came in a funny way people have not planted yet so drought will continue (rains started in March/February which is unusual so we were not sure whether to go ahead and plant or wait for the right time to plant)...The project really assisted. Although the money is very small but it assisted in food stuff...they were very happy no one died of hunger...actually got to know Red Cross with the assistance...but still they need more assistance.”* **Chief, Kupibagasa, Marsabit**

*“We have had four seasons of drought in this community. Our animals died and many community members have little or no livestock. As you know, we are pastoralists. Without livestock we are nothing, we cannot buy food. So the project came at a time where families were eating enough just to stay alive.”* **Chief, Laisamis, Marsabit**

For some beneficiaries in West Pokot, the KRCS transfer saved them from destitution (see story in section 4.4.9). These beneficiaries had lost significant herds of their livestock to drought but experienced further losses when livestock rustlers raided the remaining livestock. KRCS became their only hope.

Findings from the endline survey also demonstrate improved food consumption among beneficiaries. Figure 4 shows number of meals consumed “before the cash transfer”, “during the cash transfer” and “after the cash transfer” in all seven counties. The number of meals consumed by beneficiaries increased during the cash transfer when compared to “before the cash transfer” and “after the cash transfer”. For example, the proportion of beneficiaries consuming two or more meals increased from 49.9% to 95.4% before the transfer and during the transfer respectively. With the withdrawal of the transfer, the proportion consuming two or more meals reduced to 71.4%, which is still higher than food consumption before the transfer.

**Figure 4: Meals consumed by beneficiaries “after the transfer”, “during the transfer”, and “before the transfer”**



Source: Endline survey

As highlighted in section 4.2.6, beneficiaries confirmed increasing number of meals consumed per day during the qualitative interviews. Because the value of the transfer was low, the food purchased would last a few days to a week and a half depending on the family size. Households would continue their coping strategies to supplement the cash transfer. These included borrowing food, selling of firewood and charcoal, domestic work, and livestock herding. Sometimes beneficiaries had to make decisions with regard the most important item to buy with the KSH3,000: “When we got the money we would spend most of it on sugar. One can live on tea alone. So if you have sugar you can at least have tea for a longer period.” **Beneficiaries, Wajir**

Others would eat less to stretch the food or buy less expensive food: “We would budget the food to reach the next transfer. As a mother you know how to budget...One either bought less food and stretched it. Sometimes buy less beans and mix it with more maize because bean is expensive” **Beneficiaries, Isiolo**

#### 4.4.9 Which changes are regarded as most significant?

For families in West Pokot County, Kaptolomwo location, Kour sub-location, the KRCS cash transfer saved them from destitution (see Box 1).

#### **Box 1: A story of restored hope!**

Paulina Lpus (not her real name) aged 38 lives in West Pokot, Kaptolomwo location, Kour sub-location. Paulina has 8 children and a husband, and the 2016/17 drought affected their household in a big way as they lost all their livestock except for only 2 goats that survived the drought. All their hope now rested on the 2 goats that, when they multiply their form of livelihood would be restored.

Surely, it never rains but it pours, Paulina lost her remaining 2 goats due to a raid by livestock rustlers from neighbouring Turkana County. Her hopes and aspirations were shattered and she and her husband went into a depression.

*I could not sleep at night thinking how we were going to move forward as a family with all these misfortunes. Out of desperation, my husband was on the brink of joining other livestock rustlers so that at least we could have our own livestock. However, I kept discouraging him as I was afraid, I would lose him during those dangerous raids. It was a difficult period for us as a family, there is nothing as heart breaking as seeing your children cry of hunger, and you have nothing to give them. It was by the grace of God that we survived this trying period.*

*In March 2017, the Kenyan Red Cross, came and registered vulnerable households in our community to benefit from a Cash Transfer Project. Our household was selected to benefit from the project, during a community meeting where every community member was present. I was over-joyed and could not believe this was actually happening.*

In April 2018, Paulina received her first cash transfer through MPESA. The Kenyan Red Cross Unconditional Cash Transfer Project supported vulnerable households in 7 Counties of Kenya (Turkana, West Pokot, Wajir, Garissa, Marsabit, Isiolo and Samburu). Beneficiaries of the project including Paulina were receiving KES3000 per month through the MPESA system.

With a bright face full of nostalgia, Paulina recounted;

*I remember I was coming from the forest to collect firewood, when I received a message on my phone. Upon checking the message, I realised it was the 1<sup>st</sup> cash transfer from the KRCS into my MPESA account. I was so happy that I even dropped all the firewood that I was carrying, and dashed home to share the good news with the family. We were all ecstatic, and could not wait for the next day to visit the MPESA Agent which is 5km from home, to cash out. Even through, it was late afternoon, together with my husband, we literally sped to the MPESA agent, and a distance we normally cover in 1 hour, and we arrived in 30 minutes I think. After cashing-out, we bought maize flour, cooking oil, salt, beans, cabbage and other food items that we had last ate some months back. WE had a feast that night and the children were over the moon with joy.*

This marked the turning point in Paulina's life and her family, as for the next 8 months she continued to receive KES3000 from the Kenyan Red Cross. They could now afford 3 meals a day, though sometimes they would have twice (mid- morning and evening).

*The health of my children has significantly improved, and they no longer looked sickly as before. This has brought joy to me and my husband and my husband dropped his thoughts of joining the cattle rustlers. We were now a happy family. We managed to save some money from the cash we received monthly and bought 2 goats. The two goats have since given birth to 2 kids each and we hoping that our livestock herd will soon grow.*

During the period, when she was receiving the cash, Paulina noted that they no longer survived on negative coping strategies like eating wild fruits and vegetables (some of them are poisonous if not well cooked).

Now that the Cash Transfer Project ended 2 months ago, Paulina is sad, but she has hope. Her hope is in the goats she acquired during the project, and she believes, even though life can be tough now, her tomorrow is no longer doomed. As we wrapped up the discussion, Paulina with her eyes wet with tears (tears of joy I presumed), had this to say;

*“Thank you Kenyan Red Cross for the timeous intervention, otherwise my children will have died of hunger”.*

In Oldonyiro, Isiolo County, and in Kupibagasa and Laisamis locations of Marsabit County, the cash transfer was able to increase food consumption. Some beneficiaries were able to save part of the transfer to purchase small livestock to reduce their future vulnerability to food insecurity (Box 2).

### **Box 2: Using cash transfer to address future vulnerability to food insecurity**

The KRC project changed my life. I am a single mother. In my home, I have two orphans and six children with myself we are nine people. Before the money came, I had to find food for them. Sometimes I would borrow food from neighbours or do domestic work. Other times I would go to fetch firewood for someone so they give me food.

When I was getting the money from KRCS, it would help me a lot. For that time, I would not go out to fetch firewood or borrow food. For my family the food we bought with cash from KRCS would last about three weeks. It would last this long because I used to squeeze my budget. I would buy a lot of maize and a little beans.

When I got the money from KRCS, I would take breakfast, lunch and dinner unlike before where we would eat only two meals per day (breakfast and dinner). Before we started receiving the money, breakfast will be a cup of tea without any bread. Sometimes I would cook githeri (a mix of beans, mixed maize, potatoes vegetables) but with no oil because I could not afford it.

Before getting cash, the children would also eat two meals. They would get their breakfast from the school feeding programme and then supper at home. During the time we received money from KRCS my children would come back home for lunch ensuring they had three meals a day. They would not miss any meal!

I realised that the cash transfer was short term and I needed to prepare myself for the time KRCS will no longer give us money. So I saved KSH1,000 and topped up from my other activities to buy seven chickens to get eggs for selling. The chickens have now increased to 10. I sell 15 eggs per week at KSH10 per egg. This has helped me to continue reaping the benefits of the cash from KRCS.

For me the most significant change from the money given to me by KRCS is the chickens I bought. Which are helping me with food (eggs) some money to purchase food.

My children are no longer sleeping hungry!

Some women beneficiaries of the KRCS Cash Transfer project in Turkana County managed to form a table-banking group. The group managed to register with the Social Services, come up with a Constitution and Management Committee. The group called Dungana Women Group, has a membership of about 17 women. These women initially contributed KSH500 every month, and then increased the contribution the following months. The Group banks the money and members including other community members can borrow some money from the Group and later return with an interest. This group according to the Chief is thriving and a good example of how some cash beneficiaries managed to move away from relief cases, to resilient examples.

#### 4.4.10 Were there any unintended changes due to the intervention?

Interestingly discussions with chiefs and volunteers in West Pokot revealed the cash transfer project managed to bring peace between the ever-warring Turkanas and Pokots (neighbouring tribes), where the CTP was being implemented. These two tribes are always at loggerheads owing to the livestock raids they engage in, on each other. With the coming of the Cash Transfer Project, and increased food availability at household level, the two tribes did not see the value of raiding each other, as they were food sufficient during that period.

The project may have inadvertently left some beneficiaries in debt. Credit was provided to beneficiaries based on the cash transfer. With limited information on when the project would end, traders<sup>33</sup> continued providing food loans to KRCS beneficiaries in the hope they will pay from the transfer. Beneficiaries in all project sites also highlighted that they were unaware the cash would cease in January. They therefore continued to borrow on the premise of continued receipt of the transfer. When transfers ceased beneficiaries were left with debts ranging from KSH600 to KSH3,500. The evaluation team suggests that KRCS should develop an exit strategy and communicate with all stakeholders about project timelines including when the assistance will terminate. This will ensure that the project is not creating tensions and conflict in the communities when it ends.

## 4.5 Sustainability

### 4.5.1 How would you gauge food security at the moment?

The evaluation coincided with the onset of rains. Vegetation condition was improving providing better grazing and browsing for livestock leading to improved livestock body conditions and milk production. Prices of livestock were therefore increasing which in turn increased incomes for farmers. Nonetheless, a large proportion of beneficiaries remain with poor food consumption scores (FCS). Thirty-four percent of beneficiaries are in the poor category, 21.5% are at borderline and 44% are within acceptable food consumption (see Table 13). Early Warning Bulletins produced by the NDMA support this trend. For example, the Early Warning Bulletin for Garissa for March 2018, shows the proportion of households with poor food consumption score for the month was 15%, those with border line score 56% and with acceptable at 29%. For the same period in Turkana, twenty-seven percent were classified as having a poor food consumption score whereas twenty-nine percent and forty-four percent of them were categorized under the borderline and acceptable FCS band.

Despite the high proportion of beneficiaries with poor FCS, the figures show an improving situation from August 2017. For example, in Garissa the food consumption score for the month of August 2017 showed 36.2% of households were in poor food consumption category while 47.1% were in borderline and 16.7% of households are in acceptable level.

**Table 13: Food Consumption scores**

	County							Total
	Garissa	Isiolo	Marsabit	Samburu	Turkana Count	Wajir	West Pokot	
Acceptable	50.3%	64.3%	46.5%	28.3%	53.8%	33.1%	32.2%	44.0%
Borderline	21.0%	21.0%	25.6%	18.2%	18.7%	24.4%	22.1%	21.5%

<sup>33</sup> Traders were not specifically targeted with information about the project.

<b>Poor</b>	28.8%	14.7%	27.9%	53.6%	27.5%	42.4%	45.6%	34.5%
<b>Total (Number)</b>	372	395	387	435	385	356	366	2696

Source: Endline survey

#### 4.5.2 How do you think coping strategies have improved at the household level?

The final evaluation sought how the cash transfer program improved the household coping strategies at household level. This included reducing the number of coping strategies and the frequency at which they were used at household level and this is a measure of people's behaviour when they do not have access to sufficient food. During the final evaluation period, about half (51%) of the surveyed households were using coping strategies indicating that some households had short-term food insufficiency. This was comparable with the PDM 2 and 3 values. Analysis of the PDM and final evaluation data found that, majority of households were using low coping strategies (88.7% during PDM 2, 76% during PDM 3 and 91.7% at end line).

**Table 14: Coping strategies**

Measure	Target	PDM 2	PDM 1
<b>Households using coping strategies</b>	-	45.3%	54.6%
<b>Households using 'Medium' and 'Low' coping strategies<sup>34</sup></b>	80.0%	88.7%	76.0%

Source: PDM 1 and PDM 2 datasets; Endline survey results

#### 4.5.3 What measures do you think the project has put in place to prevent food insecurity in future?

Addressing the relief to early recovery continuum was not a particular focus of the project. There were no budgetary provisions for supporting early recovery. Nonetheless, cash provides inherent advantages for jumpstarting recovery, which could have been taken advantage of by KRCS. As seen in section 4.4.9, beneficiaries depending on how they perceive their future vulnerability to food insecurity can save part of their transfer to supplement with other sources income to purchase small livestock or engage in micro businesses. Opportunities exist through supporting households' decision making in this regard through: messaging, and formation of savings and lending groups.

#### 4.5.4 Following this intervention, what measures have individual households undertaken to ensure they don't get food insecure in the future?

As highlighted in section 4.4.9, a limited number of beneficiaries have invested in small livestock mainly chickens and goats. Others such as in Turkana have grouped to initiate table banking.

#### 4.5.5 What are the institutional actions undertaken during the project period to ensure food security in future?

No actions were planned for to ensure early recovery interventions.

<sup>34</sup> Households using below 9 (out of the 12) coping mechanisms

## 5 Conclusion and Recommendations

### 5.1 Conclusion

The project was successful in mitigating the impacts of the drought induced food deficit. Food consumption had improved during the cash distribution period with majority of households eating between two and three meals a day. This later regressed to one meal a day after the cash distribution. These achievements are despite the clear inadequacies of the KSH3,000 as demonstrated by beneficiaries and that it was lower than the MEB. The ability of households to get food on credit from traders against the predictable transfer enhanced the value of the cash transfer to beneficiaries. Beneficiaries however, still complemented the cash transfer with other negative coping mechanisms such eating more meals but smaller quantities or buying less preferred food in order to purchase more quantities of food, selling of firewood or charcoal but these were implemented to a lesser scale than before the transfer.

While the project was successful in mitigating the impacts of the drought, it failed to meet its targets for several reasons. The baseline data used county averages yet the project targeted the most vulnerable who are likely worse off than the average. In this case, there is a probability that: 1) the project set unrealistic targets; and 2) the project's impact was understated. Secondly, because the transfer value was low beneficiaries would prioritise dietary diversity but rather length of time the food would last and thus would buy more of the most important food items (maize and sugar). Cash is dependent on household decision making on expenditure. Without a deliberate strategy to influence those decisions, it was always going to be difficult to achieve the outcomes.

There areas of improvement to enhance the effectiveness of the cash transfer project tin the future as noted in the Recommendations section.

### 5.2 Recommendations

This section presents recommendation for KRCS. The recommendations have been presented by evaluation criterion.

#### Efficiency

##### **Recommendation 1: Improving Capacity of staff**

The following recommendations will enhance the capacity of staff in designing, monitoring and delivering cash transfer projects

**Recommendations 1.1:** There is need for a CTP technical advisor and CTP manager at national level to oversee cash transfers in KRCS. This is line with KRCS' thrust to scale up cash transfers. These will spearhead organisational capacity development and improve KRCS' "cash readiness".

**Recommendation 1.2:** All volunteers working on cash transfers need to receive significant training on monitoring and implementation of cash transfers instead of the short orientation process for a specific cash transfer project. If recommendation x.x above is implemented this training can be implemented in house.

##### **Recommendation 2: Enhancing Value for Money**

The following recommendations are aimed at improving the cost efficiency of KRCS' cash transfer projects.

**Recommendation 2.1:** KRCS needs to develop unit costs for cash transfer support activities. This will support appropriate costing of support activities at budgeting stage. Support activities include targeting and verification, encashment, PDMs and complaints reporting and feedback processes.

**Recommendation 2.2:** In some counties, volunteers were based at the county centre instead of target localities. This increased costs of mobilisation of volunteers and slowed response time. KRCS needs to ensure volunteers for a similar project are based within localities of the project.

### **Recommendation 3: Improvements to PDMs**

PDMs had several deficiencies that need to be re-looked:

**Recommendation 3.1:** PDMs need to collect the following additional information

- f) Sales and of traders to measure the multiplier effect of the cash transfer
- g) Price monitoring should include all main food commodities purchased by beneficiaries or that constitute the food basket for the typical household in ASAL.
- h) The targeted areas were predominantly pastoralist areas. It is important for PDMs to also measure the impact of the cash transfer on livestock ownership
- i) Distances travelled by beneficiaries to cash out, receive cash, or get to the market and back home. It is important to monitor disadvantaged beneficiaries and find ways of supporting those areas to reduce the travel burden.
- j) Indebtedness of beneficiaries. The evaluation demonstrated that the cash transfer had increased local credit ratings for beneficiaries opening up food credit markets that were previously closed to them. Beneficiaries used these markets to smoothen consumption. However, some beneficiaries were left in debt after the project had ended. The extent of this problem is not known.

## **Effectiveness**

### **Recommendation 4: Measurement of results**

**Recommendation 4.1:** KRCS needs to ensure a baseline undertaken of beneficiaries receiving the cash. This can be undertaken as part of the verification exercise.

**Recommendation 4.2:** the results on some indicators during the PDMs e.g. CSI, FCS and HDD show the need for thorough training of volunteers who collect data. It is recommended that KRCS consider longer periods of training to ensure volunteers grasp the concepts in data collection.

### **Recommendation 5: Improving market assessments and feasibility studies**

**Recommendations 5.1:** KRCS only conducted market assessments in Marsabit. It was clear there were areas that could have benefited from decisions emanating from a market assessment. It is recommended that KRCS should make it mandatory for market assessments to be undertaken prior to any cash distribution-taking place. This forms good and mandatory practice in cash transfer programming.

**Recommendation 5.2:** Beneficiaries that had to walk long distances to markets were disadvantaged. One option that KRCS could consider is that, within markets assessment, they should ensure to explore options of supporting mobile vendors who have capacity to supply goods to participate in Food and Non-Food items fares. This includes exploring propositions to community leaders to work closely with KRCS and the vendors to introduce an open markets days system that will benefit not only KRCS

beneficiaries but the wider community as well. In budgets, advertisement costs, including vendor support costs (transport and fares logistics) will have to be included.

**Recommendation 5.3:** While payments modality selection was informed by a Payments Mechanism assessment, there was no evidence on the ground that areas where beneficiaries had to walk long distances or incur high costs to access an MPESA agent, mobile network or market were considered in the implementation of mobile money cash delivery. In future, we recommend that KRCS' design including the assessments that lead to it should consider such aspects, which might negate an otherwise crucial response.

**Recommendation 5.4:** There is to formalise the arrangements of alternates there is need to formalise these arrangements through a written agreement that is signed by both parties. This would limit cases of alternates abusing the money or seeking favours for acting as the alternate.

### **Recommendation 6: Improving verification processes**

**Recommendation 6.1:** A small proportion of beneficiaries was disadvantaged with the challenge of IDs not matching registration details of the sim card, discovered at the time of transfer. While the numbers are small the potential to cause conflict are significant. This issue can be resolved during verification but there was inadequate time for this process. It is recommended that KRCS plan for between one month to one month and a half for the targeting and verification process, which will enable volunteers to do a thorough exercise of verifying beneficiary details.

### **Recommendation 7: Improving targeting processes**

**Recommendation 7.1:** The CBA was adapted to suit different contexts by CTP staff in the counties. However, the adaptations can carry with them risks that need to be managed. In this regard, KRCS should develop scenario planning to provide boundaries for modifications and system of approval for such modifications.

**Recommendations 7.2:** To dilute the influence of chiefs in selection of beneficiaries KRCS volunteers should be part of the village committee that undertakes the initial selection of beneficiaries as opposed to excluding the chiefs.

### **Recommendation 8: Improving complaints reporting, recording and response**

**Recommendation 8.1:** KRCS was the main mechanism for reporting complaints. However, beneficiaries their local leaders and volunteers because the operators at the call centre use Swahili which some do not speak or understand. It is therefore recommended that KRCS consider multi-lingual access at the call centre to enable more beneficiaries access the toll free line.

**Recommendation 8.2:** Beneficiaries were reporting complaints to village committee members and chiefs but these were not recorded systematically. KRCS should develop complaints registration form to be used by community leaders to record all complaints made to them.

### **Recommendation 9: Supporting achievement of outcome results**

**Recommendation 9.1:** The Transfer value of KSH3,000 is inadequate to influence large movements in outcome indicators of FCS, CSI and HDD. The KRCS is recommended to continue discussions on cash

transfer value with the government and in the Cash Coordination meetings. KRCS would do well to prepare an evidence based justification note for the need to increase the transfer value.

**Recommendation 9.2:** Cash transfers need to be supported with messaging to influence expenditure or consumption behaviour of households. The project had a plan for Marsabit but the strategy for implementing the messages was weak. It is recommended that KRCS develop communication messages and strategy for their delivery. This should be complimented with adequate training of volunteers.

**Recommendation 9.3:** Some beneficiaries were left indebted. The evaluation team suggests that KRCS should develop an exit strategy and communicate with all stakeholders about project timelines including when the assistance will terminate. This will ensure that the project is not creating tensions and conflict in the communities when it ends.

## 6 Annexes

### Annex 1: Terms of Reference



Terms of Reference  
Endline Evaluation f

### Annex 2: Evaluation Matrix



KRC\_Evaluation  
framework\_.xlsx

### Annex 3: List of Key Informants Interviewed



List of Key  
Informants.docx

### Annex 4: Tools

KII and FGD Tools	 Final Qualitative Tools .docx
MSC Story Guide	 Most Significant Change Guidelines_
Household Questionnaire	 KRCS HH Survey Questionnaire.docx
Online Survey Monkey Questionnaire	TBA

### Annex 5: List Recipients of the Online Questionnaire



Key\_Informants\_for  
\_CTP\_evaluation-7 cc