



FINAL EVALUATION OF IFRC/JRCS CASH PROGRAMME FOR SYRIAN REFUGES IN JORDAN

November 2017

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Contents

Acronyms	5
Executive Summary.....	6
Background	7
Evaluation Scope, Approach and Methodology	8
Scope.....	8
Approach.....	8
Methodology Employed.....	9
Findings by Evaluation Objective	10
Objective 1: Assess how effectively the learnings and recommendations from the first phase were implemented in Phase II	10
Risk Management	10
Community Engagement	14
Monitoring & Evaluation Systems.....	16
Programme Set-Up	18
Objective 2: Identify what were the main issues that have led to the current lack of funding and consequent programme closure, and provide recommendations to other programmes if similar issues are encountered.....	20
Events/Decisions Leading to Exit	20
Implementation of Exit Process	21
FGD/Home Visits follow-up with Beneficiaries Post-Project Closure	22
Objective 3: Identify the main success points of the programme that can be shared across other IFRC programmes.....	23
Lessons Learned Identified	23
Best Practices	25
Additional Evaluation Recommendations.....	26
Annex A: Terms of Reference – Final Evaluation of IFRC/JRCS Cash Programme for Syrian Refugees in Jordan	28
Annex B: CTP Jordan Evaluation Matrix.....	28
Annex C: CTP Programming Learning Follow-up from Phase 1	32

Annex D: Beirut Lesson Learned Workshop	32
Workshop Agenda.....	32
Workshop Notes	33
Operationalizing Lessons Learned – Jordan CTP Workshop	40
Annex E: Key Informant Interviews Conducted	44

Acronyms

BNWG - Basic Needs Working Group (a UNHCR coordinated working group in Jordan)

CCF - Common Cash Facility

CRM - Complaint Response Mechanism

CTP - Cash Transfer Programme

FGD - Focus Group Discussion

FSP - Financial Service Provider

ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross

IFRC - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

RCRCM - International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

JRCS - Jordan Red Crescent Society

KII - Key Information Interview

LoA – Letter of Agreement

MENA – Middle East and North Africa

PDM - Post-Distribution Monitoring

PMER - Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting

PNS - Partner National Society

PSS - Psycho-Social Support

RAIS - Refugee Assistance Information System

RCRCM - Red Cross Movement

SDR - Secondary Data Review

SOP - Standard Operating Procedure

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

VAF - Vulnerability Assessment Framework

Executive Summary

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Jordan (IFRC Jordan) and the Jordan Red Crescent Society (JRCS) secured funding and support for the implementation of Cash Transfer Programme (CTP) in August 2012 aimed at supporting Syrian refugees in Jordan. The overall programme objective was to support Syrian refugees in Jordan to meet their basic needs through unrestricted cash assistance. The first phase of the CTP ran from March 2013 to May 2014. The second phase of the CTP was initiated in October 2014 (following a retooling after an accountability incident reported in late 2013) and was eventually closed in July 2017. This followed an unsuccessful search for additional funding and at least two episodes of funding gaps within a 6-month timeframe to which PNSs responded—allowing the programme to close without risk of reputational damage to JRCS/IFRC and return the beneficiary caseload to United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

In general, during Phase II of programme implementation, the CTP programme solidly met stated objectives while maintaining a minimum standards approach in providing cash assistance to vulnerable populations in a protracted context. Additionally, JRCS profile was significantly raised amongst beneficiaries as a result of CTP Programme.

While, the programme excelled in a few prioritized areas - ultimately, it did not adequately adjust (despite being informed of these points in previous evaluation instruments) and embrace a more robust and comprehensive approach to risk management, strategic planning (including programmatic bridging and an exit strategy) and M&E investments in evidence-based programming, which might have assisted in avoiding the problems it encountered as well as prolonging the life of project and attracting more donor interest.

However, despite issues experienced with resourcing by the IFRC CTP programme, funding opportunities are still available in Jordan - although competition for these resources has increased. That being said, IFRC is well-placed to take advantage of these opportunities with a built-in comparative advantage should internal technical and management issues be addressed. IFRC Jordan needs to be much more agile, despite limited HR resources, in adopting programming approaches, robust M&E systems, management best practices and laying the foundation for donor cultivation and profiling opportunities. IFRC Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Regional Office needs to provide additional needed technical assistance to the country level and facilitate timely financial and management support, which will enable the country office's ability to quickly react to a changing donor landscape. IFRC Geneva plays an essential role in providing strategic direction and additional technical backstopping and guidance through the development of key tools, systems and standards for CTP. Should the organization be able to effectively mobilize these efforts, and the challenges in doing so will be significant, it will be effective at capitalizing limited resourcing opportunities in serving its humanitarian mandate - even given the protracted nature of the Syria Crisis.

Background

The IFRC Jordan Country Office and the JRCS secured funding and support for the implementation of CTP in August 2012 aimed at supporting Syrian refugees in Jordan. The overall programme objective was to support Syrian refugees in Jordan to meet their basic needs through unrestricted cash assistance. The first phase of the CTP ran from March 2013 to May 2014. The second phase of the CTP was initiated in October 2014 and closed in July 2017.

Phase I:

The CTP was integrated into the regional emergency appeal for Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq launched in August 2012. The CTP was initiated in March 2013 and jointly implemented in a partnership between JRCS, IFRC Jordan, and Swiss Red Cross. The CTP provided monthly basic needs cash assistance and one-time winterization assistance to a total caseload of 5,600 Syrian refugee households, approximately 28,000 people in Amman, Ajloun, Jerash and Madaba. The first phase of the CTP was closed in May 2014, followed by an extensive audit which informed the strengthening of risk management and control mechanisms designed to improve accountability.

Phase II:

The second phase was initiated in October 2014 through the launch of a targeted emergency appeal for Syrian refugee assistance in Jordan. This enabled the design and implementation of monthly basic needs and one-time winterization assistance CTP for Syrian refugees referred by UNHCR Jordan. There were changes in the caseloads in March 2015 and again in December 2015 which was the caseload until project closure.

Period	Households Served	# Individuals
October 2014-March 2015	1,893	9,465
April 2015-November 2015	1,339	6,695
December 2015-Project Closure (June 2017)	1,200	6,000

The multilateral supporting partners were British and Netherlands Red Cross societies together with European Commission of European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). During 2015, a total of 1,893 families (9,465 people) were supported with monthly cash assistance and winterization support. The emergency appeal was further extended to from January 2016 to June 2016, during which time approximately 1,200 families (6,000 persons) were supported with monthly cash and one-time winterization support. This phase was supported by American Red Cross, Australian Red Cross, British Red Cross, and Finnish Red Cross and Japanese Government funds.

Since July 2016 the monthly basic needs and one-time winterization cash assistance to the Syrian refugee families continued under the IFRC Jordan Country Office's operational plan—a different funding framework than the Emergency Appeal mechanism under which the programme had been previously operating. The total caseload of Syrian refugees receiving monthly assistance during this period was 1,066 families, and 1,341 received winterization assistance living in host communities of south and east Amman. The main supporters were British Red Cross, Danish Red Cross, Netherlands Red Cross and Swedish Red Cross.

However, due to a series of funding constraints¹ and changes in the funding landscape, IFRC Jordan/JRCS was not able to continue the monthly basic needs and one-time winterization assistance CTP for Syrian refugees. Following internal discussion and rapid resource mobilization forecast, it was evident that funds were no longer available for the programme as of June 2017. In April 2017, IFRC Jordan officially notified UNHCR Jordan that the IFRC support was coming to an end and started the discussions about handover of the caseload to UNHCR and planning the CTP beneficiary notification procedures with the last cash transfer occurring in June 2017 - thus maintaining a minimum standard two-month notification threshold for beneficiaries and avoiding any loss of reputational integrity which might otherwise arise from a sudden withdrawal.²

Evaluation Scope, Approach and Methodology

Scope

This is a final evaluation of the multi-year JRCS/IFRC Cash transfer programme in Jordan to identify how effectively the Phase I and ECHO evaluation lessons learned and recommendations have been implemented during Phase II. The focus of the evaluation is on both accountability and learning with the primary focus on documenting and sharing learning and recommendations that can be applied in future long terms cash programmes. The evaluation methodology is designed accordingly.

The evaluation has been commissioned by IFRC MENA and IFRC Jordan and it is being managed by a specially formed committee that includes some of the Cash Peer Working Group (CPWG)³ members including: IFRC Geneva, American Red Cross, British Red Cross, Netherlands Red Cross and Swedish Red Cross.

Approach

The evaluation is an independent and comprehensive review of the IFRC/JRCS CTP Programme with a specific focus on the response and adaptation of the project in response to events involving the discovery of integrity issues in 2013. Moreover, the evaluation seeks to capture and document lessons learned in order to add to the body of CTP experience within the Red Cross Movement—especially as it relates to long-term refugee programming response.

The evaluation employs both quantitative and qualitative methodology in its overall approach. To this end, documents from past evaluations/audits were utilized to determine if previous prescriptive measures and recommendations were adopted as planned and if so, to what extent were they incorporated into project operations. Sub-systems critical to the overall CTP integrity and functionality were reviewed and evaluated based on their adherence to developed SOPs. Furthermore, the evaluation compares the performance of the programme in accordance with the *Critical Path* guidelines and Minimum Standards for Reconciliation as included in the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRCM) Cash Toolbox. While it is understood that the RCRCM Toolbox standards were developed after the inception of the CTP programme, they form the 'gold standard' for CTP programming and are, therefore, an appropriate means to measure the level of adoption of cash-programming minimum standards by the project.

Additionally, focus group discussions (FGD), key informant interviews (KII) and workshop discussion groups have been employed to examine multi-dimensional aspects of the programme—particularly as it relates to questions surrounding beneficiary communication, the planning and

¹ Funding gaps had been identified on at least 2 previous occasions in 2016-17 but were eventually resolved through PNS support.

² Background excerpt taken from IFRC Document "Terms of Reference: Final Evaluation of IFRC/ JRCS Cash Programme for Syrian Refugees in Jordan"

³ Movement Cash Peer Working Group is a central point of discussion and engagement to define, coordinate, provide, advocate for and improve the quality of mainstreamed appropriate CTP in preparedness for response and emergency response within the RCRCM. The CPWG meets on a regular basis as peers to collaborate on encouraging and equipping the RCRCM to embrace and increase its institutional capacities in CTP.

implementation of the programme exit planning and “larger” strategies such as finding continuous funding streams for long-term programming which has both short and long-term implications for the positioning of IFRC and RCRCM partners within the donor landscape.

Methodology Employed

The following tools were employed in the final CTP programme evaluation:

Desk Review - comprehensive secondary data review (SDR) of key project documents was conducted prior to the field visit to familiarize with the successes and challenges of CTP programming efforts within the Jordanian context.

Programme Systems Check - employed a process-oriented, step-by-step review of key functions within the CTP as well as a quantitative analysis of the level of adherence to SOPs through random sampling to determine the level of adoption of key recommendations as provided by previous programme audit and evaluation documents (most notably the KPMG Audit following the occurrence of an accountability incident in 2013 and an ECHO Evaluation conducted in 2016). *A summary table of findings can be found in Annex C: CTP Programme Learning Follow-Up from Phase I of this document.*

Key Informant Interviews (KII) - employs a semi-structured interview framework of a qualitative nature. A series of guide questions have been developed, customized and cross-referenced to ensure that all evaluation questions are addressed with those groups that are most likely to add perspective to the discussion. In total, over 30 key informant interviews were conducted during the evaluation process which included a sampling of relevant IFRC, JRCS, PNS, UNHCR, ECHO and external INGO staff to give a representational perspective of cash programming experiences within the Jordan context. *A summary list of KIIs conducted is included in Annex E within this document.*

Focus Group Discussion (FGD) - employs qualitative methodology to explore the experiences of former participants of the IFRC/JRCS CTP programme particularly as they pertain to community engagement and the project exit. FGD guide questions will be reviewed in country for cultural appropriateness and translation prior to implementation. Due to time limitations, a total of two FGDs disaggregated by gender (one male-headed beneficiary household and one female-headed beneficiary household) were conducted which included a total of 17 former beneficiaries. *Please refer to the Focus Group Discussion Guide Questions section in the Evaluation Inception Report for further details on guide questions and target audiences.* Additionally, a small number of Home Visits were arranged to provide contextualization to the beneficiary perspective.

Workshop Discussion and Analysis - a one-day workshop was scheduled in Beirut (September 25, 2017) which served as both a reporting-out on initial findings/recommendations from the evaluation process as well as complemented further discussion and analysis by participants on incorporating lessons learned and commonalities from the CTP programme into current and future programming endeavors. *Please refer to Annex D for outputs from the Beirut Workshop which include an action plan for operationalizing lessons learned from the Jordan CTP Programme into ongoing MADAD programming.*

An evaluation matrix which includes all the guide questions and methodologies employed was developed for the final evaluation and can be referred to in the *Evaluation Inception Report* as well as in **Annex C: Evaluation Matrix** included within this report.

Finally, it should be noted that the CTP Jordan programme staff were especially knowledgeable about project procedures and actively embraced the learning aspect of the evaluation. This fact was especially significant given the rather broad scope of the evaluation which required examining the programme from multiple perspectives.

Findings by Evaluation Objective

The following is the summary of key findings and conclusions synthesizing all methodologies as outlined in the CTP Evaluation Matrix (*detailed in Annex B included in this report*) and outlined by Evaluation Objective below.

Objective 1: Assess how effectively the learnings and recommendations from the first phase were implemented in Phase II

Especially those around:

- Risk management, key mitigation controls and accountability system (to all internal and external stakeholders, including beneficiaries)
- Beneficiary communications and exit strategy and programme closure
- Monitoring and evaluation systems
- Programme set-up: different roles, segregation of responsibilities, relevance of staff CTP experience/competencies in CTP, access to technical support

Risk Management

This evaluation used two major guiding principles in conducting its analysis to determine the level that risk management is actively incorporated and employed by the CTP Programme:

RCRCM Cash Toolkit Document--M_4_5_5_1--Reconciliation Roadmap

- Reconciliation procedures should be designed to mitigate the risks associated with the particular activity and method of delivery, and catch and resolve errors in a timely manner. Different individuals should be responsible for the reconciliation process than are responsible for initiating, recording and authorizing the transactions or activity. Special attention should be given to who should be responsible for investigating and resolving discrepancies, taking into account appropriate separation of duties. Finance should support the design of the reconciliation system. *The reconciliation procedures should be documented so that anyone, including auditors and donors can easily understand the reconciliation practices and who was involved and responsible during each step.*

RCRCM Cash Toolkit Document M3_1_4_1 Roadmap for CTP risk analysis

- As risk analysis is *started and updated throughout the project cycle*, the reconciliation procedures should be developed and updated, if needed, to mitigate accountability, fraud and corruption risks, beneficiary registration risks, and capacity related risks.

Observations

IFRC invested heavily in the following key system improvements in Phase 2 as part of a comprehensive approach to improve risk management measures of the CTP Programme:

- Adoption of Iris Scan technology for verification—significantly reduced potential for mishandling of ATM by ensuring identity of beneficiaries
- UNHCR systems (RAIS database)—allows the efficient access to data to cross-verify select beneficiary information which allowed the CTP team to verify family data and therefore confirm requests for changes in family size (which impacted disbursement amounts) without the need for additional travel.
- Development of SOPs
 - Comprehensive and detailed - with date stamps to show revisions
 - Segregation of responsibilities were well-established and detailed and provide transparent division of roles/responsibilities and cross-verification of procedures amongst the various systems and sub-systems within CTP Programme processes.

- Development of IFRC/JRCS database
 - Password-protected, varying authorization levels each with individual-password and access only on the IFRC server (remote access was not allowed) which also serves as a back-up of all data
 - Beneficiary Confidentiality measures maintained within process (encrypted data files/files sent to bank with limited beneficiary info/separate data packs sent)
 - Creates and maintains beneficiary and payment records which are cross-verified
 - Allows for timely reconciliation of bank statements and confirms beneficiary withdrawal of funds
 - Allows for timely alterations in beneficiary status and the return of project funds from beneficiaries who were not accessing the cash transfer provided

These priorities were developed in a coordinated, transparent manner, in conjunction with JRCS and other partners and are well-documented.

Main Findings

- Core CTP systems which were developed by IFRC are stable and well-functioning and provide a higher preventative threshold than existed in Phase I (this is especially true of the adoption of appropriate technologies with database/iris scan) in addition to a significantly improved level of efficiency (utilization of the RAIS database to cross-verify beneficiary information is a significant time-saver), thereby reducing the need as well as the time/expense required for travel.
- Additionally, special consideration is given to procedures which involve direct contact with beneficiaries (two individuals required—one from JRCS and one from IFRC for any transaction) and segregation of procedures are maintained and documented. Changes in beneficiary status that affect eligibility require two levels of management authorization as well as several reviews and cross-verification.

However, there were a number of weak points noted during the evaluation process primarily in terms of the active availability/accessibility of risk management systems and its utilization and the transparent documentation of procedures implemented. Please also refer to the table in *Annex: CTP Programme Learning Follow-Up from Phase I* for a summary of the learnings taken up by IFRC in Phase II of programme operations and are incorporated into the findings and conclusions presented below.

- It was only assumed that a risk assessment was conducted during the initial planning phase of project development but this was not able to be located during the evaluation, so could not be verified. Furthermore, a reference to the commitment to update the risk assessment as per the KPMG management response could not be verified. This points to potentially two issues - if documents are not easy to locate, they are clearly not being utilized by the project from a management/learning perspective. Additionally, it is impossible to tell whether a comprehensive risk assessment was ever conducted for the programme and what factors were considered in the analysis - potentially, giving a false sense of security in areas where potential risk was not adequately considered. Risk is fluid and needs to be reviewed intermittently to capture changing threats to the project environment - this is especially true for CTP projects in general. To this end, a risk management matrix should be used as a living document which needs to be routinely reviewed and updated.
- Supplementary checklists and protocols were not developed to augment the SOPs which were developed by the programme. This can potentially allow for differing interpretations of systems and the potential deterioration of intended procedures as well as pose an additional level of difficulty in the traceability of preventative/detective measures implemented.
- Furthermore, there is a need for systemized back-up of key documentation/procedures followed in addition to available electronic files to ensure adequate transparency of procedures implemented; as during the evaluation, much time was spent searching emails and back-up documentation. Unfortunately, in the case of CTP Jordan, this opportunity will

not be possible for too long post-project closure as these details will subsequently be lost, if not addressed in the near future. In particular, intermediate documentation should be developed to preserve the complex processes implemented for the purpose of archival.

- In general, the segregation of responsibilities is well-systemized and included in SOPs—but it was difficult to prove that these SOPs were followed precisely when implementation occurred. Increased use of checklists would serve as a way of ensuring procedures were completed and followed in a transparent manner (especially important for the highly complex, multi-step procedures that occur in the project) as well as form a documented record of activities to aid in transparency and in overall detection. This is especially important in cases of high staff/delegate turnover/project closure, where it is easy to inadvertently lose system integrity. In this case, summary documents of the reconciliation efforts of a cash payment should be used to capture the multiple reconciliation efforts in a payment cycle and would also form an integral part of the programme documentation. This could take the form of guidance/mapping document to provide a graphic representation of procedures to aid overall system transparency as well as more systemized utilization of implementation checklists to ensure the verification of different steps and actors can be more easily traced.
- No internal random checks were initiated by IFRC as part an increased response to verify completion/adherence of routine procedures to provide enhanced 'detective' coverage. This was especially surprising given the programme's history with an accountability issue in 2013. A remedial period of enhanced and documented checks/reviews would have been an appropriate follow-up recommendation given prior events.
- In addition to being mentioned in the KPMG audit, the need for a risk management assessment was also noted in a June 2016 internal country audit. In an IFRC Jordan management reply note to the June 2016 internal audit⁴, it was noted as being addressed. However, there is no evidence of risk management systems in place despite searches by current IFRC Jordan staff for referenced documents.
- There was no evidence of additional specific indicators to capture the accountability activities of the CTP Programme included in the project log frame as was recommended by the KPMG audit in addition to being noted in the KPMG Management Response from IFRC (2015).
- Furthermore, it was not possible to verify that the specific detailed roles and responsibilities between IFRC and JRCS regarding programme accountability were established and included in the programme letter of agreement (LoA) as was recommended by the KPMG audit as well as noted in the KPMG Management Response from IFRC (2015).
- As recommended by the KPMG audit, in addition to being noted in KPMG Management Response from IFRC (2015), there is a small battery of accountability questions within the PDM questionnaire - but it does not refer specifically to potential fraud issues (although questions of a general accountability nature are included).

Conclusions

Much work has been accomplished by IFRC in implementing systems which have high 'preventative' thresholds. However, 'detective' systems were not equally focused on and documented - despite having been pointed out in previous evaluation and audit documents. Additionally, there seems to have been no additional detective (other than routine verification procedures already built into the process) monitoring of procedures (random checks) to routinely test the robustness of systems. Management tools (especially the risk assessment) which would help to highlight changing risk and develop appropriate counter measures are not actively utilized in ongoing operations. While the

⁴ Routine internal audits have been conducted by IFRC (following the KPMG audit of the CTP Programme in 2015) - but were general in nature and not specific to the CTP Programme (although aspects of the CTP were included as well).

preventative measures have been raised by IFRC substantially, all the above has the potential for gradual deterioration of systems which could possibly give opportunity to additional accountability issues - although at a much higher preventative threshold than which was the case in 2013.

Recommendations

- Risk Assessment/Risk Analysis is an essential in CTP projects and the process cannot be short-changed and should be in a formalized document to determine the extent of analysis of the overall context. Furthermore, a risk management matrix needs to be reviewed and updated on a routine basis and signed off by key decision makers of the operations including management, programme, finance and security in order to make this a true living document.
- A mapping of the CTP delivery process is also an effective tool to determine if there are any additional gaps in the system (a mapping exercise was conducted informally during this evaluation and a small gap was noted). Risk management systems need to be transparently built into procedures, and routinely utilized, to support both preventative and detective mitigation measures.
- Detective measures need to be built and supported into the CTP process just as much as preventative systems. Projects that experience a breach in accountability should revise the existing SOPs or develop specific protocols for reviewing/confirming that system changes have been made and that routine internal checks on preventative as well as enhanced detective measures are being implemented. This should be done in addition to documenting results and changes (including the rationale for changes) as the project evolves. Checklists should be utilized to ensure that complex procedures are completed as intended and are especially recommended in cases with high staff turnover to protect system integrity.
- In long-term/high-profile programmes, it is important to ensure that there is a review/monitoring workshop every 6 months and ensure all relevant documentation related to key implementation documentation and reports, changes in decision making at operational and managerial level and risk management are well documented. This would provide IFRC at the regional level with an opportunity for routine, technical systems check-up of country programmes to validate progress towards objectives as well as any needed technical guidance for ongoing operations. In collaboration with IFRC Geneva, there is also an opportunity to develop key documents that every CTP programme must maintain in order to establish a more robust minimum standards threshold.
- For CTP projects which experience a breach in accountability, it is recommended that a mandatory review “check-up” is scheduled approximately 6 months after remedial measures have been implemented to verify progress to date and to give additional technical guidance, if required. Results should be documented and signed off by key management and technical departments to ensure that they are available as part of project documentation.
- There needs to be an investment in improved programme documentation:
 - It is especially important to have checklists as an intermediary back-up to complex electronic-based procedures to verify that necessary step and cross-verifications have been performed.
 - Current SOPs are detailed but the development of an operational protocol would include supporting documentation to give a more detailed picture of implementation which would be especially useful as a handover tool. An Operational Cash Flow diagram mapping facilitates transparency of procedures for external audiences as well as helps to prevent unintentional deterioration of procedures/identify system gaps. It is further recommended that a set of minimum standards for CTP project documentation be developed and routinely updated to allow for greater oversight at the IFRC regional level to identify potential gaps and developing problem areas in country-level CTP programming. This is especially critical for high-profile or long-term operations.

- A comprehensive review/preparation of documentation and archival also need to be included part of the exit process to provide proper documentation of process implementation and verifications, in addition to the focus on programmatic beneficiary communication and handover tasks. It is further recommended for future programming this should be considered from the earliest stages of response design/implementation in order to document the rationale of decision-making, risks, etc. This will increase the understanding of why decisions were taken, increase accountability and enable adequate documentation is available for reviews, midterm, real time or other evaluations.

Community Engagement

Feedback Mechanism/Complaint Hotline

The feedback mechanism is the main means of contact between beneficiaries and the CTP Programme. It is also the main detective measure of the project and it includes a dedicated complaints hotline. In well-functioning projects, a formal feedback, complaint and response mechanism (CRM) provides safe, accessible and effective channels for individuals and communities to raise complaints, ask questions and give feedback, and for the organizations involved to respond.

Observations

- The hotline is operated from 10 am to 2 pm during working days and is accessible through a cell phone. There are 2 lines which can answer it. There is no voicemail which can record beneficiary messages - although this point was also mentioned by a previous evaluation of the project.
- All beneficiary inquiries are recorded into the Complaint Log along with time of each call (many beneficiaries have several calls) as well as the type of call and resolution of complaint. Summary statistics from the hotline are routinely compiled on a monthly basis and circulated to project managers for review and programme record-keeping. However, there is no longitudinal analysis in terms of changes in the number or types of cases generated.
- The beneficiary complaint mechanism is used to update the status of an individual (for example an addition of a family member which increases the distribution ration). Efforts to confirm information will first be attempted by electronic means (verification with RAIS database and phone interview) and only then was a home visit initiated. This is a significant improvement of efficiency in the reduction of the time and expense in trying to locate beneficiaries in order to verify rather basic eligibility information.
- While the hotline is the main form of project communication, there are a few informal pathways of project communication within the programme:
 - While the majority of beneficiaries contact the project primarily through the hotline, a specific number of them will come in person to the JRCS office at which point they are referred to the JRCS CTP Officer, who will attempt to address their issue. Additionally, this also occurs when a transfer of documents takes place between the programme and the beneficiary - with the most frequent application being the handover of ATM cards to beneficiaries who are unable, for medical reasons, to be included in the iris scan registration. In this case, two staff members (one IFRC and one JRCS) are always utilized to handover new ATM cards and the process acknowledged through the signatures of all involved in the transaction.⁵

⁵ Newly issued ATM and PIN codes from the FSP are always picked up by two CTP Jordan staff members (a JRCS and IFRC staff member with each individual receiving either PIN codes or ATMs) and kept in a secure lockbox (and documented) before transfer to beneficiaries

- Additionally, an informal referral system for beneficiaries was supported by JRCS to health, psycho-social support (PSS) services and other safety net resources (when the JRCS CTP Officer was aware of it). JRCS created their own log format to record these efforts.
- Volunteers conducting home visits and PDMs were another informal communication pathway - but information disseminated was highly dependent on the individual knowledge of the volunteer and/or the ability to follow-up with the CTP Beneficiary Support Officer.
- Additionally, when it was clear from a hotline call that a beneficiary was having technical difficulties with the iris scan technology, programme staff would either try to talk the beneficiary through the iris scan process or alternatively meet them at the ATM and assist/alert bank personnel to assist with the procedure.
- During FGDs which accompanied this evaluation, the hotline was positively noted by beneficiaries. It was further noted at the FGDs that several in attendance had accessed it and were generally satisfied with project communications. However, it was also mentioned that beneficiaries did not have an overall understanding of the project such as why they were selected and most importantly, how long the assistance would last.
- IEC materials were generally not used to complement beneficiary messaging and the project relied mostly on SMS messaging for its mass messaging efforts.
- During FGD sessions which accompanied this evaluation process, it was noted that JRCS profile had increased significantly as a result of programme activities. In particular, the JRCS was noted as being “more responsive and more helpful” than UNHCR.
- A set of detailed SOPs was developed to inform the hotline procedures as well as to define the roles/responsibilities regarding who responds to beneficiary feedback/complaints and questions.

Main Findings

- The beneficiary hotline provided a critical communications support mechanism in a project with few opportunities for direct contact. Intake data from the hotline is documented and systems involving the segregation of duties regarding beneficiary contact were respected. Reports are summarized and allow for a transparent review of the process by programme management.
- There is a need for more comprehensive messaging approach from the project in communication formats other than electronic ones to reinforce messaging and understanding by beneficiaries. This was previously noted in the 2016 ECHO evaluation of the CTP Programme.
- Informal means of beneficiary communication was also employed by the project in the form of visits to the JRCS office, referrals and direct communication with JRCS volunteers conducting PDMs and home visits; however, these systems needed to be systemized in order to be more effective. This was also previously noted in the 2016 ECHO evaluation of the CTP programme—but not implemented.

Conclusions

Beneficiary communication systems as implemented by IFRC were generally well-functioning and met minimum standards of implementation. However, while there seems to be recognition for the need for additional messaging/services by the programme, complementary programming add-ons in the form of referrals were significantly weaker. While this was noted by a previous evaluation in 2016, systems were not improved as a result. Significantly, this was a **missed opportunity** as IFRC efforts to formalize these mechanisms would have served it in good stead as the international donor community in Jordan is increasingly looking to integrated programming approaches, where

initial response activities become a portal which leads seamlessly to other safety net/transitional programming avenues and where the IFRC/JRCS have a strategic advantage.

Recommendations

- General project messaging on the aspects of the project should be developed and disseminated upon entry into the project. Develop complementary IEC materials for the project to support volunteers in giving referrals when in routine contact with beneficiaries and to maintain integrity of communications.
- Have at least one dedicated staff member with no other task than to answer hotlines and focus on providing beneficiary services. Staff with multiple responsibilities sometimes struggled with beneficiary response—particularly during times of peak communication (such as payment disbursements and programme closure).

Monitoring & Evaluation Systems

As per the Red Cross Movement Cash Toolkit, monitoring involves the collection and analysis of programme information on a routine basis in order to track progress against plans and check compliance with established standards. It helps identify trends and patterns, adapt strategies and inform decisions on project management⁶.

Observations

- There were two main monitoring instruments utilized in the CTP Programme—the home visit and PDM. The home visit was used to verify beneficiary eligibility upon entry in the programme or a change in status that would affect beneficiary eligibility (most usually an increase in family size). PDMs were chiefly utilized to verify receipt of cash, track beneficiary expenditures, note overall beneficiary satisfaction with the programme and contained a small battery of accountability questions which were developed by the BNWG (Basic Needs Working Group) to provide standardized measurement of indicators across the many partners implementing under the UNHCR umbrella. A set of detailed SOPs informs the process.
- In addition to routine monitoring provided through the PDMs, home visits were utilized to add beneficiaries that qualify for the project - but this occurred only rarely; so in effect, the home visit was only used to alter beneficiary information which could affect eligibility or an increase in family size which would result in an increased distribution ration. In almost all cases, home visits were initiated after there was a beneficiary request to review a case status which could result in an increase in the disbursement a beneficiary household receives. There is no evidence that monitoring results from programme were routinely analyzed and utilized to inform programmatic decisions or to justify beneficiary ‘graduation’ from Basic Needs to other more recovery/development oriented programming.
- PDMs by design are supposed to be completed every three months and target 25% of the beneficiary pool - theoretically, reaching every beneficiary on at least once yearly. However, PDMs were not completed on a consistent basis throughout the life of project—although this improved closer to project closure when standards in accordance with SOPs were re-established. Additionally, in several of the PDM reports, the number of PDMs conducted fell significantly below the target figure of 25%. FGDs were also part of the PDM process and were conducted on a routine basis - but there seems not to have been any specific decision rules for how many were to be conducted per cash distribution cycle. Once completed, PDM data would be consolidated into the UNHCR framework where they would

⁶ Red Cross Movement Cash Toolkit Document M5_0 Roadmap for monitoring and evaluation

be consolidated into programme results. In general, PDM reports reported out on data that was collected during the reporting period - but there is no evidence of long-term analysis over multiple periods to changes in changing or emerging trends.

- An informal log frame and activity timeline were developed for both the livelihood and cash programme components of operations in addition to a basic framework within the Emergency Appeal; however, there were no objective (impact) level indicators ever developed for the cash component—with all indicators being strictly activity (process) level. At a point later during the evaluation process, it was discovered that what was assumed to be the programme log frame was actually an informal planning tool rather than an official log frame for project and a log frame had in fact, never been developed for the CTP Programme.
- There are two main reports which are process outputs of the programme - the cash flow report which is distributed on a weekly basis and the monthly summary of beneficiary reports arising from the project feedback mechanism. There are no sections in either reporting format which directly provide statistics/indicators from an accountability perspective.
- UNHCR stated that most required information generated by the project was submitted on time but there were notable delays at times although this was mostly in the past (over one year ago). There was no opinion given about the quality of reporting provided.

Main Findings

- It is not surprising that the IFRC struggled with challenges surrounding the development of impact indicators for the CTP given the protracted nature of the crisis and the fact that other INGOs faced the same challenges. However, most organizations surveyed did eventually develop methodologies to either directly measure programme impact or developed proxy indicators which were effectively utilized. Similarly, a full project log frame for the CTP was never developed as the project transitioned from Emergency appeal to Country Operational Plan. In both cases, these were significant **missed opportunities** in establishing specific impact results from operations would have provided a rationale for the project theory and facilitated resourcing efforts.
- Home visits were rarely utilized as a mechanism due to the limited turnover of beneficiaries during implementation of the programme⁷. This was a **missed opportunity** which could have provided insightful information as part of a routine reassessment of beneficiaries to 1) demonstrate project impact and 2) provide more detailed information on beneficiary resources which would have informed a graduated phase out or removal from the beneficiary list in order to allow others on the waitlist to benefit from the limited programme resources. A routine reassessment of beneficiaries was a standard practice amongst other humanitarian organizations interviewed which were operating with the Basic Needs model in Jordan.
- Activity indicators and the reporting format were not adjusted (as outlined in the KPMG Audit Management Response Letter) to reflect the accountability activities of the project as well as to highlight any arising accountability issues in project reporting. This would have allowed risk management to be part of a more active awareness and planning by the programme.

Conclusions

While the CTP programme maintained a minimum standards approach to data collection and reporting, there were several missed opportunities noted above (which had also been identified by/pointed out to the programme in previous evaluations) which would have been good investments in best practices and innovative approaches to transition the CTP Programme from unrestricted Basic Needs programming into a platform for additional humanitarian services which would have

⁷ Reductions in the CTP Programme beneficiary numbers over the life of project (LOP) were funding-driven and not based on a needs-based 'graduation'.

significantly improved overall programmatic efficiency & effectiveness. Moreover, this would have been an important opportunity to increasingly align IFRC/JRCS programming capacity with that of the international donor community's interests in integrated programming approaches where initial basic needs response activities become a portal which leads seamlessly to other safety net/transitional programming avenues and is an area where the IFRC/RCRCM maintains a strategic advantage in terms of scalability.

Recommendations

- The programme should have invested in a yearly effort to re-qualify beneficiaries and create a more nuanced understanding of beneficiary pool resources which would have facilitated a more gradual phase out/bridging strategies. This gap was understood by some staff members interviewed within the programme team and there was an attempt made to develop this concept in 2017 - quite late in the programme cycle. However, these plans never fully materialized - primarily as the time needed to support critical resourcing efforts needs overtook other programmatic needs in addition to a lack of technical expertise in recognizing the need and developing the survey work.
- There is also a need to invest in monitoring and evaluation systems which document impact results/objective level indicators through a commitment to evidence-based programming. The CTP Programme could have used the VAF score format provided by UNHCR as part of beneficiaries' original eligibility status as a baseline score to develop proxy indicators to indirectly measure project impact (i.e. reduction of negative coping strategies). This could have been better achieved through being more fully aligned with UNHCR mechanisms (the VAF and CCF systems)⁸ which would have not only provided needed information to conduct the analysis - but would have made a well-received statement regarding the IFRC's full alignment with established UN humanitarian coordination mechanisms within Jordan.
- There was a **missed opportunity** during the transition from Emergency Appeal to country-level Operational Plan in which a fuller project design could have been achieved - complete with log frame and impact/objective indicators which would have captured the results the project was achieving. At the same time, this was also an opportunity to build risk management indicators more comprehensively into the project design as well as an opportunity to redesign the PDM reporting format to better reflect result analyses. In total, a commitment to these efforts, plus a complementary communications strategy to donors and PNS to explain the changes in formatting and transition plans, would have assisted in providing the type of result-based information that donors/back donors are looking for and would have facilitated the IFRC in its resourcing endeavors. Lastly, robust and timely management guidance on the part of IFRC management at the country level is especially needed, in and above the programmatic and technical advice from both the IFRC regional and country technical and programming teams, in order to ensure timely support for the development of these efforts as well as a smooth transition.

Programme Set-Up

During the course of the CTP Programme evaluation process, a set of "other contributing factors" (outside of the technical and programming spheres) were identified which impacted programme quality, innovation and the overall agility of both the IFRC country office to leverage resourcing opportunities, as well as the IFRC regional office ability to support those efforts. These issues were particularly challenging to effectively capture as they are primarily managerial in nature and had multiple, conflicting perspectives represented in the analysis.

- HR Issues/Team Work - this comment refers to several issues under the broader HR heading.

⁸ The CTP Jordan programme only had access to the UN RAIS database during implementation—other UN systems such as the VAF and CCF systems required additional agreements with UNHCR which were never developed.

- The programme had a high turnover of delegates during Phase II operations (approximately 6-7 were documented during the 2-year period) contributing to a lack of consistency in strategic direction and programming implementation quality.
 - Not all delegates involved in the CTP Programme were technically proficient in cash programming and this factor being mentioned in several evaluation interviews. A lack of cultural sensitivity/awareness in relations with the JRCS was additionally mentioned regarding some former delegates.
 - Personality conflict and a lack of team building was noted as a contributing factor at the IFRC country level which impacted programme implementation as well as technical support from the IFRC regional office.
 - Is IFRC at both the regional and country level able to act quickly and decisively when a programme encounters HR issues that negatively impact implementation quality such as poor delegate performance? When there are issues with performance, are these being adequately being captured from a technical perspective? Are they reflected in performance reviews? Is technical input included as a dimension of performance reviews?
- A lack of overall RCRCM coordination prevented the Movement from capitalizing on the significant combined programming CTP efforts in Jordan (second only to UNHCR in terms of overall cash beneficiary numbers) as well as to profile add-on/graduation from Basic Needs programming opportunities – a point which would resonate with donors who are looking to fund ‘seamless’ operations at scale in order to reduce administrative overhead. This comment also refers to a missed opportunity for greater efficiency of CTP operations where three RCRCM operations were being implemented by JRCS simultaneously - each with their own procedures and formats.
 - A need for improvement in providing timely information, results and communication to donors/back donors. This point was mentioned by more than one PNS who noted that some key partners were not aware of the latest developments of key project milestones while others had been informed resulting in unnecessary confusion.
 - A lack of Strategic Planning: was the CTP/IFRC team always putting out fires or anticipating/planning for shifts in programming/donor funding interests? The argument here being that investing in planning will decrease the number of ‘emergencies’ encountered and allow it to focus on programme improvements. This was further compounded by a situation within the CTP Programme of high turnover of programme delegates as well as weak handovers and delegate transition planning.
 - How the IFRC “packaged” the CTP programme impacted its ability to fundraise (i.e. by listing the CTP Programme as Shelter/Livelihoods programming instead of Basic Needs, it further complicated funding efforts). Also, a question was raised as to whether IFRC structures support fundraising for protracted crises—in this particular case, the designation of Emergency Appeal versus Country Operational Plan?
 - Turnaround times in the approval process—this comment refers to the inordinate amount of time needed to turn around routine decisions/information request within the IFRC at the regional level—thereby contributing to an overall lack of agility of the IFRC at the country level to quickly react and respond to opportunity.

Recommendations

- There should be increased focus on the proper vetting and the placement of technically-qualified and experienced cash delegates by IFRC HR - this is especially critical in cases with high-profile and/or long-term programming – such as the CTP Programme in Jordan.
- Additionally, there needs to be ongoing and routine technical interaction between the country and regional levels of IFRC in order that individuals other than country-level programme staff

have a comprehensive understanding of the technical needs and opportunities to help ensure that the programme seeks to develop industry-standard best practices in meeting its humanitarian mandate.

- Critically, when performance issues impact programme quality, IFRC country level management must be in a position to quickly identify, access additional technical resources as needed and remedy programme operations in order to prevent significant deterioration in service delivery to beneficiaries as well as to fully leverage the potential of programme development and resourcing opportunities.

Objective 2: Identify what were the main issues that have led to the current lack of funding and consequent programme closure, and provide recommendations to other programmes if similar issues are encountered.

Of interest, also the identification of key elements to recover and maintain donor and PNSs trust⁹. The planning of the exit strategy and closure of the programme.

Observations:

Events/Decisions Leading to Exit

This component was difficult to effectively capture as the intricacies of events immediately following the cessation of ECHO funding are quite complex with several conflicting perspectives represented. However, there seems to have been at least two emergency gaps in funding of the CTP Programme since the end of ECHO funding to which PNS responded. The first of which was approximately in June-Sept 2016 which was initiated by the closure of ECHO funding. PNS responded to the gap request effectively with contingent 'one-off' emergency funding and were frustrated when an additional funding gap later emerged shortly thereafter in Dec 2016-Jan 2017. A meeting was later held in Amman in February 2017 upon the urging of PNS where contingency planning was discussed and a comprehensive document outlining all the available options was disseminated to partners. Following the meeting, it was decided by JRCS, in consultation with IFRC, to exit the programme and to maintain a minimum standard 2-month notification period which was developed in full alignment with UNHCR technical input—perhaps having to spend in deficit to maintain operational integrity. Luckily, additional PNS contributions were confirmed during this time which allowed the IFRC to avoid that option—allowing it to close the programme without loss of operational and reputational integrity to JRCS and itself as well as to be reimbursed for previous operational deficits.

Despite a 'successful' programme closure, there are doubts about the ability of IFRC - both at the regional and country levels - to effectively forecast & communicate funding gaps leading to a situation where it appears they were completely caught off guard. This perception is further reinforced by events in January 2017 when a fully-funded delegate arrived for the start of a 6-month assignment, only to be informed during orientation that there are no operational funds with which to implement the project. It has been offered that part of the issue regarding the sudden nature of funding gap is how the IFRC considers pledged funds - and that many potential funding streams, such as concept papers submitted, were counted as soft pledges - while in reality, they were not secure funding commitments. There is also evidence where a PNS was included as having committed to a soft pledge to the CTP Programme - when in fact, this was not the case. Furthermore, it does not seem that the transition from Emergency Appeal to country operational plan was not fully appreciated at the time, it is important to note that IFRC at the country level did invest significant resources in developing concept papers and investigating alternative funding sources

⁹ Please Note: specific comments and advice to recover and maintain donor and PNS trust are addressed under Objective 3

over the period of June 2016-Jan 2017 - eventually leading up to the final decision to withdraw in February 2017. That being said, however, there are questions regarding the quality of those proposal development efforts as well as the appropriate targeting of donors. Additionally, it seems that there were shifts in donor interest and requirements that IFRC Jordan had not fully taken into consideration in the concept development - rendering the effort ultimately ineffective.

Inconsistent funding during this period also led to delays in cash distributions for beneficiaries. While these delays were communicated by the programme in advance of the expected disbursement dates, specifics were not given as to when exact distributions would occur causing some degree of inconvenience and concern for beneficiaries. Unfortunately, these delays coincided with the announcement of the German Red Cross of the closure of their programme - perhaps causing some beneficiaries to wonder whether they would indeed receive distributions and perhaps inadvertently signaling the end of the program.

Implementation of Exit Process

While there were delays in the eventual decision for programme closure, once a decision was taken to exit, the steps in the exit process were developed in full consultation/alignment with UNCHR recommendations and a set of detailed SOPs were developed outlining the multiple steps and timelines involved in the programme closure. However, this process would have been significantly streamlined with the development of a timely decision paper by IFRC management authorizing the decision for programme closure. Key focus areas of closure planning included formal communication with partners, UNHCR and a communication strategy for beneficiaries which included SMS messaging, the beneficiary hotline, specific volunteer PSS training and support with FAQ sheets. Informally, the programme did include (psycho-social support (PSS) and other health referrals to beneficiaries - when the CTP programme staff was aware of complementary services - but this was never systemized. In the end, a 2-month exit notification was achieved by IFRC/JRCS and supported by a substantial increase in hotline activity where the programme team answered beneficiary questions about the closure.

A formal exit strategy was never developed for the CTP Programme - although components of a transition/graduation strategy did exist with a livelihood focus as part of a bridging strategy which was conceptualized beginning in 2015 when the contextual environment in Jordan had shifted sufficiently to allow the possibility of livelihood programming options for Syrian refugees. Importantly, a comprehensive Livelihoods feasibility study was developed through PNS contribution in March 2016 and complemented with a substantial investment in a livelihood training workshop in November 2015 and a pilot project (also funded by the same PNS) implemented by IFRC Jordan from November 2016-June 2017 as a test component for wider livelihood programming conceptualized for Jordan in accordance with programming strategy recommendations detailed in the Livelihoods feasibility study. Additionally, a separate EU-funded programme which features a livelihood component (MADAD), which took 1.5 years to develop from concept phase to funding, was also envisioned as a partial component of the exit strategy for the CTP Programme, at least for a percentage of beneficiaries for whom such programming would be appropriate - but the timing of the close of the CTP Programme and the onset of activities of the MADAD did not align to allow for a seamless transition. However, (as of the writing of this evaluation report), the MADAD project in Jordan, as part of the beneficiary selection process, will conduct an assessment from an initial pool of former CTP beneficiaries to determine suitability for entry into the programme. It remains to be seen how the ongoing needs of those former CTP beneficiaries for whom the MADAD livelihoods component is not a viable option will be addressed.

It should also be noted that the German Red Cross exit experience, which focused on providing systematic PSS follow-up support to beneficiaries post-notification of the project closure, as well as a multi-month final disbursement payment as a planned component of its exit strategy planning, was positively cited by RCRCM counterparts as well as external organizations and can serve as a best practices example of a well-designed and implemented exit given a situation similar to one that the IFRC encountered.

FGD/Home Visits follow-up with Beneficiaries Post-Project Closure

As part of the evaluation exercise, two FGDs were conducted primarily for the purpose of informing the beneficiary experience as part of the exit process - (i.e. whether the exit messaging was clear, if beneficiaries knew how to access additional information if they needed it, whether UNHCR contacted them post-project closure, and most importantly what changes in coping strategies had taken place in the 2 months since project closure). A summary of key points from those sessions are noted below:

- All participants acknowledged having received the exit messaging through SMS and while all acknowledged that it was a shock, all participants reported that the information included was perfectly clear. While not all participants accessed the hotline, those that reported they had accessed it stated that it was helpful in resolving their informational questions.
- All participants reported having been contacted by UNHCR to arrange for reassessment-- and in all cases except one, these reassessments were conducted-- although most participant did not know the outcome of these sessions at the time that the evaluation FGD was conducted.
- Regarding coping strategies - there was a significant gender difference with women identifying specific financial worries that they were concerned about while men were more stoic and stated that they would somehow manage. It was also noted that there was also a re-emergence of negative coping strategies in two areas - shelter and education.
 - Shelter responses included having to move - most often to cheaper accommodations—but one beneficiary reported having to move to more expensive accommodations.
 - Reduction of transport for education, purchasing uniforms and partially pulling children out of school were the most frequent education responses mentioned.

Conclusions

The shift from Emergency Appeal to Country Operational Plan was underappreciated by IFRC as it had a substantial financial impact on the continued funding and longevity of the CTP Programme. With the benefit of hindsight, this should have triggered an automatic strategic management and operational review of the programme to include a programmatic redesign and communication strategy with key donors and stakeholders which may have assisted IFRC in its efforts to locate additional funding to prolong the programme. The failure to develop an exit strategy over the lifetime of the programme is indicative of a lack of routine strategic planning around the CTP Programme which also would have provided the IFRC with the tools to recognize and react to shifts in the donor landscape. There is some evidence of a transition/bridging strategy for the programme being developed for Jordan which included the livelihoods component of the MADAD programme but the timing of exit and start of implementation of the MADAD did not coincide to allow for seamless programming. Additionally, it is clear that the any plans for follow-on livelihood programming would only be appropriate for a small percentage of CTP beneficiaries and that further programming strategies would need to be developed to assist the majority of vulnerable beneficiaries for whom basic needs support was ending.

That being said, however (and despite delays), once the decision to exit the programme was made, it was implemented on schedule, at a minimum standards level, in full alignment with UNHCR recommendations and advice and avoided a potential risk of loss of reputation for JRCS and IFRC should they be forced to implement a rushed exit due to a lack of funding. At the end of the day, JRCS profile was significantly raised as a result of CTP Programme with beneficiaries in the evaluation FGD reporting to have not known anything about the organization previous to their participation in the programme or thinking that JRCS programmes were only for Jordanians. All involved reported that JRCS was much more responsive and helpful than other organizations they encountered in the process—most notably, UNHCR.

Recommendations

- The shift from Emergency Appeal to Country Operational Plan had a substantial financial impact on the funding stream of the CTP Programme. This should have triggered an automatic strategic management and operational review of the programme to include a programmatic redesign and communication strategy with key donors, PNS and stakeholder to elaborate on the transition. It is further recommended that future programming moving from an Emergency Appeal include a comprehensive transition strategy to address these and other critical management elements BEFORE such a transition is implemented.
- IFRC at both the regional and country levels must routinely verify resourcing forecasts every 3-6 months as part of routine strategic review of cash programming as well as to verify programming strategies are still relevant and make needed adjustments. Additionally, they should keep engaged and abreast of donors interest and changing strategic priorities on an ongoing basis in order to develop effective programming and proposals as well as review assumptions with contingency planning in light of funding forecasting.
- In future protracted crisis programming, seek to strategically develop Basic Needs into Portal Programming opportunities. Adopt gradual phase-out and transition/graduation strategies and referrals (exit planning) in the strategic planning process. Additionally, invest in innovative programming add-ons and profiling opportunities as part of a longer-term strategic development.
- In protracted crises situations, it is especially critical to stay ahead of programming arc as contextual situation is quite fluid and funding streams tend to be shorter. IFRC team needs to routinely review resource forecasts (on a quarterly basis) as well as the programmatic development to ensure it stays ahead of the natural arc of the programme lifespan as well as donor trends.
- There is a serious need to review how resourcing is considered as a hard/soft pledge in terms of programme resourcing and how that information is transmitted on a timely basis to PNS and how utilized. This is especially the case for CTP programming where beneficiaries are highly reliant on funds and disruptions have significant impact on beneficiaries. It is further recommended that a minimum funding level of 6 months of hard pledges be considered the threshold for programming continuation.
- Once a decision is taken for project closure, it should immediately be accompanied by a decision paper and signed off by operational management in order to delay any delays in the start of the implementation of exit activities.

Objective 3: Identify the main success points of the programme that can be shared across other IFRC programmes.

Also, learnings and best practices from the use of innovation and technology and FSP contracts in multi-year responses.

Lessons Learned Identified

The following are the main lessons learned identified during the Evaluation Process in response to the CTP Evaluation Objectives and presented at the Beirut CTP Jordan Lessons Learned Workshop on September 25, 2017. The key output from the workshop was a group discussion and exercise in operationalizing the lessons learned identified in the CTP Programme to ongoing operations in the MADAD Programme operations in Jordan. The resulting Action Plan, Workshop Agenda and Workshop notes make up *Annex C: Beirut Lessons Learned Workshop of this document*.

Risk Management/Reconciliation

- Risk Assessment/Risk Analysis is an especially essential component in CTP projects and the process cannot be short-changed and needs to be in a formalized document to determine the extent of analysis of the overall context. Risk management systems needs to be

reviewed, updated and utilized on an on-going basis, in order to support both preventative and detective mitigation measures, as well as to track and prepare for shifts in the risk environment.

- Investment in technologies and procedures that increase the preventative threshold (iris scan/segregation of responsibilities, improvements to database etc.) are important; however, this needs to be also balanced with supporting detective systems and procedures as well as routine monitoring and reviews of system adherence.
- Strict segregation of responsibilities is especially important for cash programming—and no single organization or staff member should be handling multiple roles that would allow for opportunities for fraud or compromise of the integrity of programming. This is especially critical for interactions with beneficiaries which need to be transparently implemented and verified in order to ensure accountability of system procedures.
- Accountability measures must be specifically built into systems such as monitoring and evaluation and visible in reporting so they can be identified and reacted to quickly in the event that accountability issues occur. Risk is ever evolving and needs to be actively integrated in operational management on an ongoing basis in order to provide credible detective measures to a shifting risk context.
- Given the high turnover of staff that the project encountered, it is especially important to invest in systems that maintain procedural integrity and allow ease of handover.

Community Engagement

- Current investments in beneficiary communications effectively provided critical interface with beneficiary populations from a programmatic/accountability perspective but there were missed opportunities (despite having been previously informed of this fact in other evaluations) in the form of referrals and other add-on programming opportunities (such as those detailed in the Jordan Livelihoods Feasibility Study) to further strengthen bridge strategies which are increasingly promoted by donors and could have assisted IFRC/JRCS to better position the programme with regards to resourcing opportunities.

PMER

- Part of the transition process from Emergency to Operational programming needs include the investment of a full project design process (including log frame, M&E systems and reporting) in order to effectively inform an evidence-based approach.
- Beneficiaries in protracted-crisis programming need to be periodically re-assessed (on at least an annual basis) in order to ensure continued compliance with beneficiary criteria as well as to inform graduation and other development-oriented bridging/transition strategies.

Utilization of an Exit Strategy

- By not actively formalizing an exit strategy, there were several missed opportunities which were identified that could have improved the CTP Programme closure process (as well as possibly extended the life of the programme). These include:
 - Invest in M&E functions or reassessments which could have justified a gradual phase out strategy which could have prolonged the amount of available funding for the project.
 - Improve beneficiary support during the exit notification to beneficiaries with systemized PSS support/development of personalized action plans for beneficiaries.
 - Develop robust portal programming opportunities (or graduation from basic needs to other appropriate programming options) or referrals for both livelihood (as per the Jordan Livelihood Feasibility Study) AND other safety net programming.

Resourcing

- Need to stay innovative with programming and significantly ahead of a 'minimum standards' approach in order to position IFRC ahead of shifts in the donor landscape. Identification of, and frequent interaction with, strategic donors and coordination forums needs to occur on a regular basis at the country level, in order to stay ahead of trends and shifts as well as to communicate timely information about funding opportunities with IFRC at the regional level in order to best leverage technical resources to emerging funding opportunities. Furthermore, strategic planning and review needs to occur on a routine basis within the programme cycle in order to avoid being overtaken by events - through anticipating programmatic developments and advancements - rather than reacting to them. A large component of this process is having a comprehensive exit/transition strategy along with contingency planning developed in advance of an imminent programme closure which will help anticipate and navigate through shifts/developments in the programming landscape.
- Using the core programme to seek innovative add-ons presents an opportunity to profile the organization - particularly in programming niches where other organizations do not have a comparative advantage. Also consider opportunities to work in consortium settings with other programming opportunities as a sub-recipient to establish a history with new strategic donors being cultivated. In particular, donors view IFRC as well-positioned to take advantage of portal programming opportunities.
- Programming results are there - but are they being captured effectively? This echoes previously made points regarding implementing industry standard M&E methodology and cultivating an evidence-based approach to IFRC programming. Once results are captured, a further question is whether the IFRC is effectively utilizing/communicating impact results with partners and donors?
- Need to communicate innovation and comparative advantages better to both donor and PNS. Seek high-profile opportunities to communicate innovations (e.g. Coordination working groups are an especially important opportunity to present ideas/operational research and improve profile as they are attended regularly by major donors).
- The shift from Emergency Appeal to Country Operational Plan should have also been complemented by a messaging strategy to key donors, partners and stakeholders in order to effectively communicate the need for such a transition and anticipate any questions arising from the transition.
- Consistent funding streams need to be forecast AND verified in advance in order to maintain programmatic integrity-- not to mention causing unnecessary hardships on beneficiaries due to payment delays. Reliable forecasting mechanisms need to be employed by IFRC in order to accurately anticipate funding and avoid funding gaps. This is especially critical for cash programming where inconsistent funding can have substantial ramifications for beneficiaries dependent upon timely disbursement payments.
- Finally, there is a need to ensure adequate human resources and technical competencies are in place within the IFRC country team in order to undertake high-profile cash programming such as the CTP Programme in the first place. While this recommendation does primarily refer to the position of the Cash Delegate's role within the country team, it also comes with the recognition of the need to also have supportive managerial leadership at the IFRC country-level in order that all aspects of cash programming are not the sole responsibility of the Cash Delegate/s.

Best Practices

- Investments in the project database are a best practice of the project and there is an **opportunity** for increased profile of IFRC on this point - especially within the Movement. It would be especially useful to attempt to quantify efficiency gains from the system investment - to the extent possible - which would also resonate with donors/back donors.

- Adoption of Iris Scan Registration systems and other technologies raised the threshold of preventative measures of the programme considerably; however, the introduction of new technologies needs to be countered with a human interface. This was successfully accomplished by the programme via the hotline as well as informal support provided by IFRC/JRCS staff and volunteers and Cairo Amman Bank staff.
- Alignment with UN systems provided more concise beneficiary registration information and independent verification systems of beneficiary welfare (through the VAF registration system) than would have been the case had the IFRC/JRCS operated independently. Access to the RAIS database served as an efficient tool for beneficiary verification purposes; however, there was a missed opportunity for further alignment with the UN system through the CCF (Common Cash Facility) and VAF which would have allowed the programme to collect data to inform impact results as well as to access an improved rate on funds transferred through the CCF¹⁰.

Additional Evaluation Recommendations

- In addition to the specific systemic recommendations which were provided in Objective 1 and 2 above, the following are key recommendations arising from the CTP Jordan Evaluation research which can be implemented in the short-medium term which will have substantial programmatic and impact for IFRC:
- An important recommendation is the need to follow up on lessons learned identified during the Beirut Workshop where an action plan was developed to operationalize lessons learned (included in Annex D of this document) and apply them to the Jordan component of the MADAD programme. The action plan should be reviewed and approved by IFRC regional and country management and follow-up scheduled to ensure adherence as soon as feasible.
- There is an important opportunity to follow-up on the changing conditions of beneficiaries of the former CTP Jordan by cooperating in a post-closure review in tandem with German RC. This process will help to inform both the UNHCR system as it adjusts to an expanded caseload as well as to identify/target potential safety-net programming opportunities for the RCRCM with a beneficiary population that has been supported for years and which has limited opportunities elsewhere.
- Beyond the CTP Jordan, there is a strong need for increased and routine programmatic, technical and management review and coordination between IFRC at the regional and country levels in order to facilitate the promotion of best practices within programme implementation as opposed to a minimum standards approach, as well as to quickly address HR and other issues that inhibit operational excellence. To this end, frequent and routine technical interaction between the regional technical level and country-level programming needs to be supported by ongoing IFRC management guidance and support at the country level, especially in high-profile programming, in order to achieve implementation excellence as well as to quickly troubleshoot and address problems when they arise. In addition, increased utilization of programme steering committees was one suggestion made at the Lessons Learned Workshop to ensure that an additional programmatic structure exists to improve overall agility in addressing HR and other issues which inhibit operational excellence.

Conclusions

¹⁰ It should be noted here that the IFRC states it probably would have entered the CCF should additional funding have been secured to prolong the programme but did not do so at the onset as IFRC-negotiated rates with the FSP were initially better and with the focus on locating resourcing for the continuation of the programme took precedence.

In general, during Phase 2 of programme implementation, the CTP Programme solidly met stated objectives maintaining a minimum standards approach in providing cash assistance to vulnerable populations in a protracted context.

The Programme excelled in a few prioritized areas and achieved increased efficiency and effectiveness in those chosen areas in doing so - but ultimately, did not adequately adjust (despite being informed of these points in previous evaluation instruments) and embrace a more robust and comprehensive approach to risk management, strategic planning (including an exit strategy) and M&E investments in evidence-based programming. Had it done so, the CTP Programme might have avoided the problems it encountered, as well as prolong the life of project, attract more donor interest, as well as achieve even greater improvements in programmatic efficiency and effectiveness in a wider spectrum of project activities.

Despite issues experienced with resourcing by the CTP, funding opportunities are still available in Jordan—although competition for these resources has significantly increased. That being said, IFRC/JRCS are well-placed to take advantage of these opportunities with a built-in comparative advantage should internal technical and management issues be addressed. IFRC Jordan needs to be much more agile, despite limited HR resources, in adopting programming approaches, robust M&E systems, management best practices and laying the foundation for donor cultivation and profiling opportunities, while IFRC MENA needs to provide additional needed technical assistance to the country level and facilitate timely financial and management support which will enable the country office's ability to quickly react to a changing donor landscape. Should the organization be able to effectively mobilize these efforts, and the challenges in doing so will be significant, it will be effective at capitalizing limited and competitive resourcing opportunities in serving its humanitarian mandate - even given the protracted nature of the Syrian Humanitarian Crisis.

Annex A: Terms of Reference – Final Evaluation of IFRC/JRCS Cash Programme for Syrian Refugees in Jordan

(Please refer to attached PDF file)

Annex B: CTP Jordan Evaluation Matrix

#	Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Approach	Guidance Document(s)	Relevant CTP Processes
Evaluation Criteria 3.1 - Effectiveness & Relevance				
3.1.1	<i>How effectively were the recommendations from Phase I implemented in Phase II?</i>	Checklist review of recommendations from guidance documents and systems developed and operationalized; Supplemented by KII of key programme staff	-KPMG Audit -ECHO Evaluation	-Set-Up & Implementation (including Beneficiary Communications/Ac countability) -Monitoring & Evaluation
	3.1.1.1 Did this result in a more effective and relevant programme?			
	3.1.1.2 What recommendations were not implemented and reasons?			
	3.1.1.3 What worked well and what did not during Phase II?			
3.1.2	<i>How successful were the risk management-mitigation measures and accountability systems implemented in Phase II?</i>	Audit randomized programme samples to determine level of adherence to SOPs and industry standards. Note level of discrepancies and outcomes of tests which deviate from SOPs	-RCRCM Cash Toolkit Critical Path Assessment -Workshop Discussion Agenda	-Set-Up & Implementation (with a focus on Reconciliation) -Monitoring & Evaluation
	3.1.2.1 What are the recommendations & learnings that can be applied to programmes facing similar issues?	Findings summary together with outputs from Worskhop discussions; Supplemented by KIIs to include donors, external INGOs, PNS, JRCS and key programme staff		
3.1.3	<i>What were the main issues that have led to the current lack of funding and consequent programme closure?</i>	KIIs to include key IFRC programme staff and JRCS (donors, external INGOs, PNS are included to provide a comparative perspective)	-Semi-structured KII interview question sets disaggregated by informant type	-All (with focus on Phase II operations)
	3.1.3.1 What recommendations can be provided to other programmes when similar issues are encountered?			

	3.1.3.2	Was there a clear resources mobilization plan in place that could adapt effectively to the changing context?			
	3.1.3.3	What are the key elements that enabled IFRC to recover and maintain donor and PNS trust?			
3.1.4	<i>How relevant and efficient was the use of technology to increase the timeliness, effectiveness and accountability of the programme?</i>				
	3.1.4.1	What are the main learnings from the use of the database and data management, ATM Cards, iris scan, etc.?	KIIs to include key IFRC programme staff and JRCS (donors, external INGOs, PNS and FSP are included to provide a comparative perspective); supplemented by feedback from Beneficiary Communication Records & Beneficiary Focus Groups	-Semi-structured KII interview question sets disaggregated by informant type	-All (with focus on Phase II operations)
	3.1.4.2	What are the best practices and recommendations for the future on innovation and technology based on the Jordan experience?			
	3.1.4.3	Including use of long-term contract to deliver multi-year cash transfer via the same service provider.			
Evaluation Criteria 3.2 - Efficiency					
3.2.1	<i>What were the main challenges around resource and staff allocation during Phase II?</i>		KIIs to include key IFRC programme staff and JRCS (donors, external INGOs, PNS & FSP are included to provide a comparative perspective)	-Semi-structured KII interview question sets disaggregated by informant type	-All (with focus on Phase II operations)
3.2.2	<i>What worked well in terms of staffing structure, staffing needs and resources, finance, logistics, HR, funding and resource mobilization, management support? What did not work well and why?</i>				
3.3.3	<i>Were the human resources adequate for the high-level needs and CTP expertise required to support the implementation of this programme?</i>				
	3.3.3.1	Did the cash staff have a strong knowledge of CTP and extensive CTP implementation			

		experience?			
	3.3.3.2	Was the remote cash technical support available and used efficiently, including support visits to the country when required?			
Evaluation Criteria 3.3 - Accountability					
3.3.1	<i>Assess the effectiveness of the beneficiary and community feedback mechanisms in place.</i>		Audit randomized programme samples of Complaint Response Mechanism (CRM) documentation to determine level of adherence to SOPs and industry standards. Note level of discrepancies and outcomes of tests which do not follow SOPs as well as level of supporting documentation.	-RCRCM Cash Toolkit Minimum Standards for Beneficiary Communication/ Accountability	-Set-Up & Implementation (including Beneficiary Communications/Accountability)
	3.3.3.1	What is the capacity of IFRC Jordan/JRCS to respond to the comments received?			
	3.3.3.2	Is there any evidence of feedback influencing decision-making?			
3.3.2	<i>How effectively were risk management and accountability improved from Phase I?</i>		Audit randomized risk management/accountability samples from Phase II and compare similar randomized samples from Phase I for comparative purposes (compare to findings taken during KPMG audit as pertinent) as well as supporting documentation.	-RCRCM Cash Toolkit Minimum Standards for Reconciliation	-Set-Up & Implementation (with a focus on Reconciliation)
	3.3.2.1	What worked well and what were the main challenges to accountability in Phase II? How were they addressed?			
	3.3.2.2	How were the accountability and M&E systems improved after Phase I? Was monitoring used to inform decision making or change the programme?			
	3.3.2.3	Was the programme able to deliver on donor reporting requirements in a timely and adequate manner	KIIs of donors and PNS; Review reporting submission records and donor feedback	-Donor agreements outlining reporting requirements and frequencies	-Set-Up & Implementation -Monitoring & Evaluation

3.3.3	What was the perception of different stakeholders (staff, community, donors, IFRC region/Geneva, RCRCM partners, FSP, etc.) about the accountability of the IFRC/JRCS programme? Did the perception change from Phase I to Phase II?	KIIs to include key IFRC programme staff, JRCS, donors, external INGOs, PNS & FSP	-Semi-structured KII interview question sets disaggregated by informant type	-All
Evaluation Criteria 3.4 - Lessons Learned				
3.4.1	What are the lessons learned and recommendations that can be used to improve the quality and transparency of similar programmes in the future?	Outputs from Workshop discussions; KIIs to include key IFRC programme staff, JRCS, donors, external INGOs, PNS & FSP; Beneficiary Focus Groups	-Semi-structured KII interview question sets disaggregated by informant type -Focus Group Guide -Workshop Discussion Agenda	-All
3.4.2	What are the lessons learned from the design and implementation of the exit strategy/programme closure?	Outputs from Workshop discussions; KIIs to include key IFRC programme staff, JRCS, donors, external INGOs, PNS & FSP; Beneficiary Focus Groups	-Semi-structured KII interview question sets disaggregated by informant type -Focus Group Guide -Workshop Discussion Agenda	-All
3.4.3	How did the IFRC Jordan/JRCS and the programme adapt to the changing humanitarian context in Jordan?			
3.4.3.1	What were the internal/external factors that affected implementation & project quality? How were they addressed and what are the main learnings from the experience?	KIIs to include key IFRC programme staff, JRCS, donors, external INGOs, PNS & FSP	-Semi-structured KII interview question sets disaggregated by informant type	-All

Annex C: CTP Programming Learning Follow-up from Phase 1

(Please refer to attached Excel file included in the report)

Annex D: Beirut Lesson Learned Workshop

Workshop Agenda

Time	Session	Lead
09:00-10:15	Part I. Jordan CTP Evaluation Findings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Methodologies Employed • Initial Findings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Risk Management ○ Other CTP Systems • Lessons Learned/Best Practices • Conclusions • Q &A 	Timothy Cummings
10:15 – 10:30	Coffee break	
10:30-12:30	Part II. Analysis, Discussion and Strategizing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Exit Strategy</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Exit experience of CTP programmes ○ Lessons Learned • <i>Resourcing Efforts at Field Level</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Lessons Learned <p>Discussion: Funding Challenges for CTP in Protracted Crises/Identifying Red Flags</p>	Timothy Cummings, Marga Ledo
12:30 – 13:30	Lunch Break	
13:45-15:15	Part III: Operationalizing Lessons Learned <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prioritization of Lessons Learned • What are the areas identified through this process that can be addressed at the Jordan Country level? MENA level? • How best to operationalize at the Jordan Country level? MENA level? <p>Activity: Developing a time-bound action plan</p>	Marga Ledo Timothy Cummings
15:15-15:30	Coffee break	
15:30-16:30	Part III: Operationalizing Lessons Learned (continued)	Marga Ledo Timothy Cummings
16:30 – 17:00	Part IV: Wrap-Up <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of discussion outputs • Review of Action Plan <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Schedule follow-up to action plan items • Next Steps 	Marga Ledo Timothy Cummings

Workshop Notes

25/9/2017
Yukta Kumar

NOTES FROM WORKSHOP – JORDAN CASH EVALUATION

- Introduction – Marga Ledo (Team Leader, Global Cash Transfer Programming, IFRC)
 - IFRC is collecting lessons learnt as part of global response
 - Agenda, ground rules and participatory approach of this workshop
 - RCRCM examples of CTP in refugee protracted crisis: Turkey (Turkish RC cash programme with WFP) and IFRC Greece (IFRC implementing partner of UNHCR)
 - Jordan: biggest programme for IFRC and multi-year in response to a protracted refugee crisis
 - Global initiative to identify critical learning and best practices to inform future improved quality and accountability IFRC CTP
 - Learning applied to Jordan/ MENA action plan
- Presentation on Evaluation/ lessons learnt by Tim Cummings (Consultant)
- Methodologies employed
 - FGDs to examine exit strategy experience
 - FGD – random selection – 16 people in each group
 - Review of phase 2 learning efforts
 - CiE toolkit – sets a standard
 - Limitations – broad task
- Risk management
 - Big overarching team is risk management – CiE toolkit – guidance
 - The CTP response identified and invested in certain components as part of the risk management – did it very well
 - Risk management as a whole was not actively programmed
 - Detailed risk assessment was never verified – responsive
 - Reliance on preventive measures but not complemented by increase in detective measures
 - SOPs – checklist
 - Intermediate documents to document reconciliation efforts
 - Specific indicators to capture accountability activities were not developed
 - A periodic check-up following a breach in accountability - review of measures (routine audits did occur but not specific to CTP)
 - Decrease/ softening of systems especially in the context of handovers
 - Risk management – always adapting
 - Q: Was there a risk management register
 - Systematic one – no but there were systems to address within programming
 - Comment: Risk assessment – it is done but lost. Need to recognise the importance and implement similar systems as in logs/ procurement. In toolkit risk register – even looks at funding opportunities. In general – very weak in risk assessment and management
 - Community engagement
 - Complaint and feedback mechanisms
 - Informal pathways of project communication
 - Need to be complemented by direct beneficiary strategies
 - Opportunity for more integrated programming
 - PMER
 - It is not surprising that CTP struggled with Impact indicators

- A full project log frame was never developed as the project transitioned from emergency to operational – missed opportunity
- Home visits were rarely utilised as a mechanism due to limited turnover of beneficiaries – could have provided insightful information to demonstrate project impact and provide more detailed information
- PDM reporting was data- driven—but little analysis
 - Q.: where was the clear transition from emergency to operational
 - There is a standard cut off and there needs to be a full review (emergency appeal to country plan)
 - Going from emergency to operational is not business as usual – need for a change in mind-set
 - Guidance needs to be developed especially in protracted crisis
 - Comment: Need for log frame and management decision
 - Q.: is there a decision paper on the move from emergency appeal to country plan?
 - Tim: did not see documentation on that
 - Comment from -: During the transition – it was grouped into a broader country plan/ results matrix
 - Tim: as a specific log frame for project – no, TOC for the project was not there and should be in place.
 - Comment: There was a referral system that ran for one year (2 case managers at the PSS) – needed to find a way to implement it better. Gap in communication between JRCS to IFRC in terms of hotline complaints and information back on response. JRCS more responsible for coordinating in the field after the incident. Good relationship with IFRC people but no official communication channels.
 - Comment: Bank issues tend to be solved within a day – few complicated cases.
 - Comment: One repetitive case that was an internal issue with the bank but no feedback on it
 - Comment: The human component was little lost
- Lessons learned
 - Learn from previous evaluations/ systems
 - Risk management/ assessment (audit)
 - Measurable indicators (audit)
 - Opportunities for CEA – systemizing (ECHO)
 - Risk analysis (ECHO)
 - Alignment with standards (ECHO)
 - Met minimum standards (CiE toolkit)
 - Reconciliation/ risk – didn't stand up well (CiE toolkit)
- Lessons learnt overview
 - Risk assessments/ reconciliation
 - Need to be head of the curve vs reacting and putting out the fires
 - Comment– without a risk assessment – no project should be signed off
 - Separating responsibility among different organizations
 - Handovers
 - Community engagement
 - Missed opportunities
 - PMER
 - Transition process with complementary M&E systems
 - Evidence based programming
 - Project to be reassesses to inform graduation and bridging/ transition strategies
 - Best practices
 - Project database
 - Efficiency savings – if they could be documented

- Bank partnership
 - Alignment with UN systems (RAIS, CCF, VAF)
 - Conclusion – met basic objectives but not adaptive
- Key global learning elements
 - Exit strategy – lessons for other future programme
 - Funding – funding challenges, new donor trends, 2018 – engage directly with FSP
 - Resourcing – how much resources were allocated, technical support, additional support mobilised – were they even requested.
 - Exit strategy
 - No comprehensive exit strategy
 - German RC exit approach was interesting – lump sum to beneficiaries over monthly
 - Q.– Exit strategy in early documents
 - Comment: In the early stages – 6-month support – 3 months and then reassessment 3 months – Swiss RC – 1 year, IFRC – 6 months
 - Comment – dependent on funding, unsure how long it would go for – extension of emergency appeal – need to start with exit strategy
 - Comment: day 1 – there was a discussion of exit strategy – only supposed to be emergency relief, unsure how to move forward when they realised needs were higher. During transition – discussions was around funding – reducing case load by transition to livelihoods, reduce to most vulnerable
 - Comment: reflecting on nature of continued engagement in protracted crisis
 - FGDs
 - Women were more concerned about coping
 - Shelter was a key area
 - Shifts in terms of education for children (transportation)
 - Profile of JRCS – increased significantly
 - Not formalising exit strategy, there was missed opportunities
 - Exit planning as part of on-going programme management
 - Support coordinated approach to exit (GRC/ICRC)
 - Comment: neither GRC nor IFRC were clean exits considering the longer term plan. ICRC – bigger challenge considering case load
 - Comment: different context in Jordan – lessons learnt – when it is visible that it will turn from emergency to operational, need to re-plan – cash assistance – becomes source of living. Communications is essential.
 - Resourcing
 - Need to stay innovative – in advance to minimum standards approach
 - Use core programme to seek innovative add-ons
 - Programming results are there – were they captured?
 - RCRCM comparative advantage
 - Forecast and verification - CTP high risk programme in terms of funding
 - Agility of RC structure
 - RCRCM coordination
 - HR
 - Comms with donors
 - Strategic planning – on going communication with donors
 - Do IFRC structures to support fundraising
 - Turnaround time for approval process
- ACTIVITY: Discussion based around guiding questions
 - Group A

- Q.1. a. IFRC system fit for protracted crisis
 - Emergency to operational – communication gap in terms of decision – need a dialogue with donors/ contingency planning
 - Existing systems were not utilised – real time evaluation was not implemented/ followed
 - Absence of meaningful communication – no documentation and no communication to stakeholders
 - Emergency appeal – easier funding tool but questioned over a few years
 - Discussion for the future – what makes a more or less attractive plan for donors – no clear objectives/ impact indicators
 - Clarifying purpose of programme and objective
 - Absence of accountability at various level (operational, country, MENA, global)
 - Are they systems for accountability and if they are – are they applied
- Q.1.b. Exit strategy alive and relevant
 - Need to have regular check ins and systems
- Q.2.a. Changing and highly competitive donor environment
 - No donor consultation at the point of transition from emergency operational
 - Need for regular check-in
 - No clear objective of the programme – cash is modality and not a programme in itself
 - Specific people need to be assigned to resource mobilisation – sit in someone portfolio – who is held accountable and responsible for oversight over resourcing situation
 - Funding driving the project – donors are very astute to it.
- Q. For PNS – why did you come back to support?
 - Comment: It was seen as a good programme and a moral obligation. Decisions and commitment made in September 2016 that won't happen again in terms of management. Not bailing out again – could have
 - Comment: Lack of understanding between – “we will request funds from back donors” and “soft pledges” – proposals vs soft pledges
 - Comment: 6-month funding plan needs to be in place
 - Comment: Does the system allow for planning based on “soft pledge”
 - 5 different stages – recommended that a hard pledge needs to be in place 3 to 6 months – then initiate exit strategy
 - Comment: What caught the system off guard that there was a move from emergency to operational – it affected back donors pledges to PNS. The PNS supported a back donor discussion
 - Comment: When it was flagged about funding for MENA – why was there was no response?
 - Lessons learnt: accountability measures need to be in place for red flags
- Group B
 - Q.2.b. Red flags – actionable indicators
 - Move from external donor funding to PNS funding (August 2016) – can we recover funding in the future and think of exit strategy
 - Why did we lose ECHO funding – lack of communication with external, larger donors
 - Change in ECHO funding agreement – European NS can lead and IFRC will not compete for ECHO funding
 - Relationship is owned at country level not Regional office level
 - Outlook in funding, forecasting etc:- owned at country level

- Need to engage even in technical level especially in coordination mechanisms – needed for positioning with donors
 - Being evaluated even when don't realise
 - Unless a pledge is a hard pledge – don't expect
 - Lack of long term funding strategy – short term planning – default
 - JRCS LOA – fund dependent and affects NS and long-time to process – short time contracts without continuity – huge pressure on NS especially in terms of implementation period and planning
 - Lessons learnt: Systems need to ensure timely processing – how to adapt – make it more agile
 - Need to recognise the funding requests of CTP
 - Sustainability – time bound
 - Develop long term strategy + donor support
 - Exit strategy developed + updated regularly
 - NS requirement
 - NS – consolidate systems – One NS plan
 - Demand accountability of systems
 - Need to re-program – changing strategy with related plan and budget (systematic strategic review)
 - Lessons learnt: CTP coordinated by NS and centralised
 - BRC working with LRC on a learning – funding streams coming into NS and mitigate some of the problem
 - Timelines/ double spending on loading
 - Federation – should take a coordination role (where possible and have resources)
 - Ensure Business continuity for NS
 - Integrated programming and funding streams
 - Q.3.a. Minimum requirement for CTP technical expertise
 - Technical expertise – IFRC/ NS
 - Right level of expertise
 - Engagement time frame (funding)
 - Performance and accountability
 - External technical support – funding / timeliness
 - NS cash preparedness – investment needed
 - Q.3.b. Ensure coordination potential is leveraged to effective programme management
 - Need for one system
 - ICRC
 - IFRC
 - German RC – Best practices – cloud system, CCF, good CEA, PMER, Bank relationships
 - Good network w/ cash working group partners
 - NS project (representation at coordination events) with stakeholders
 - Coordination – institutional mind set
 - Short sighted vision linked to funding needs
 - NS need to also know what they want/ prioritise – one OD plan
- OPERATIONALISATION OF LEARNING
 - Focus on risk management and resourcing
 - Group 1: Risk management
 - Group 2: Resourcing
 - First thing is to prioritise and then of them figure out which is actionable and put in the plan – either for country, MENA, GVA, good programming

- GROUP 2: RESOURCING
 - 3 interlinked priorities
 - 1. Impact results – need it to support the rest
 - 2. Quality Programming
 - 3. Forecasting
 - MADAD – natural recipient of CTP lessons learnt
 - Detailed log frame, action plan linked to budget (baseline has taken place)
 - Action to be taken at country level, reviewed by MENA, done within two months
 - Basic tools to manage programme
 - Quality control action point – agility
 - Quality review of skills/ capacity done at country level and checked by regional office
 - Technical support to ensure tools is utilised – 4-6 months
 - Project steering committee at country level/ coordination meeting – every 2 weeks – put in for MADAD project
 - Give oversight, consistently review, provide advise
 - Key instrument for stakeholders on way forward and ensure that it is going according to plan
 - Develop a quarterly strategic review
 - To be started by regional office and then handed over to country office (could link to steering committee)
- GROUP 1: RISK ANALYSIS
 - 1. Risk analysis
 - 1. Accountability
 - Management SOPs and tools are also necessary
 - Resource mobilization
 - Budget management
 - Resource management
 - Forecasting
 - Risk analysis
 - 2. Segregation of duties
 - 3. Procedural integrity – handover
 - All risks were tied and the main risk was that even if it is there – not to get complacent about
 - Create risk matrix/ assessment
 - Update regularly (every 3 months)
 - Accountability with Head of CO
 - Developed in collaboration with different functions
 - Lead responsibility sits with contracting partners (whether with NS or IFRC)
 - Country level
 - Immediate action
 - Request support in time if needed
 - MADAD project manager to start with it
 - Focus of risk assessment – programming, context, ‘do no harm’ risk assessment
 - Consultative process with internal and external stakeholders
 - Aims to inform risk programming
 - MADAD – natural entry point – interesting discussion
 - Agreement with country team – within 3 weeks and get together with stakeholders and review, and ensure it is a living document
 - NS does not feel consulted – important to get them involved at all levels
 - Accountability Matrix
 - Develop 360 accountability framework

- Accountability to beneficiary framework
- Clear levels of accountability – signed off and communicated between IFRC Jordan, JRCS, MENA office
 - Within next 3 months – by November
 - Accountability is with Head of CO and if needed, escalated to Regional Management
 - JRCS should be part of the risk assessment/ analysis
 - All reports to be shared with JRCS moving forward to ensure transparency and openness
 - Need for communication framework – also discussed as part of recent EMM
- Wrap up and moving forward in the region - Mads
 - Need to take these activities especially in terms of applying for MADAD
 - Put them into a matrix and assign names and responsibilities
 - Send it to MENA with clear request for supports
 - Ideally – finalise by end of next week to ensure it keeps going forward
 - Need to hold colleagues and ourselves accountable
 - Question of credibility in the EU system as a Movement
 - Show collective responsibility as we move forward
 - It is a local/ country level discussion to move forward especially in terms of the steering committee
 - Outcome is a very positive in terms of discussion moving forward
 - Thanks Timothy – work of good quality and we got much more than we bargained especially in terms of details and consultation. Gives the exercise strength.
 - Timothy – needs to be accountability at country level and agreement that they will take it on. Feedback loops – EU interested in it and see it as an investment.
- Moving forward – Marga
 - The draft report will be shared by mid-October and case study developed based on workshop
 - Based on learnings from cash – EU can see it implemented as part of MADAD
 - Appreciate the honest engagement and work in constructive manner – provide better service by working together and move forward.
 - Thanks from PNS on the constructive way it is moving forward
- MOVING FORWARD – Yukta, Marga, Timothy
 - Tim and Yukta need to put together a chart/ worksheet with key recommended actions and space for to assign responsibility/ accountability with recommended action plan and timeline. To be sent forward from Mads to Jordan office for with action by Thursday (28/9).
 - Mid- October – Draft report to be shared with 1 week for all inputs.
 - Case study to be shared by 23 October
 - Final report – End of October

Operationalizing Lessons Learned – Jordan CTP Workshop

Output from Group 1 – Operationalizing Lessons Learned on Risk Management

The group approached the exercise in that ensuring risk assessments of programmes and regular updates of them and accountability frameworks will support quality programming but also support planning and designing mitigation measures and timely decision making. The group decided the most practical way forward was to apply the lesson from the CTP to the MADAD project.

The Plan of Action ensure quality programming with appropriate mitigation measures and decision-making framework through 1) a comprehensive risk assessment with a timeline for regular updates, and 2) a 360-degree accountability framework that is shared broadly and utilized.

Output from Group 2—Operationalizing Lessons Learned on Resourcing

The group approached the exercise in that improving resourcing opportunities requires enabling and ensuring quality programming. The group also decided that the most practical way forward was to apply the lessons learned from the CTP Programme directly to the MADAD project.

The Plan of Action enables the development of quality programming by 1) Building a quality programming framework which will allow for the collection of impact results; 2) Implementing a Steering Committee which will help to ensure high-level oversight and management of the project on an ongoing basis; 3) The development of an exit strategy (in this case a graduation strategy) for beneficiaries that are aligned with donor interests and reviewed on an intermittent basis; 4) The development of a system for corrective measures if there are managerial/technical quality control issues within the project and 5) A Quarterly Oversight review mechanism to allow for a transparent review of programme progress.

Objective	Lessons Learned	Recommendations (What)	At What Level (Jordan, MENA)?	Movement Component (Shared Responsibility, Country/Region/Global)	Support Needed (Financial, Technical, Managerial)	Recommended Timeframe
Risk Management	Risk analysis is essential and should be a formalised document to determine extent of analysis of external context. Risk management systems needs to be utilised on an on-going basis in order to support to both preventative and detective measures.	<p>Conduct a thorough risk assessment and create a risk matrix for the MADAD programme.</p> <p>- Focus of risk assessment on following components:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Finance 2. Funding 3. Resourcing 4. Context 5. 'Do no harm' assessment (in terms of impact on beneficiaries) 6. Forecasting 	Jordan	Sits with Head of CO – review by MENA	Developed with support from all departments/functions	Within 3 weeks and to be updated every 3 months based on assessment and discussion
	Accountability measures needs to be specifically built into systems such as M&E and visible in reporting	Develop a 360-degree accountability framework	Jordan	Sits with MADAD project manager – review by MENA technical team	Support from all functions/departments	Within the next 3 months
	Accountability to beneficiaries framework for MADAD	Jordan	Sits with Head of CO	Technical delegates and beneficiary	Within the next 3 months	

					comms. officer	
		Clear roles and responsibilities and accountability – signed off by IFRC Jordan, JRCS, and IFRC MENA	Jordan	Sits with MADAD project manager	Support from JRCS and IFRC MENA technical	Within the next 3 months
		Reporting framework developed in collaboration with JRCS to ensure transparency	Jordan	Sits with Regional Office Management	Support from regional PMER and Resource Mobilization	Within next 3 months
		Communications framework developed among partners (part of EMM discussions)	MENA	Sits with Head of CO – review by MENA	Developed with support from all departments/functions	?
Resourcing	The need for ongoing/routine strategic and management review as well as to anticipate/plan for shifts in funding and in the donor landscape	Taking LL from CTP and apply to MADAD-Develop a detailed project log frame, action plan and tie to budget	Jordan	Developed at country level with Regional Review from MENA	Possible Financial, Technical, Managerial Support	2 months
		Develop a MADAD project steering committee with monthly coordination meetings to provide strategic and managerial oversight for the project	Jordan	Developed at country level with Regional Review from MENA	Possible Technical and Managerial Oversight	2 weeks to develop SOP and implement
		An immediate need of the MADAD steering committee is to develop an exit strategy for the	Jordan	Developed at country level with Regional Review from MENA	Possible Technical and Managerial Oversight	1 month to develop once steering committee is formed

		project which can be reviewed on an as needed basis				
		Review of staff Management Capacity and Skills to Ensure Programme Quality of MADAD project (as a corrective measure)	Jordan	Sits with Jordan Country Head with Supervisory Check by Regional Director	Managerial Oversight	4-6 Months Overall* 3 month of probationary performance; 1 month to review; 2 months to implement performance improvement plans, if needed
		Develop independent Quarterly Review Process for MADAD	MENA	Shared Responsibility- - information from programme results, reporting and Steering Committee minutes are reviewed at MENA level for routine verification of progress versus objective and managerial/strategic review	Managerial Oversight and feedback to programme	Immediate Decision to Implement; 1 month to develop SOP and implement

Annex E: Key Informant Interviews Conducted

Organization	Role	Name
UNHCR	CBI Lead/ Chair of BNWG	Elizabeth Barnhart
ICRC Jordan	Head of ECOSEC -	Aslan Bzhikhatlov
ECHO	Jordan Programme Coordinator	Matteo Paoltroni
Cairo Amman Bank	Card Products and Payment Services Supervisor	Rawan Habahbeh
	Account Manager	Dojanah Jaafreh
JRCS	Head of Health and CTP Lead	Mamdouh Al Hadid
JRCS	Head of Disaster Management	Rad Al Hadid
IFRC Jordan	Head of Country Office	Muftah Etwilb
	Previous Head of Country Office	Mohammed Babiker
	Previous Country Programme Coordinator	Christopher George
	Senior Finance Manager	Khaled Abu Assaf
	Beneficiary Communication Officer	Sawsan Abu Rassa
	IT/Database Officer	Zeinab Baniata
	Livelihoods Delegate	Hilary Motsiri
	IFRC Livelihoods delegate – Syria (previous CTP delegate in Jordan)	Yolanda Davila
	IFRC CTP Delegate in Jordan (January to July 2017)	Marshal Mukuvare
	IFRC CTP delegate in Jordan (2015-2016)	Mariano Gomez
IFRC MENA	MENA Regional Cash and Livelihoods Delegate	Yukta Kumar
	Previous MENA Regional Cash and Livelihoods Delegate	Azim Noorani
	Head of Finance and Administration	Zamira Muca
	PMER Officer	Nadine Haddad
	Partnerships and Resource Mobilization Coordinator	Sami Fakhouri
IFRC Geneva	Cash Lead	Marga Ledo
German RC	Head of Region	Astrid Nissen
British RC	Syria Crisis Programme Coordinator	Hosam Faysal
Swedish RC	Syria Crisis Programme Coordinator	Tania Kisserli
American RC	Manager-Cash Transfer Programming	Wendy Brightman
Danish RC	Head of Region-MENA Zone	Charlie Higgins
Danish RC	Regional Grant Coordinator-MADAD	Ilaria Ravai
ACF	FSL Head of Department - Jordan	Lara Colace
CARE	Project Manager	Noor Snobar
	Deputy Program Director-Urban Protection	Mohammad Al Awamreh
ACTED	Project Development Manager-Jordan	Marion Mouton

The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

Humanity The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.

Impartiality It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

Neutrality In order to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

Independence The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.

Voluntary service It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

Unity There can be only one Red Cross or Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

Universality The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
Global Cash Transfer Programming

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